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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Probably no events in recent years have captured more attention than the revolu­
tionary changes besetting the communist world during the 1980s. Contrary to the pre­
diction a quarter century ago by Brzezinski and Huntington ( 1964) that no forces from 
within—neither socio-economic complexity nor technological modernity—would lead 
to the emergence of a pluralist society behind the "Iron Curtain," the 1980s witnessed 
massive political and economic reform efforts in the communist world. Although un­
even, these reforms have begun to reshape— and will ultimately transform— the 
social structures of communist societies. 
This is a study of one such reform. Specifically, the study focuses on the reform 
of the state industrial sector in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and on the 
emerging institutional pattern of its industrial organization. In the PRC, as in other 
communist countries, state-owned industrial enterprises (hereafter, state enterprise), 
after rapid socialist industrial expansion beginning in 1949, encompass a full range 
of production and constitute the mainstay of the national economy, (for a detailed 
description, see Walder, 1984). By the year 1987, this sector included 97,000 enter­
prises employing over 40 million workers and producing 70 percent of the gross value 
of industrial output (State Statistical Bureau, 1988a: 301-313). Despite of its rapid 
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expansion the state enterprise in the PRC shares with its communist counterparts 
a host of structural weaknesses: chronic shortages, stagnant productivity growth, 
structural imbalance, slow technological innovation, and inefficient use of resources 
(Kornai, 1980a; Perkins, 1986). 
Recognition of critical dysfunction prodded leadership in the PRC to modify 
the principles and procedures governing economic activities at both the macro- and 
the micro-levels. To invigorate the economy, a resolution was adopted by the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 to decentralize decision 
making and to place greater reliance on the market mechanism. In accordance with 
this reform idea, various policies have been implemented since 1978 to reform the state 
industrial sector. These policies were initially effected on an experimental basis and 
were gradually expanded nationwide after 1984 (Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, 1984). 
The crux of the reform was to to modify the rules and procedures governing 
the economic activities of participating individuals and organizations. It involved a 
redefinition of boundaries in that it attempted to establish a new relation between 
state and economic enterprises. It also involved the introduction of a limited market 
mechanism, in place of state planning, to regulate economic activities, rather than to 
insulate them from market forces. The general thrust has been towards the controlled 
delegation of power to economic enterprises by allowing a certain degree of freedom 
in the pursuit of economic objectives. Through these changes, it was expected that, 
by limiting arbitrary state interventions, the reform would make state enterprises 
relatively independent financially and thus responsible for their own losses and profits. 
It was envisioned that the reform would link reward to enterprise performance and 
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thus provide incentives for state enterprises to improve efficiency. 
Statement of the Problem 
In view of the importance of the reform, questions arise as to what extent it has 
been implemented and as to what changes it has brought about in state enterprises. 
The ten years of reform have provoked a wide range of reactions, and scholars are 
divided on their assessments of the outcomes of the reform. To some observers, the 
reform has been a great success in breaking down the rigid economic structure and 
in revitalizing the economy (Chen, Wang, and Colleagues, 1988; Hua, Zhang, and 
Luo, 1988). Zhao (1987:30), for instance, concluded that "significant achievements 
have been scored in the reform of China's economic structure, which has instilled 
new vitality into socialism." The same reform, however, has been viewed as a failure 
by others (Johnson, 1988; Wong, 1986). In assessing industrial reform in the PRC, 
Johnson (1988: S241) argued that in the state industrial sector, "either little reform 
has occurred or, when there have been significant reforms, most reforms have misfired 
because the reform was incomplete and the results that occurred had serious negative 
consequences." 
The divergent assessments of the reform give rise to some important questions. 
First, how has the reform process evolved since 1978, when it was initially introduced? 
Second, what progress has it achieved, and what difficulties has it encountered during 
the process? Third, what continuities and discontinuities has it involved? A detailed 
examination of the process of the reform and an objective assessment of its relative 
successes and failures is not only necessary to answer these questions but is also 
important inasmuch as it will add to our understanding of momentous social change 
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occasioned by the reform. 
It has long been recognized by theorists that organizations are embedded in 
institutional environments within which they operate (Granovatter, 1985). Environ­
ment has a profound influence on organizations (PfefFer and Salancik, 1978). Such 
recognitions have been, however, largely based on the observations of organizations 
and of their institutional environments in Western societies (Scott, 1987; Per row, 
1986; PfefFer and Salancik, 1978). The question of how the institutional environment 
exerts influence on organizations in socialist societies has not been systematically 
studied (Carroll, Goldstein, and Gyenes, 1988). To what extent can the principle be 
validated by evidence from socialist societies? What represents the major variation 
of this principle, and what modification is needed if the principle is to be applied to 
studies of socialist countries? 
In contrast to the market economy, in which market conditions and horizon­
tal interorganizational relations constitute the environments of industrial firms, in a 
socialist economy, the state and its relations with organizations form the basic insti­
tutional environment within which organized activities take place. Many functions 
performed by the market in a market economy are performed by the state in a socialist 
economy. The socialist state, an important part of the organizational environment, 
has been pivotal in shaping organizations' behaviors. 
Theory of state (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985; Hamilton and Big-
gart, 1988s) suggests that the state plays an important role in national development 
and that state building is a crucial element of national modernization. Reforms in 
socialist societies generally, however, take the form of state withdrawal from certain 
areas of the economy (Nee, 1989). Thus, further questions arise as to how changes 
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in the state's role will affect the behavior of organizations. How does change in the 
state-organization relation affect the activities of organizations? And, importantly, 
how will the absence of change in certain aspects of this relation impede change in 
the organization of socialist economies? 
One of the most remarkable features of industrial reform in the PRC has been 
an attempt to change the rules and procedures governing the economic activities 
of industrial organizations in the state sector. Specifically, reform efforts have been 
directed to modification of the rules and principles governing the relation between the 
state and industrial economic enterprises. According to the institutional perspective 
(North, 1981; Nee and Su, 1990), social change is a process of changing the rules and 
principles governing social and economic activities. But how do socialist institutions 
change? And how are the activities of organizations affected by institutional changes 
in socialist societies? 
Another question to be addressed is whether the reforms in socialist societies have 
resulted in the emergence of a new institutional pattern distinct from the old one. If 
so, what are the similarities and the differences between the old and new pattern? 
Kornai (1987,1989) describes the resulting institutional pattern in Hungary under its 
reform as a mode of dual dependence characterized by a persistence of paternalism 
and continued soft budget constraints. To what extent are Kornai's observations 
valid in the PRC's setting? Are the features recognized in the institutional pattern 
of Hungary also recognizable in the PRC's emerging institutional pattern? 
If the institutional environment in a socialist economy plays a similar role in 
shaping economic organizational behavior as observed in market economies, what in­
strument can be effectively used to ascertain such institutional effects? Developments 
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in empirical methodology have not kept pace with the rapid development of new in­
stitutional perspectives in social sciences (Williamson, 1985; March and Olsen, 1989; 
Moe, 1984; Stark and Nee, 1989). The major difficulty causing the slow development 
of methodologies has been the issue of multilevel units of analysis. Thus, a final 
question this study poses is whether an institutional effect can be effectively assessed 
through a statistical means or, specifically, how the issue of multilevel information 
can be used in a statistical analysis. 
Objectives of the Study 
The major concern of this study is the changes and continuities of the institu­
tions governing the economic activities of industrial organizations in the PRC. It is 
not, however, a study on industrial economics in the PRC, for it does not attempt to 
analyze the production of goods and services, monetary systems, or economic trans­
actions. Nor is this a study on the Chinese political economy, because it does not 
attempt to analyze the politics of economic reform, such as how different interests 
have affected the trajectory of reform. Rather, this study will examine the system of 
socially defined relationships underlying economic processes and behavioral regular­
ities. As Smelser (1963: 33) pointed out, the major concern of economic sociology is 
to examine the social relationships within "concrete economic units" and "between 
economic units and their social environment." In this study, I attempt to accomplish 
the analysis in the second setting—that is, the social relationships between economic 
units and their institutional environment. 
Instead of performing any formal economic analysis, this study will focus on 
the mechanism underlying the economic production and exchange, the relationships 
tying the economic units and their environment, and the institutional arrangements 
shaping the behaviors in production and transaction. In short, this study is inter­
ested in the social nature of economic activities. Underlying this research focus is 
a sociological assertion that production and transaction cannot be performed in an 
isolated relationship between producers and their production activities, or between a 
seller and a buyer. What happens to the organization in the course of producing or 
transacting is determined, to a great extent, by a larger setting within which these ac­
tivities take place. That setting, be it a capitalist or a socialist society, is institution. 
Therefore, production and its relation to organization cannot be understood without 
reference to the institutionalized sysems in which organizations operate. Understand­
ing institutional arrangement and the way they govern is the key to discovering the 
behavioral regularity of organizations and the way in which organizations relate to 
others. Here lies the answers to the questions about what the reform in the PRC has 
achieved, what it failed, and how further reform should proceed. 
In his discussion of economic action and social structure, Granovetter (1985:504) 
criticized the tendency of sociologists to refrain from the "serious study of any sub­
ject already claimed by neoclassical economists." By elaborating on how economic 
behavior is embedded in social structure, Granovetter (1985) demonstrated the way 
sociology could contribute to understanding of economic behavior. Therefore, a ques­
tion should be posed as to what can sociology contribute to an understanding of 
economic reforms in socialist societies. In turn, another question can also be asked 
as to how can the economic reform can inform the study of sociology. 
By using an institutional approach, the current study takes as its point of de­
parture the assertion that economic organizations are inescapably bound to their 
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institutional environments and tangled in a web of authority relations that constrain 
their behaviors. To change the behavior of an organization, one must change the 
context of the behavior—that is, the institutions governing that behavior. Thus, by 
viewing reform in socialist societies as a process of institutional change modifying the 
rules and principles governing economic activities, this study pays special attention 
to the process of institutional changes resulting from industrial reform in the PRC. 
In order to understand the social nature of economic activities, the study will 
examine the relations between enterprises and the state in the PRC. This relationship 
is important because the state in a socialist economy plays a decisive role in shaping 
the behavior of enterprises, and because the state itself constitues the most important 
element of the social environment of economic units. Because the major thrust of the 
reform has been directed towards changing the state-enterprise relation, the emphasis 
of this study will be, specifically, on changes and continuities of state-enterprise 
relations. The rationale underlying this emphasis is the argument that economic 
activities of industrial organizations in the PRC cannot be fully understood without 
a detailed analysis of the role of the state and of the ways in which the state is related 
to economic organizations. 
Because the sweeping reforms in socialist countries are new phenomena, the issue 
of how to approach the reform with an appropriate theoretical framework will be the 
major concern of the second chapter. Through a systematic review of the major 
comparative studies of communism, this study argues that an emerging institutional 
perspective, with its potential to accommodate the role of the state and its emphasis 
on changes in rules and procedures, provides an appropriate theoretical framework 
to study reforms in socialist countries. In line with the institutional perspective, this 
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study maintains that Kornai's (1987) theory of dual dependence is an appropriate 
theory for studying the changes and continuities in the state's role and in the emerging 
institutional pattern under the reform. 
How institutions change will be the focus of the third chapter, in which the 
changes and continuities in the rules governing state-enterprise relations will be de­
scribed and the major stages of the reform process discussed. By way of a detailed 
examination of ten years of reform as evidenced by documentary data, this study 
argues that although there have occurred gradual expansions of enterprise autonomy 
since the reform, these events have been accompanied by serious unanticipated con­
sequences. As can be seen in the progress of and in the difRcuties encountered by 
the reform process, the piecemeal nature of reform is the major factor impeding its 
success. 
The characteristics of state-enterprise relations will be studied in the fourth 
chapter, in which the difficulties of reform will be examined in light of Kornai's 
concepts of paternalism and soft-budget constraint. These concepts will be elaborated 
upon, and hypotheses regarding them will be developed and partially tested against 
empirical data. Based on this analysis, the persistence of these phenomena will be 
discussed in relation to Kornai's theoretical framework of dual dependence. 
The fifth chapter will focus on a statistical analysis of industrial enterprise data. 
By proposing a multilevel model by which to assess institutional effects, the structural 
effects of the distorted price system on the continued failure of enterprise to link 
reward to performance will be demonstrated. It will be argued that decentralization 
of power to the state enterprises should be coordinated with the reform of the state-
imposed price structure because reforms in these two areas are highly interrelated 
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and because the price structure constitutes a major external environment in which 
economic organizations operate. 
In the sixth chapter, the major theoretical and empirical findings will be sum­
marized, and their sociological importance will be highlighted. Ths final chapter will 
conclude with a discussion of the research limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Overview 
This chapter will focus on the general theoretical framework used in this study. 
Three major components constitute this framework: an institutional perspective, an 
emphasis on the role of the state, and Kornai's concept of dual dependence. 
First, this chapter will review the body of literature on the comparative study 
of communism associated with the PRC. It will be argued that three dominant 
perspectives-totalitarianism, modernization, and Marxism-are not appropriate to 
the study of current reforms in socialist societies. Instead, the emerging institutional 
perspective, with its potential to accommodate the concept of state and with the 
emphasis on institutional change, provides a useful theoretical framework in which to 
understand these reforms. Institutionis defined according to March and Olsen (1989) 
as sets of rules and routines through which activities of participants are structured. 
Likewise, institutional reform is defined as the process of change in principles and 
in procedural rules that define actions of and interactions among participants. Thus 
defined, the institutional perspective permits the study of issues such as the extent 
to which rules and procedures have been changed under reforms, and the extent to 
which participants' activities have been affected by changes or by the lack of change 
in the institution. 
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Second, the scant attention paid to the role of the state in Western organiza­
tional theory will be criticized, and the important role played by the state in socialist 
societies will be discussed. By highlighting the importance of the role of the state, the 
second section will discuss the rationale for incorporating the concept of state into 
the institutional perspective. To accomplish this, state is defined as an authoritative 
part of the institutional framework of society. It consists of a set of authoritative 
institutions and procedural rules that, taken together, constitute a vital aspect of 
the structural environment within which organizations operate and interact. Incor­
porating the concept of state into the general theoretical framework allows attention 
to be focused on the evolving relations between state and economic enterprises, a 
relation of central importance to the PRC's industrial reform. 
Third, in keeping with the institutional perspective and the emphasis on state, 
Kornai's concept of dual dependence will constitute part of the theoretical framework. 
Dual dependence, according to Kornai (1987), is a mode of institutional governance 
in which, state-owned enterprises are vertically dependent upon the state and, at 
the same time, horizontally dependent upon market. Dissimilar to both hierarchical 
mode, which is characterized by state economic control and central planning, and to 
market mode, which is characterized by private ownership and free-market transac­
tions, the dual dependence represents an emerging mode of institutional governance 
in socialist economies under reforms. It will be argued that applying Kornai's (1987) 
dual dependence concept to the Chinese setting provides an opportunity to observe 
problems generic to the reform of socialist economies. 
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Institutional Perspective 
Rhetoric of paradigmatic confrontation and succession has been commonplace 
in every area of scientific inquiry. Not unlike their counterparts in other scientific 
disciplines, social scientists today adhere to a variety of perspectives. Researchers 
into the study of socialist societies are no exception to this rule. Over the past four 
decades or so, three perspectives have dominanted this field: totalitarianism, mod­
ernization, and Marxism (and neo-Marxism). For example, as Whyte, Vogel, and 
Parish (1977: 180) claimed in their review of sociological studies of China, "modern­
ization theory, totalitarianism, and Marxism (with Chinese modifications) all have 
[had] some influence" on this field. 
The studies of comparative communism, like those of other social science fields, 
have revolved around the question of how social order is possible. Developed to 
explain the rapid consolidation of social order after the overthrow of old regimes, 
the theory of totalitarianism gained preeminence before the 1960s. According to 
this theory (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956), the strengthening of social order in the 
societies involved was accomplished through a pessimistic asymmetry: power was 
concentrated in the state at the macro-level, mass was atomized at the micro-level. 
It was argued by this theory (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956) that, through this 
asymmetry, the new regimes created conditions that helped ensure elimination and 
containment of challenges from lower levels. 
In sharp contrast to industrial capitalist societies, in which procedural democracy 
balances social interests, and the market mechanism regulates exchanges, communist 
societies, according to the totalitarianism school (Friedrich, 1954), were characterized 
by a single mass party armed with communist ideology and relying upon political 
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terror, which devastated the boundary between public and private and between state 
and economy, thus penetrating into every realm of economic and social life (Brzezin-
ski, 1956; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956; Wolfe, 1956). Under totalitarian regimes, 
the entire economic process was directed to the launching, execution, and supervision 
of centralized state planning. The state, through centralized planning and political 
mobilization, stretched its control of a nation's economy to an extent never before 
experienced in human history. 
This asymmetrical image depicted by totalitarianism was pessimistic. As long 
as a monopolistic party-state maintains its total control over the allocation of so­
cial rewards and punishment, the totalitarianism school argued, this system could 
endure the challenges of technological modernization, industrial specialization, and 
bureaucratization without significantly altering its core Leninist institution (Brzezin­
ski and Huntington, 1964). As Stark and Nee (1989:4) pointed out, "the possibility 
that existing socialisms might evolve or be transformed was precluded by a theory 
that portrayed an atomized citizenry, a frozen society, and an immutable state." 
The static imagery of socialist society was expressed no more conspicuously than 
in the discussion of the future development of communist societies by Friedrich and 
Brzezinski (1956: 294-303) in their study of totalitarianism. 
Researchers into socialist sociétés who were guided by the school of totalitarian­
ism rightly grasped the role of the state as the key to their comparative studies. But 
they were misguided in their reduction of socialist society to one of total state control 
and total societal submissiveness. Rather than identifying the complex institutional 
processes by which social relations were constantly being developed, the approach 
drew a static picture of a totalitarian party-state with a captive society, a picture 
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that excluded the likelihood of these societies' evolution. 
In direct contrast to the totalitarian school of socialist studies, Marxist social 
science in the East vigorously defended the pervasive state through a brand of prole­
tarian dictatorship. Based on the theories of class conflict and permanent revolution, 
the Marxist school believed that the only way to do away with evils of capitalism was 
by means of the proletarian dictatorship expressed by the pervasive state acquiescing 
to all possible means of proletarian domination. The nationalization of industry, the 
Marxist social scientists argued, would eliminate the anarchical tendency inherent 
in the market economy. Similarly, state monopoly through a transfer of means of 
production from private to public ownership and centralized state planning through 
a hierarchical system would do away with class exploitation via state redistribution. 
Consequently, the public ownership represented by state monopoly would serve as an 
effective means of emancipating the productive force from the fetters of the capitalist 
mode of production. 
Even when there was evidence that continued social stratification and ineffi­
ciency resulted from central planning, Marxist social scientists generally ascribed 
these effects to bureaucratic distortion of the proletarian state or to the remnants of 
capitalism or even of feudalism (Zhao, 1987). Using such familiar paired concepts as 
productive forces versus relations of production, and economic infrastructure versus 
ideological superstructure, the Marxists portrayed an image of a marketless social­
ist society as an equitable and vital force that would ultimately demonstrate the 
superiority of socialism over capitalism. 
Nevertheless, Marxist paradigm was as ill-equipped to explain how socialist soci­
eties operated as it was to explain what was happening in the capitalist world. Except 
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in terms of ideological justifications, the Marxist concept of the mode of production 
could not help explain the patterns of institutional regularity. As Nove (1983:20) 
concluded, "there is no Marxist political economy of socialism." Based on Utopian 
assumptions of abundance rather than on serious considerations of scarcity, "Marxist 
economics," Nove (1983:59) argued, "is either irrelevant, or misleading, in respect 
to the problems that must be faced by any socialist economy which could exist." 
Marxism, as a dominant paradigm in socialist countries, shared with its totalitarian 
counterparts an ideological tenor and is thus also quilty of same reductionism. 
Partly as a result of dissatisfaction with the static view of totalitarianism and 
partly as a result of the observations of the trend towards bureaucratization and 
routinization in Russia after large-scale industrialization, writers have shifted their 
emphasis since the late 1960s to the observed changes in socialist societies (John­
son, 1970). The paradigm that has emerged in the west is modernization theory. 
Modernization theorists, unlike their totalitarianism predecessors who focused on 
ideology, attached explanatory primacy to technology and modern values (Stark and 
Nee, 1989). Based upon the historical experience of industrialization in the West, the 
modernization theorists questioned the static view of totalitarianism. They argued 
that technological needs and the requirements of bureaucratization were in direct 
conflict with totalitarian dictatorship. The inherent contradiction between industri­
alization and totalitarian control would give rise to changes in these societies (Lewis, 
1969). 
Both communist and capitalist states, the modernization theorists argued, are 
obliged to adapt to the exigencies of the modern period, with its increasingly sophisti­
cated industrial production and pattern of modern life (Walder, 1979). By extending 
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the logic of industrialism (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers, 1960) observed in tech­
nologically advanced capitalist societies to the development of communist societies, 
the modernization theorists believed that there were certain inherent characteristics 
such as rationalization, differentiation, and bureaucratization that delineate the de­
velopmental trajectory beyond conscious social intervention (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, 
and Myers, 1960; Lewis, 1969; Lowenthal, 1970). 
As a result of this paradigmatic shift, the schematic questions changed from 
how totalitarian ideology and control prohibited socialist society from change to 
how changes were determined in socialist societies, and what direction of change the 
societies would follow. Taking constancy of change in the societies as a given, scholars 
in this area began to ask questions such as how changes in socialist societies were 
determined by the peculiar characteristics of the societies or by the processes intrinsic 
to large-scale industrial production (Walder, 1979). 
In part because of an awareness of the distinctively Chinese traditional social 
structure, and in part because of the PRC's renounced split from the Soviet revi­
sionists and determination to forge a Maoist approach to development, studies of the 
PRC under the modernization paradigm focused on the convergence thesis. Thus, 
attention was directed to extent to which the Soviet-style social structure was altered 
and transformed as introduced into China, whether it was possible to retain certain 
characteristics of the Soviet model while rejecting others, and whether the PRC's 
approach to economic organization was an alternative both to the Soviet and to the 
capitalist model (Whyte, Vogel, and Parish, 1977). 
Accepting the premise that Maoist approach to industrial organization was in­
deed distinct from both the Soviet and the capitalist model, the argument advanced 
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by convergence theorists was the invariant process of modernization. Theorists 
(Lewis, 1969; Lowenthal, 1970) denounced the PRC's attempt as inherently infeasi-
ble and elaborated on the detrimental effects of the approach. The deviant Chinese 
mode, according to this view, was doomed to counter-productivity and failure be­
cause the inherent character of technology and the requirements of modern methods 
of economic organization demanded increasing differentiation and large-scale organi­
zation. 
But the divergence theory was upheld by others (Andors, 1977; Hoffmann, 1974). 
Accepting the thesis that there was a distinctive Chinese road to development, di­
vergence theorists viewed the strategies employed by the PRC as not only realistic 
but also effective means of directing large-scale development. Here was a participa­
tory management aimed at eliminating human alienation (Andors, 1977; Hoffmann, 
1974). Here was a self-reliance strategy that was realistic in its desire to avoid being 
engulfed in the capitalist system (Bettelheim, 1974). Here was an anti-bureaucracy 
innovation directly challenging the logic of industrialism (Gurley, 1971). To those 
who favored particularity in contrast to generality, the PRC was a solid example of 
a development model that was a feasible alternative both to the Soviet-style and to 
capitalist model of development (Bettelheim, 1974; Gurley, 1971). 
Both sides of the debate concerning the modernization paradigm have their mer­
its as well as their shortcomings. Difficulties encountered by the PRC's development 
strategy in the 1970s proved its infeasibility, as the convergence theorists had argued. 
In addition, by this time it had become clear that the Maoist approach to economic 
organization was not something really distinctive but only a variant of the Soviet-
style centralized command economy (Waldr, 1986; Riskin, 1987; Whyte, 1989). The 
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Maoist approach shared with its East European counterparts the same host of prob­
lems; overcentralized management, irrational factor allocation, slow technological 
progress, and poor labor motivation, which are the classical symptoms predicted by 
the convergence theory (Lardy, 1983; Nove, 1983; Riskin, 1987). The convergence 
school, however, can be faulted for oversimplification in extending the process of 
modernization observed in the West to its Eastern counterpart and for insensitivity 
to complex institutional arrangements. Not unlike the Marxist persuasion of mode of 
production, according to which economic base dictates choice of institutional super­
structure, the convergence theorists (Lowenthal, 1970) argued that technology and 
large-scale production dictates that a socialist society adopt an institutional structure 
consistent with that of the functions and values of technologically advanced capitalist 
society. 
The divergence thesis of attending to the particular did, in fact, breed some 
fruitful results and sensitized scholars to cultural diversity and distinctive institu­
tional patterns. The earlier applause for the uniqueness and feasibility of Chinese 
approaches, however, was based largely upon fragmentary information and upon gov­
ernment media report (Whyte, Vbgel, Parish, 1977). Research increasingly showed 
that the earlier impressions bore very little resemblance to organizational realities 
(Walder, 1989). For example, a host of literature on China's participative manage­
ment practice was proved false by Walder's (1986) later, systematic investigation. 
In addition, the divergence thesis can also be cited for its tendency to project an 
idealized view of socio-political and economic processes onto the study of socialist 
societies. 
Clearly, no single paradigm reviewed above can be said to have come to grips 
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with many perplexing and complex problems calling for insight and analysis. More­
over, current changes in the communist world and widespread reform efforts have 
rendered these paradigms irrelevant for the most part (Walder, 1989). For example, 
the Chinese reformers' attempts to approach their work within the Marxist framework 
by arguing that the PRC was in the "primary stage of socialism" (Zhao, 1987; 9-18) 
was itself a conceptual manipulation aimed at providing accommodation for other 
theories. On the other hand, neoclassical economics as a major branch of modern­
ization theory was increasingly plagued by its lack of applicability due to free-market 
assumptions and institutional insensitivity. It has become clear that neither total­
itarianism, Marxism, nor modernization was a useful research paradigm for which 
many scholars were searching. It is increasingly evident, however, that the emerging 
theoretical framework known as the "new institutional perspective" provides a point 
of view from which contemporary socialist societies can be studied, analyzed, and 
understood fruitfully. 
The new institutional perspective emerged recently from a general dissatisfac­
tion with an inability of existing paradigms to explain the operation, change, and 
transformation of social systems. Developed mainly by an economist (Williamson, 
1985) and designed to facilitate study of the transition to hierarchical governance 
in capitalist societies, this perspective gained popularity in sociology (Granovatter, 
1985; Zald, 1987; Stark, 1986; Nee, 1989; Nee and Su, 1990; Stark and Nee, 1989) 
and political science (March and Olsen, 1989; Moe, 1984). Institution is defined by 
this perspective as sets of formal or informal rules and procedures that set constraints 
on actions of, and interactions among, participants, be they individuals, groups, or 
organizations (March and Olsen, 1989). The basic tenet of the perspective, in sharp 
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contrast to that of the neoclassical formulation, is the assertion that the variety of 
behaviors and performances of participants are, by and large, profoundly influenced 
by institutional arrangements. In analyzing economic action, new institutional theo­
rists maintain that institutional arrangement influences transaction costs (i.e., costs 
over and above production costs) and thereby determines the structure of incentives, 
which shapes the behavior of participants as well as the form of organizations (Nee 
and Su, 1990; Williamson, 1985). 
The institutional perspective's emphasis on transitions undergone by organiza­
tional forms and institutional patterns is particularly suited to understanding the 
development pattern of the socialist system and its recent reform. The institutional 
changes in the PRC from 1949 to 1978, for example, can be viewed as an institutional 
change that replaced the rules and procedures of the market economy with those of 
a command economy. It took place mainly in the area of redistribution of property 
through state nationalization of wealth and creation of state and collective organi­
zations. These massive institutional changes eliminated the market and replaced it 
with a hierarchy allocating resources and regulating transactions, a hierarchy that 
subsequently sealed state enterprises from market forces. By the same token, the 
recent economic reforms can be understood as a process of modiflcation and refor­
mulation of governing rules and procedures in response to the perceived failure of 
the centralized command economy. From the institutional perspective, the economic 
reforms in the PRC since 1978 can be viewed as an effort to replace the rules and 
procedures of centralized state bureaucratic planning with the rules and procedures 
governing the marketplace. From this angle, then, the emphasis of the study can 
be to what extent the rules and procedures have been replaced, and what new in­
22 
stitutional pattern has been introduced by the reforms. Similarly, attention can be 
directed to how changes in rules and principles have affected economic activities of 
individual economic organizations. 
Several advantages of the new institutional perspective over the existing paradigms 
can be observed. First, the institutional approach broke with previous frameworks 
in its accommodation of changes and evolutions. Unlike the neoclassical formulation, 
which assumes a static equilibrium (Langlois, 1986; Nelson, 1986), the institutional 
perspective studies change as a process of institutional evolution (Schotter,1986). In 
contrast to the totalitarianism school, which depicts an immutable state and a frozen 
society, the institutional perspective draws attention to institutional characteristics 
facilitating or impeding change. Developed to explain the transition between orga­
nizational forms, the institutional perspective is particularly suited to studying the 
changes and reforms recently taking place in communist societies. 
Second, unlike the existing paradigms analyzing socialist societies in terms of 
the West (see Stark and Nee, 1989 for a criticism of this method), the institu­
tional perspective avoids bias by paying strict attention to distinctive institutional 
arrangements in communist societies and by identifying specific institutional pro­
cesses through which institutional structure is reproduced. In addition, studies con­
ducted by some social scientists from socialist societies, particularly those of Kornai 
(1980a;1987;1989), have played an important part in the development of the institu­
tional perspective, of Kornai (1980a; 1987; 1989). Kornai's work has in fact reversed 
the traditional trend of conceptual borrowing from the West by the East (Stark and 
Nee, 1989). 
Third, the institutional perspective allows interpénétration between analyses of 
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economic organizations and social institutions, thereby combining the strengths of 
sociology, political science, and economics. Unlike neoclassical economics, which de­
picts an economic man striving to maximize utility, unfettered by socio-political in­
stitutional constraints, the institutional perspective recognizes the complex interplay 
between socio-political institutions and economic activities. 
Fourth, unlike many other theories of formal organizations which do not take 
the state's role into consideration, the institutional perspective has the potential to 
accommodate this role (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). By 
focusing on change in the rules and procedures governing the relations between the 
state and micro-economic organizations, the theory provides a framework in which 
socialist institutions can be better understood. 
Fifth, the institutional perspective pays particular attention to the systemic na­
ture of a social structure and, in the study of social change, recognizes the functional 
interconnectedness of social systems. Institutional theorists maintain that changes in 
one area will lead to changes in others. Institutions are functionally interrelated to 
the extent that it is impossible to change one without triggering changes in others. 
Thus, institutional theory attaches importance to the sociological interpretation of 
social change. 
Emphasis on the State 
Despite the paramount importance of the role played by the socialist state, scant 
attention has been paid it by Western organizational theorists. Having enjoyed long 
applicability to market economies. Western organizational theories have in fact very 
limited utility in the study of issues arising from socialist systems. 
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As Carroll, Goldstein, and Gyenes (1988) pointed out, one obvious weakness 
of Western organizational theories is the neglect of the role of the state. Assuming 
that organizations are basically autonomous entities and legally independent of the 
state, conventional organizational theories have attached only marginal importance 
to the state's role. Major graduate textbooks on organizational theories (Hall, 1987; 
Perrow, 1986; Scott, 1987), for example, seldom include the word state in the subject 
index. Even the institutional approach, the only approach seemingly capable of 
accomodating this role, is basically concerned with culturally held values and beliefs 
enacted and maintained by the state (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). 
Such an orientation is understandable. In the West, the basic assumptions of 
organization are colored by the observation that organizations are all autonomous 
entities with the legal right to compete in a free marketplace. And even comparative 
studies dealing with organizational issues in socialist societies are largely overshad­
owed by influential works such as those by Bendix (1963) and Schurmann (1968), 
in which the overarching concern is ideology, not state. As Scott (1987: 181) ob­
served, "[theorists] are just beginning to become aware of the importance of the state 
structures and activities...as powerful forces shaping the environment of all types of 
organizations." 
Such neglect is hardly defensible (Carroll, Goldstein, and Gyenes, 1988). The 
role of the state in shaping the trajectory of industrialization has long been observed 
by sociologists. For example, the dependence of economic enterprises upon subvention 
and protection by the Russian government in the 19th century and the role played 
by the state in the Soviet Union's industrialization was well documented by Bendix 
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(1963). The differences in state-business relations between three Asian countries 
and differing degrees of pervasiveness of the state in determining their organizational 
forms were discussed by Hamilton and Biggart (1988). Even in advanced capitalist 
societies, the expanding role played by the state should not be overlooked. Melman 
(1970), for example, illustrated how large firms in the defense industry depend on the 
government contracts. Based on a case study of the relation between the aeronautics 
and microelectronics industries and the Pentagon, Hooks (1990) demonstrated the 
effort of the state to shape production and distribution in these industrial sectors in 
the United States. 
In socialist societies, the state plays a decisive role in defining the institutional 
environment for organizations and is the most important factor in shaping interorga-
nizational relations (Carroll, Goldstein, and Gyenes, 1988). Not only does the state 
directly perform certain functions performed by the market in capitalist societies, it 
also penetrates almost every aspect of organizational lives (Walder, 1986). In socialist 
countries, the state itself forms the significant environment for economic organiza­
tions. Failure to recognize the role of the state in some sense reflects a cultural bias 
in organizational theory development and reveals a defect in the basic assumptions 
of conventional organizational theories. 
Ironically, the motivation to bring the state back in to the social sciences has 
not come from the organizational but from both the comparative development theo­
rists (Skocpol, 1979; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpal, 1985) and the comparative 
economists in the East (Kornai, 1980a; Horvat, 1982; Richet, 1989). Paradoxically, 
unlike scholars from the West (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985) who gen­
erally pointed to the theoretical importance of the state in explaining national de-
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velopment, scholars (Kornai, 1980a; Horvat, 1982) from the East pointed to the 
detrimental effects of a pervasive state. Although the subjects dealt with by the 
theories are quite different, all indicate the importance of the state's role. Inspired 
by this theoretical development, the current study emphasizes the state and its direct 
relation with organizations. 
State refers to an authoritative part of the institutional framework of society. 
It consists of a set of authoritative institutions and procedural rules that, taken 
together, constitute an important part of the structural environment within which 
organizations operate and interact. The emphasis here is on the word authoritative^ 
which distinguishes the state from other institutional frameworks such as the market. 
One advantage of this definition is that it avoids a pitfall of resource dependence 
theory (PfefFer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 1979), which assumes that resources are 
the sole source of power, and which overlooks the sovereignty and authority of the 
state. Another advantage of this definition is that it incorporates the concept of 
power into the study of state-enterprise relations because the state derives its power 
not from economic but from political resources. 
State is also defined as a neutral term embodying a real and independent au­
thority that can either promote or destroy socially desirable outcomes. Although 
studies of comparative development often emphasize the role of the state as an active 
promoter in national development (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985), the 
role can be overestimated (Hooks, 1990). Instead, the nuetral defînition does not 
preassume this active role, but argues that a pervasive state will not necessarily but 
can have, detrimental effects on national development as well. 
Given the importance of the state, some questions arise as to what role it plays in 
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the reform of socialist societies. The theory of state building emphasized the beneficial 
effects of state intervention on national development (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and 
Skocpol, 1985). But reforms in socialist countries have generally entailed the state's 
withdrawing itself from society and the economy. Ten years of economic reform in the 
PRC, for example, has witnessed a partial withdrawal of the state from the economy, 
in the form of the family responsibility system in the rural areas (Huang, 1989; 
Nee, 1989; Nee and Su, 1990) and in the form of expanding enterprise autonomy in 
industrial sectors (White, 1989). Therefore, a question that can be asked is how the 
state of the PRC, given its previously pervasive role, has withrawn from the economy 
and what impact this withdrawal has had on the economy. By viewing the state as 
a major factor in the determination of organizational behavior, this study takes the 
state-organization relations as a key factor in analysis of the PRC's industrial reform. 
Concept of Dual Dependence 
Institutional economists often use the antithetical concepts of hierarchy and 
market to form a bipolar scheme of comparative economic institutions (Williamson, 
1985; Kornai, 1989). A market mode of governance represents a means of regulat­
ing economic activities through continual and spontaneous adjustments of supply 
and demand of products, money, and labor. The price system it furnishes provides 
information with which to coordinate the actions of various economic agents. The 
transactions under the market mode of governance are characterized by a horizontal 
relation between individuals and organizations participating in exchange activities 
(Kornai, 1989; Richet, 1989). 
In a hierarchical mode of governance, by contrast, the coordination of activities 
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is carried out by administrative means through the transmission of commands along 
a multilevel, vertical structure (Kornai, 1987,1989). This mode involves a pyramid 
structure of administrative control in which centralized planning is the main feature 
of coordination. Therefore, the transactions and information exchanges under hier­
archical governance are characterized by a vertical relation between the coordinating 
individuals and organizations on the one hand and the coordinated individuals and 
organizations on the other (Kornai, 1989). 
Contemporary economic institutions share, to various degrees, some features 
from both modes of economic governance. Those subject to hierarchical governance, 
in which the vertical relations prevail, are simultaneously regulated by various ele­
ments of the market modes. Those subject to market governance, in which price is 
the most important signal for the adjustment of actions, are frequently constrained 
by state regulations and other types of intervention (Richet, 1989). As Kornai (1986) 
argued, however, the two pure types can be distinguished by considering three sets of 
constraints facing a basic economic unit: resource constraints, demand constraints, 
and budget constraints. According to Kornai (1980a:23-25), resource constraints 
refers to the use of production inputs not exceeding the amount of available re­
sources, whereas demand constraints refers to the limits under which sale of products 
do not exceed the buyer demand at given prices. Budget constraints refer to a set of 
financial disciplines under which firm's financial expenses cannot exceed the amount 
of its money stock and of its proceeds from sales. Budget constraints are "hard" if 
strictly enforced and "soft" otherwise (Kornai, 1986). 
In its classical form, the market mode of governance is a demand-constrained 
system in which production increases are constrained by buyer demand. Under the 
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market economy, a firm exists as long as it can maintain its sales while keeping 
its costs low enough to make profit. By contrast, under the shortage conditions 
characterizing socialist economies, the classical relation of supply to demand under 
the market economy is altered. A firm in the socialist economy is resource- rather 
than demand-constrained, and the budget constraints it faces are soft rather than 
hard. In sum, its survival and growth are not dependent upon its performance on 
the market. 
As Williamson's (1985) study indicates, emerging corporatism and hierarchical 
forms of organizations can be seen as adaptive responses of organizations to market 
failure in capitalist economies. In the same vein, the adoption of limited market 
mechanisms as a result of reforms in socialist countries should be viewed as a re­
sponse to organizational failure in socialist economies (Stark and Nee, 1989). Though 
various theories have been proposed to explain such organizational failures in social­
ist economies, Kornai's (1980) institutional explanation has been the most telling. 
Central to his explanation is the assertion that organizational failures in socialist 
economies are rooted in the relations between firms and the state. A high level of 
paternalism, institutionalized by state ownership, and soft budget constraints are the 
fundamental characteristics of a relation leading to a broad spectrum of economic 
dysfunction (Kornai, 1980a). 
If reform in socialist countries can be viewed as an organizational response to 
perceived failures in the hierarchical mode of governance, to what extent have the 
reforms been directed to reduce paternalism? To what extent has the phenomenon 
of soft budget constraints been reduced? Because reform in the PRC has primarily 
taken the form of state withdrawal and of adoption of market mechanism, what has 
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been the emerging institutional pattern? More to the point, as Walder (1989:421) 
asked, to what extent can market forces be combined with hierarchical planning in 
the long run? And "are market and hierarchy incompatible dualities, fundamentally 
at odds with each other as forms of coordination in socialist economy" (Stark and 
Nee, 1989:19)? 
Some studies of China's economic reforms have already noted the distinctiveness 
of the emerging economic institution. Boisot and Child ( 1988), for example, described 
what they termed a "fiefdom-type" transaction pattern. From a cultural perspective, 
they argue that degree of codification and diffusion of information, as well as physical 
and technological infrastructures is the major factor responsible for the fiefdom-like 
governance. Independent of Boisot and Child, Solinger (1989) found that a hybridized 
pattern of relational contracting developed as a result of three structural properties: 
degree of scarcity, lack of standardization, and uncertainty of information. Byrd 
(1989) developed a general equilibrium model to account for the economic activities 
under the hybrid of a two-tier plan-market system. Although the three just cited 
studies approached the basic issues of Chinese reform from different angles, all noticed 
that the emerging pattern, whether fiefdom, relational contracting, or two-tiered 
system, is distinct from the ideal-typical market governance on the one hand and 
from the hierarchically arranged administrative structure on the other. 
This study argues that the PRC's industrial reform, as a response to perceived 
bureaucratic failure and as a move towards greater reliance on the market mode of 
governance, has given rise to a combination of elements from both modes of gover­
nance. Though the reform has pushed the PRC away from the traditional Soviet-style 
model, the emerging model is far from the full-fledged market mode embraced by re­
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formers and expected by economists. This emerging mode of economic governance, 
orchestrated by reform policies, is characterized by the co-existence of rules, norms, 
and principles from the different political and economic systems as the three studies 
just summarized (Boisot and Child, 1988; Solinger, 1989; Byrd, 1989) have suggested. 
But unlike studies attributing attributed the emerging mode of governance to 
exogenous determinants such as culture (Boisot and Child, 1988) or infrastructure 
(Solinger, 1989), the current study places greater emphasis on the process of change 
and continuity and on the characteristics of state-enterprise relations. Unlike neo­
classical studies which analyze the relative magnitude of freely marketed products to 
determine the success or failure of reforms, this study maintains that certain struc­
tural properties are more important than others and that they will not disappear 
easily with a decrease in the amount of planned goods and an increase in the magni­
tude of freely marketed products. 
In previous studies on industrial reform in the PRC, most attention has been 
focused on the reduction in central planning and the increase in markets (Tidrick and 
Chen, 1987). Self-evident although largely ignored by the literature is the relational 
context within which economic activities are performed and economic transactions 
conducted. From a sociological perspective, this study will pay special attention to 
changes in and continuities of a set of relations existing between participants. The 
study will also rely heavily upon Kornai's theoretical framework of dual dependence. 
Dual dependence, as coined by Kornai (1987; 1989), represents a phenomenon in 
which an enterprise "depends vertically on the bureaucracy and horizontally on its 
suppliers and customers" (Kornai, 1989:40). Under dual dependence, enterprises have 
begun to depend, to some extent, on the market in order to buy and sell products. As 
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Kornai (1987; 1989) showed in his analyses, however, a whole spectrum of enterprise 
activities, including entry and exit; determination of input, output, price, wage, and 
employment; and choice of technology, management, and investment, is determined 
by government authorities. It is true that under dual dependence the market has 
begun to play some regulatory role in reformed economies. Notwithstanding, the 
combination of elements from two modes does not necessarily mean that there is a 
harmonious symbiosis of hierarchy and market. Instead of standing for the establish­
ment of the so-called "planned commodity economy" (Zhao, 1987:23), or regulated 
market envisioned by reformers (see White, 1989 for their views), dual dependence 
represents a paradoxical mixture whose dominant flavor is bureaucratic. 
According to Kornai (1980a;1987;1989), two features characterize the relation 
between state and enterprise under dual dependence. One is continued soft budget 
constraints. The other is persistent paternalism. Kornai's (1980a) concept of soft 
budget constraints refers to a lack of financial disciplines in the micro-economic ac­
tivities of an organization. Soft budget constraints are characterized by a unique 
phenomenon: firms are not obliged to cover their expenditure from revenues made 
at market; instead, expenditures can be recompensed by state assistance via pricing, 
taxes, grants, credit, and other subsidies. 
Paternalism is a concept evoking the relationship between parent and child, and 
Kornai (1980a) uses the term in his analysis of relation between state and enterprise 
in socialist societies. Kornai's framework (1980) characterizes paternalism by five 
levels of increasing dependence: degree 0: self-supporting, unassisted; degree 1: self-
supporting, assisted; degree 2: financial allowance; degree 3: grants in kind, wishes 
actively expressed; and degree 4: grants in kind, passive acceptance. Coinciding with 
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the ideal typology of market and hierarchy as polarized economic institutions, Kornai 
(1980) argued that the classical Soviet-type economy can be represented by a high 
level of paternalism, the ideal free-market economy envisaged by the Friedman-Hayek 
school can be represented by a low level of paternalism. 
In describing economic reform in Hungary, Kornai (1980a) noted a shift away 
from paternalism in Hungarian state-enterprise relations (i.e. from degree 4 and 3 
towards degrees 2 and 1). But he also noted that the shift was incomplete and 
that it coexisted with a strong tendency to regress to greater degree of paternalism 
(Kornai, 1980a;1989). The persistence of paternalism coupled with continued state 
intervention under dual dependence (Kornai, 1989) has had noteable ramifications 
on the economy. 
First, under dependence, economic reform generally takes a cyclical form whereby 
reform and retrenchment, decentralization and recentralization, acceleration and de­
celeration alternate (Kornai, 1980b). Second, under dual dependence with persistent 
paternalism and soft budget constraints, state enterprise can continue to rely on state 
subsidies, which undermines the link between performance and reward. Third, there 
is no real incentive for enterprise to improve efficiency, because subsidized prices, 
credit, and grants can be obtained easily through state patronage. The fourth and 
final result of continued dependence on the state and soft budget constraints imposed 
on enterprise is beleaguered economic performance. 
The dual dependence perspective is different from cultural and neoclassical eco­
nomic perspectives in that, first, it pays particular attention to the relational aspects 
of economic life and to how authorities and economic agents are related. Instead of 
assessing the reform by measuring the relative magnitude of freely marketed or cen­
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trally planned goods, the dual dependence perspective provides a framework in terms 
of which to explain the behavior of economic organizations, a framework which disen­
tangles the exiting relation between of command and obedience, thereby recognizing 
the interplay of economic organization and socio-political institution. Second, the 
dual dependence perspective emphasizes the role played by the state in shaping or­
ganizational behavior. While recognizing the importance of culture, it overcomes the 
limitation of a cultural perspective that neglects the role of the state in enacting and 
maintaining culturally held beliefs. By emphasizing the state, it also distinguishes 
itself from other institutional economics by assigning a place to authority and de­
pendency. Third, its level of analysis is organizational rather than individual and 
thus encourages sociological analyses. It should not be forgotten, however, Kornai's 
concept of dual dependence is based upon his observation of the Hungarian economic 
reform experience. Can his observations be generalized to other socialist countries 
under reform? To what extent can his theory be supported by reform experiences in 
the PRC? 
Summary 
Based on the literature review and discussion, the theoretical framework used in 
this study can be summarized as follow; 
First, reform in socialist countries can be viewed as an organizational response 
to perceived failure of the centralized bureaucratic mode of governance. Such reform 
generally takes the form of partial state withdrawal from the economy and the soci­
ety by relinquishing a certain autonomy to economic organizations and by allov/ing 
market mechanisms a limited role in coordinating economic activities. 
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Second, this partial state withdrawal involves a process of institutional change 
that modifies the rules and principles governing relations between the state and the 
economy. The resulting change in this relation is generally towards an expansion of 
autonomy of the economic units within limits specified by the state. 
Third, because of the systemic nature and the interconnectedness of the systems 
involved, piecemeal reform is often accompanied by both intended and unintended 
consequences. Continuities and discontinuities are involved. Under piecemeal reform, 
changes made in one area coexist with lack of change in other areas. Thus, reform 
process generally takes an incremental form in which start and stop, acceleration and 
deceleration, alternate. 
Fourth, the piecemeal nature of reform, and the coexistence of change and conti­
nuity, gives rise to a paradoxical phenomenon Kornai ( 1987) termed dual dependence. 
Under this mode of governance, persistent paternalism and continued soft-budget 
constraints are the primary features characterizing state-enterprise relations. The 
persistence of these two socio-economic features are of great consequence to the eco­
nomic development of socialist economy. 
Fifth, the nature of interconnectedness of the systems is particularly evident in 
the linkage between macro- and micro-economic reforms in socialist economies. The 
tension between expanded micro-economic units' autonomy and continuation of state 
controlled pricing is particularly acute under a piecemeal reform. Consequently, the 
need for a coordinated reform both micro- and macro-levels is of central importantce 
to the success and failure of institutional reform in socialist economies. 
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CHAPTER 3. STATE-ENTERPRISE RELATIONS IN TRANSITION: 
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
Overview 
While social scientists (Chandler, 1977; Per row, 1981; Williamson, 1985) were 
explaining market failure and the emergence of a hierarchical mode of economic gov­
ernance in the West, it was already clear that the hierarchically administrative mode 
of economic governance in socialist countries fell far short of what had been envi­
sioned (Kornai, 1980). Before reform, industrial organization in the PRC had been 
modeled, in large part, on that of the Soviet Union, and state-owned enterprise had 
operated in a highly bureaucratic environment. The erection of a state hierarchi­
cal mode after industrial and commercial nationalization and the rapid expansion of 
state industry transferred substantial power from the society to the state bureaucracy 
and thus established the state's control over the market (Perkins, 1966). It was a 
pervasive state that regulated the economy by means of centralized plans enforced 
by a hierarchy of political and adminstrative agencies. The role of market relations 
was greatly circumscribed by political and administrative bodies. 
The state-enterprise relation was characterized by omnipresent administrative 
control, with state dominance on the one hand, and dependent enterprise on the 
other. Even to casual observers, it was clear that state-owned enterprises were little 
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more than appendages of state bureaucracy. Such enterprises operated in a rigid 
hierarchical pyramid, with substantial external control imposed by administrative 
governing bodies, be they ministries or bureaus at the provincial or county levels 
(Perkins, 1966; Schurmann, 1968). These bodies acted as giant conglomerates inter­
nalizing all exchange activity and were further integrated into the center by means 
of both central planning and chains of command. Such a system, as Richet (1989) 
put it, provide means for state dominatation of all economic processes and control 
over the entire economy as if it were a single large enterprise; it allowed the state to 
penetrate into the market and society to an extent perhaps unattainable in a market 
economy. 
Four principles of administrative control governed each of the following areas: 
planning, monetary allocation, material supply, and employment. First, state enter­
prises were bounded by detailed mandatory plans in which physical output targets 
and input quotas were the dominant criteria by which enterprise performance was 
evaluated. These centrally determined plan indicators were disaggregated succes­
sively from higher to lower echelons along a multilevel hierarchy, with factories at the 
bottom of the pyramid. 
Second, monetary relations between enterprise and the state were governed by a 
principle of unified control of revenue and expenditure ( tongshuo tongzhi). Under this 
highly centralized budgetary system, an enterprise was required to remit all its profits 
and depreciation funds to state agencies while receiving all its investment funds and 
working capital from the state, according to a centrally predetermined plan. 
Third, factory products were purchased and sold by the state commercial sector 
under a unified purchase and sale system {tongguo tongxiao) while its resources were 
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supplied by the state under a system of unified allocation {tingyi diaobo). Trans­
actions, by and large, were monopolized by the state according to the prescribed 
quantity and quality specified in the annual plan. Product prices were determined 
administratively by the State Price Management Bureau, with no regard to supply 
and demand of the market. 
Fourth, labors were allocated administratively by the State Labor Bureau (tong-
bao tongpei) according to the plan, and workers were paid according to a unified 
national wage scale stipulated by the state. This undermined the possibility of remu­
neration according to merit. Accordingly, factory managers were appointed by the 
state and were bound in a web of bureaucratic control that left them little opportu­
nity for autonomous behavior beyond that directed towards fulfilling output targets. 
Under such a hierarchical governance, enterprises were expected neither to have their 
own objectives nor to apply their own criteria in decision making; instead, they were 
expected to apply the criteria dictated by the state. 
No concept better captures the essence of such state-enterprise relations than 
Kornai's (1980a:561) concept of "degree of paternalism." Kornai (1980a) uses this 
concept, which evokes the relationship between parent and child, to analyze the 
relation between state and enterprises in socialist economies. Classifying relations 
between state and enterprise into five categories of increasing dependence, Kornai 
argues (1980a) that the classical Soviet-style economy can be represented by a great 
degree of paternalism, whereas free-market economy can be represented by a low 
degree of paternalism. 
In studying Hungarian economic reform, Kornai (1980a) noted a shift towards 
a lower degree of paternalism in state-enterprise relations. But he also noted that 
39 
arbitrary state interventions remained, and that firms continued to depend upon the 
state for pricing, taxes, and credit subsidies (1980b;1987;1989). Not only was there 
pressure to renew paternalistic practice, but such pressures succeeded in certain cases 
(1980b). Kornai (1987) argued, based on these observations, that partial reform in 
Hungary had resulted in a mode of governance he termed dual dependence, which 
was distinct from both the bureaucratic mode of centralized planning and the mode 
of coordination of free-market. 
What has been the experiences of the PRC's reform? The aforementioned four 
principles governing the state-enterprise relation in the PRC can be identified as 
high degree of paternalism. The unified allocation of capital, labors, and credit by 
the state and passive acceptance of the centrally prescribed command by enterprises 
were consistent with the degrees 3 and 4 of paternalism classified by Kornai (1980a). 
Recognizing the dysfunction caused by paternalism, the major thrust of reform over 
the past decade in the state industrial sector of the PRC has been directed at chang­
ing the rules and procedures governing existing state-enterprise relations. Specifically, 
efforts have been directed at reducing the high degree of paternalism characterizing 
state-enterprise relations and at making enterprise financially independent and re­
sponsible for its own profits and losses. This attempt at reform has undergone three 
stages: between 1978 and 1982, a major effort was made to simplify administration 
and decentralize {jianzheng fangquan), specifically to delegate business power to en­
terprise managers. The second stage which lasted from 1983 to 1985, was an attempt 
to substitute tax for profit {li gai shui). In late 1986, these events sparked a revival 
of interest in the contract responsibility system {chenghao zheren zhi), interest which 
extends to the present (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988). 
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Does the reform in the PRC bear a resemblence to Hungary's as observed by 
Kornai (1987;1989)? What change process was the reform of PRC actually involved? 
Have the Chinese efforts to reduce paternalism been successful? What have been the 
results they brought about? The following sections will trace ten years of industrial 
reform in the PRC and will address these questions. First, the institutional perspec­
tive maintains that institutional change takes the form of modification of rules and 
procedures. Therefore, the process of reform that modified the rules and procedures 
will be examined. Second, partial state withdrawal has been considered as a genereal 
trend of reform of socialist societies. Thus, attention will be paid to the extent to 
which the the state has withdrawn from the economy. Third, it was an alledged 
objective of the reform in the PRC to reduce paternalism and to make enterprise 
independent. Issue that will also be addressed will include the extent to which pa­
ternalism in state-enterprise relations has been reduced. Fourth, the institutional 
perspective argues that institutional arrangements influence incentive structure and 
thus determines activities of organization. The change and continuity of incentive 
structure and how it facilitated or impeded improvement of organization's efficiency 
will be discussed. Fifth, Kornai (1989) observed that changes taking place in the 
Hungarian reform were uneven, and that reform accelerated and decelerated in turn. 
The following section will describe the pattern of industrial reform in the PRC and 
compare it to Kornai's (1987;1989) discussion of that in Hungarian reform. Finally, 
it is argued that peicemeal reform is often accompanied by unintended consequences. 
Therefore, a discussion of both intended and unintended consequences will follow the 
descriptions of each reform stage. 
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Simplifying Administration and Decentralizing 
Evolution of the state-enterprise relation began with what was later called sim­
plifying administration and decentralizing [jianzheng fangquan). Because the funda­
mental structural weaknesses identified by early critics was over-centralization and 
lack of incentives, both factors which stifled flexibility and initiative at lower echelons 
of the system, the first stage of reform attempted to remove the rigidity in the system. 
The primary means of accomplishing this objective was devolving limited business 
decision-making power to enterprise and reducing the scope of state hierarchical con­
trol while improving the incentive system. But because this stage of industrial reform 
involved only a redefinition of adminstrative power for each echelon in the system and 
did not attempt to change any of the fundamentals such as introduction of market 
mechanism and reforming ownership system, the stage was later referred to as simple 
administrative decentralization. 
Enterprise funds system: 1978-1979 
The process of simplifying administration and decentralizing began with a re­
vival of the enterprise funds system {qiye jijin) (Ministry of Finance, 1978). This 
system had been practiced in the PRC periodically during the 1950s and the 1960s 
(Lee, 1987). Its essence was to give a slice of autonomy to enterprise managers so 
that they could dispose of funds as incentives to their own initiatives, in Novem­
ber 1978, state enterprises were allowed to retain an amount of up to five percent 
of their total wage bills, as long as they fulfilled government procurement contracts 
and the so-called "eight indicators" (including total output value, product varieties, 
quality, consumption of raw material and energy, labor productivity, cost of pro­
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duction, profit, and amount of working capital appropriated). Such retained funds 
could be utilized discretionally in three funds proportionatelly {sanjin): a production 
development fund, a worker and staff welfare fund, and a bonus fund. 
The revival of enterprise funds represented the first step towards reforming state-
enterprise relations. By establishing these enterprise funds, the state began to allow 
enterprises to pursue interests not necessarily identical to the state's. It was expected 
that these incentives to enterprise managers would promote initiative and creativity. 
The effect of this step, although positive, should not be exagerated. First, the 
re-establishment of enterprise funds was simply a revival of a measure practiced 
periodically during the 1950s and the 1960s (for a discussion, see Lee, 1987). Second, 
the power delegated to enterprise was very limited. Except for the managerial right 
to use as they saw fit an amount equal to five percent of the total wage bill, no other 
power was entrusted to enterprise. Third, even this limited discretion was highly 
circumscribed by government authorities. For example, the distribution of funds 
among production development, welfare, and bonus funds was subject to approval 
by the higher administrative organ. The last but not least important aspect of the 
limitation was that being based on the total wage bill it favored enterprises with large 
workforces and was not linked to actual performance. These factors undermined the 
link between enterprise funds and its increased profitability. In one sense, the funds 
actually reinforced the parameters set by the state because physical rather than profit 
indicators were required by the state. 
Thus, one year later, in late 1979 when the profit retention system was introduced 
during late 1979, the eight indicators were reduced to four (quantity, quality, prof­
itability, and fulfilment of procurement contract) by the Ministry of Finance (1979). 
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In keeping with the prevailing profit retention system, enterprises were allowed to 
retain 15 to 25 percent of their above-plan profit. The distinction between the enter­
prise fund system and the new profit retention system became increasingly blurred. 
With a great majority of enterprises gradually shifting to the profit retention system, 
the enterprise fund system was eventually merged with the so-called profit retention 
system. 
Profit retention system; 1979-1980 
In 1978 in the Sichuan Province, six pilot schemes were conducted to experiment 
with expanded enterprise autonomy. In early 1979, this pilot scheme was extended 
to include 100 enterprises in Sichuan and eight large enterprises in Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Tianjin. Based on the results of pilot projects, five sets of regulations (the State 
Council of PRC, 1979a;1979b;1979c;1979d;1979e) were promulgated as guidelines and 
extension of testing to other localities was encouraged. Consequently, the number 
of enterprises involved grew rapidly. By July 1979, a total of 2,100 enterprises, 
accounting for 35 percent of total industrial profits and 26 percent of total output 
value, had abandoned the enterprise funds system and embarked on a program of 
profit retention (the State Economic Commission, 1980). 
There were four major components of the expanded enterprise autonomy scheme. 
First, profit-making enterprises were allowed to retain a share of profits instead of 
remitting them all to the state. Second, taxes were levied on fixed capital used by 
enterprises—previously such capital had not been not taxed. Third, 70 percent of 
the depreciation fund could be used by enterprises as they saw fit, assuming the 
higher organ approved. Fourth, the working capital of an enterprise, instead of being 
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allocated by the Ministry of Finance, was dispensed by banks charging very low rates 
of interest. 
At the core of this scheme was the system of profit retention. According to 
the State Economic Commission and the Ministry of Finance (1980b), the retained 
share of profit from 1979 onward was to be assessed on the basis of a ratio between 
1) production development funds, personnel welfare funds, and bonus funds in 1978 
and 2) the total amount of profit realized that year. Two objectives were expected 
to be accomplished by the new system. First, enterprises would gain autonomy in 
terms of the disposition of funds. Second, retained funds would be linked to total 
profit to encourage the profit motive at the enterprise level. 
As a major component of simplifying administration and decentralizing, this 
profit retention scheme represented a positive step towards reducing excessive state 
control over the economy inasmuch as autonomy was reliquished to the economic 
units. Under the enterprise fund system, the amount of retained fund, had been 
calculated on the basis of the total wage bill, which was fixed by the superior gov­
ernment bodies. Thus enterprises with large labor force were favored, but enterprise 
efficiency was not involved. The profit retention system placed more resources at the 
disposal of enterprise because an enterprise could now have a welfare fund equal to 
11 percent of the total wage bill, a bonus fund equal to 10 percent of the total wage 
bill, a new product development fund equal to 1 to 2 percent of the total profit, and 
a technical training fee, all of which were used as a basis for calculating the share of 
retained profit. These funds were in addition to the original enterprise funds equal 
to five percent of total wages (The State Economic Commission and the Ministry of 
Finance, 1980b). 
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Because the calculation was based on total profits in the previous year, an en­
terprise's retention would increase only if its profit exceeded that of the previous 
year. Likewise, enterprise would retain less than it had previously if actual realized 
profits declined. Thus, the profit retention system had an advantage over the en­
terprise fund system in that it attempted to link reward to performance based on a 
criterion—profit. 
Enterprises were quick to embark on the new program in the hope of enjoying 
additional autonomy and of obtaining discretionary funds. Despite the document 
issued in July 1979 by the State Council (1979a), which requested only a limited 
experiment in carefully selected enterprises, the program expanded rapidly. The 
number of enterprises approved in July 1979 was 2,100. This figure doubled, however, 
to 4,200 by the end of 1979 (the State Economic Commission, 1980). 
Despite its rapid growth and its clear advantage over the previous enterprise 
funds system, this 1979 version of profit retention was not without problems. A 
major difficulty was the so-called "whipping the faster ox" factor {bianda kuainiu), 
which referred to an inverse relation between retention ratio increase and previous 
performance. Because the profit retention scheme was based on the calculation of the 
ratio between the retained funds and the total profit in previous years, this method 
in reality rewarded those who had had lower levels of profitability in a previous year, 
because these enterprises had a greater potential to increase profit margin. 
Although local government and enterprises were most concerned with the calcu­
lation of the retention ratio, the problems of declining state revenues and four major 
economic indicators, and the indiscriminant and excessive distribution of bonuses 
by enterprise drew the state attention. In The Explanation Concerning Experimental 
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Methods of Profit Retention in State Industrial £'n<erpme5 issued jointly by the State 
Economic Commission and the Ministry of Finance (1980a), it was estimated that 
in 84 experimental enterprises in Sichuan province, where the profit retention system 
had first been introduced, 38 percent of the increased profits in 1979 were retained 
by enterprise. It was also estimated, however, that on the national average, retained 
profits by state enterprises were 40 percent of total realized profits. Compared with 
the enterprise fund system, in which enterprises retained profits equivalent to only 
five percent of their total wage bills, more resources were at the enterprises' disposal 
under the profit retention system, which, in turn, led to a serious reduction in profits 
remitted to the state. 
In addition to this manifest reduction, the government also noticed that some 
enterprises had become so concerned with profits that they failed to fulfill the four in­
dicators. Some enterprises were criticized for irrational behavior in that they pursued 
short-term benefits at the expense of long-term interests of the state (The State Eco­
nomic Commission, 1980). Other were criticized for taking advantage of loopholes 
created during the transitional period. Rather than striving to improve efficiency, 
many firms resorted to raising product prices and lowering product quality to raise 
profits. Other enterprises with more resources at hand used retained profits mainly as 
bonuses and indiscriminantly distributed them among workers, regardless of actual 
performances (The State Economic Commission, 1980; the State Economic Commis­
sion and the Ministry of Finance, 1980b). 
In response to these problems, the state revised the profit retention scheme in 
early 1980, only five months after its official initiation. The major revision was meant 
to address the problem of "whipping the faster ox." Instead of using the total-sum 
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method to calculate retained profits based on the previous year's record, the revised 
method differentiated baseline profits realized in the previous year from those realized 
in the incremental part of the given year and gave each part a unique retention rate. 
Once an enterprise fulfilled the profit level equivalent of the previous year's record, 
it was entitled to a fixed amount of retention. If the realized profits exceeded the 
baseline, another sharply increased percentage of retained profit would apply. 
This method was expected to have two consequences. First, it was intended 
to safeguard the state's profit share by requiring enterprises at least to match the 
previous year's profit. Second, by increasing the retained profit margin once the en­
terprise reached the previous record, the system was intended to encourage improved 
performamce. This method was later referred to as the baseline figure method {jishu 
fa), as distinguished from the total-sum method. 
In the revised profit retention scheme, the requirement to fulfill the four major 
indicators (quantity, quality, profit, and procurement agreement) was reaffirmed. It 
was decreed that retained profit would be reduced 10 percent if any one of the four 
indicators were not satisfied. Furthermore, no less than 60 percent of the retained 
profits could be used for production development, and no more than 40 percent for 
bonus and welfare funds (The State Economic Commission, 1980). 
By specifying parameters for the use of newly aquired discretional resources, the 
state tried to direct enterprises to its desired end by way of economic incentives. To 
remedy the problem of state revenue decline, more restrictive measures were devel­
oped to limit enterprises' retention of profit. In the baseline figure, a fixed rate was 
assessed on the basis of the previous profit record, either in the preceding year or 
averaged over several preceding years. This was called the fixed-comparison {dingbi ) 
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method. Early in 1980, a new circular-comparison {huanbi) method was formulated 
with a shifting annual baseline. Under this method, the comparison was no longer 
made to a fixed year or an average of several preceding years but to the preceding 
year. Once an enterprise's profit reached a given level, this level became the new 
baseline for the next year. 
Despite the more restrictive measures adopted by the profit retention scheme, 
enterprises involved in the program continued to grow rapidly. As mentioned pre­
viously, a total of 4,200 enterpises had been included in the experiment by the end 
of 1979. By June 1980, 6,600 state enterprises, accounting for 60 percent of the 
output value and 70 percent of the total profit of the state-owned large and medium-
sized enterprises, had abandoned the system of enterprise funds and embarked on 
the experiment in expanded enterprise autonomy (the State Economic Commission, 
1980). 
Economic responsibility system: 1981-1982 
Partly in line with the readjustment policy in response to state revenue decline, 
and partly as a result of technical design problem technical design and other unantici­
pated consequencies of decentralization, reforms during 1981-1982 were reformulated 
according to what was termed the industrial production economic responsibility sys­
tem {gongye shengchan jingji zeren zhi, hereafter responsibility system). As a partial 
recentralization measure, the responsibility system was introduced in April 1981 at 
the National Industrial and Transportation Work Conference. Reiterating the Com­
munist Party Central Committee's priorities of readjustment over reform, these policy 
papers (The State Economic Commission and the State Council System Reform Of­
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fice, 1981) attempted to integrate the profit retention program with strengthening 
central planning. 
Consistent with the call for strengthening central planning, these papers asked 
state enterprise to take responsibility for fulfilling the quantity, quality, variety, and 
cost targets given in the state plan, in addition to any profit target (The State 
Economic Commission and the State Council System Reform Office, 1981). The 
state had noted certain unforseen consequences (decline in state revenue, decline in 
product quality, blind pursuit of profit, increase in costs, and explosion of bonuses), 
but it maintained that the key isue was to strengthen and clarify responsibility at all 
echelons of the industrial hierarchy. 
Along this policy line, several documents were issued to promote the implemen­
tation of the economic responsibility system (The State Council, 1981). In addition, 
detailed rules and regulations were worked out by the State Economic Commission, 
the Ministry of Finance, and other relevant government bodies (The State Council, 
1981; The Ministry of Finance, 1981). As a result, by October 1982, 80 percent of 
the medium- and large-sized enterprises were involved in one form or another of the 
responsibility system (Wang and Zhu, 1985:840). 
Three characteristics of this system distinguished it from those of previous re­
forms. First, it emphasized the responsibility of both industrial hierarchy and state 
planning. In the Provisional Regulations Concerning Issues of Implementing the In­
dustrial Production Economic Responsibility System promulgated by the State Eco­
nomic Commission and other government bodies (The State Council, 1981), all levels 
in the hierarchical system, including government bodies in charge of industrial enter­
prises, state enterprises, workshops in every enterprise, work groups under workshops. 
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and individual workers, were required to clarify their own economic responsibilities 
to the state hierarchy. In addition, it restated the requirement to fulfill state plan 
targets, "no matter whether they are profitable to the enterprises" (Wang and Zhu, 
1985:163). Priority, it held, should be placed on fulfilling remittance responsibilities 
to the state treasurer. The profit sharing ratio for the increased portion of profits 
had to be in favor of the state (a minimum of 60 percent) not enterprises (a maximun 
of 40 percent). 
Second, the system stressed internal management by enterprise. As stated in 
Suggestions Concerning Issues of Implementing the Industrial Production Economic 
Responsibility System by the State Economic Commission and the State Council 
System Reform Office (1981), the economic responsibility system was to focus on both 
the responsibility of the enterprise to the state and the internal responsibility within 
the enterprise hierarchy. The system also restated the upper limits on bonuses that 
could be distributed and the ceilings for extra piece-work wages, which were stated 
in other policy papers by the State Council (1981) in the same year. Its emphasis 
on structured internal responsibility was reiterated in policy papers in 1982 (The 
State Economic System Reform Commission, the State Economic Commission, and 
the Ministry of Finance, 1982). 
The third characteristic of this system was the wide variety of forms subsumed 
under its name. Because enterprises differed in terms of such as specific product 
price imposed by the state, technological sophistication, input and investment allo­
cated by the state, labor and technical personnel skills, tasks assiged by the state 
plan, and status in the industrial hierarchy, profitabilities ranged widely. Thus, the 
earlier design of a relatively uniform retention rate was impractical and led many en­
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terprises to complain about the problem of unevenness of hardship and satisfaction 
{kule bujun). Additionally, state agencies in different localities tended to negotiate 
with individual enterprises about the profit remittance rate, a practice which led to 
destandardization. Thus, to cope with existing practices the economic responsibility 
system was reformed to accommodate diverse state-enterprise relations. 
As summarized in a suggestion made by the State Economic Commission and the 
State Council System Reform Office (1981), the responsibility system involved three 
broad categories: Profit retention, contract for profits and losses (yinkui baogan), and 
tax substitutions for profit with responsibility for profits and losses (yishui daili, zifu 
yinkui). The enterprises participating in the responsibility system usually took one 
of several courses of action. 
One such course was the retention of baseline-figure profit plus increased profit 
(jishu liucheng jia zhengzhang liren liucheng). This strategy was considered suitable 
for firms with good potential to increase production and profit. The base figure 
would be assessed based either on the previous year's profit or on profit average over 
the previous three years. Another course was the retention of total profit (quane 
liren liucheng). This was considered suitable for firms operating near capacity, with 
regular production and stable profits. Retention ratios were assessed on the average 
retention ratio of the previous three years. Some enterprises used the retention of the 
above-plan profit (chaojihua liren liucheng), A suitable strategy for firms suffering 
from profit decline or from insufficient production assignments during the period of 
economic adjustment. 
The profit contract system (liren baogan) was practiced by enterprises whose 
profitability was considered marginal {weili qiye). Two categories were developed: 
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enterprises with a potential for increased profit were considered suitable for a base-
figure contract and for an increase in shared profit (jishu baogan, zengzhang fencheng)\ 
those with less potential were considered suitable for a base-figure contract and for 
the retention of increased profit (jishu baogan, chaoshuo liuyong). In the loss contract 
system (kueisun baogan), money-losing enterprises were state subsidized by a fixed 
amount. Additionally, such firms were allowed to keep all or part of its loss reduction. 
Another category was that of enterprise given a contract for reduction in loss, with the 
firms keeping any reduction. The final category was that of enterprise substituting 
tax for profit remittance, with firms taking responsibility for their own losses and 
profits (yishui daili, zifu yingkuei). This was practiced in profitable and well-managed 
medium- and large-sized enterprises that had obtained the approval of the Ministry 
of Finance. By 1982, 456 enterprises were experimenting with this last form, which 
was later developed into a tax-for-profit system. 
The tendency to recentralize relaxed to some extent towards the end of 1982, 
when an Industrial Economic Responsibility System Conference was convened for 
eleven provinces, municipalities, and regions. In a policy paper prepared jointly by 
the State Economic System Reform Commission, the State Economic Commission, 
and the Ministry of Finance (1982) in November 1982, enterprise autonomy was 
reemphasized. Following the policy line decided upon in the 12th Party Congress, 
the new policy paper pointed out that state planning should be supplemented by 
market regulations and that, according to specific conditions, it could take different 
forms, such as directive planning, guidance planning, or enterprises autonomy to 
make business decision (The State Economic System Reform Commission, The State 
Economic Commission, and The Ministry of Finance, 1982). 
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Discussion 
The first stage of the administrative simplification and decentralization reform 
represented the the deliberate state's withdrawal from the economic sphere by relin­
quishing limited power to enterprise. This partial state withdrawal primarily involved 
in the modification of existing rules and procedures governing state-enterprise rela­
tions. As a result, the evolution of reform in the state-enterprise relation during the 
period of 1978-1982 was characterized by a rapid increase in the profit retained by 
enterprise. In 1978, profits retained by state industrial enterprise totaled 6.8 billion 
yuan, which accounted for only 13.4 percent of the total realized profit. The figure 
rose to 20.7 billion yuan, or 35.1 percent, by 1982 (see Table 3.1). ^ In addition to 
the expanded financial autonomy of enterprise, reform in this period was character­
ized by increasing simplification of the criteria used by the state to judge enterprise 
success, with emphasis gradually shifting from multiple physical targets to simple 
financial targets, particularly those of profits. 
While state enterprise under this scheme began to enjoy increased autonomy 
in economic decision-making and increased resource base, resources at the state's 
disposal were reduced. As indicated by Table 3.1, profit sharing between state and 
enterprise resulted in a substantial decrease in state revenue. Although the profit 
retained by state enterprise increased from 6.8 billion to 20.7 billion between 1978 
and 1982, the amount of profit remitted to the state by state industrial enterprise 
^ Statistics are not altogether consistent. For example, in the Report on the National 
Conference on the Work of Tax-for-profit, it was estimated that retained profits were 11.9, 
13.2, and 15.0 percent of the total realized profits in 1980, 1981, and 1982, respectively. 
It was also estimated that the total amount of retained profits during 1978-1982 was 42 
billion yuan (The Ministry of Finance, 1983a). 
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Table 3.1: Profit Distribution and State Revenues: 1978-1982® 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Profit^ 50,880 56,240 58,544 57,967 59,766 
Retained 6,838 
(1.3.4) 
11,121 
(19.8) 
13,624 
(23.3) 
16,376 
(28.3) 
20,697 
(35.1) 
Remitted^ 44,042 
(86.6) 
45,119 
(80.2) 
44,920 
(76.7) 
41,591 
(71.7) 
39,069 
(64.9) 
State revenue/ 
National income^ 37.2% 31.9% 28.3% 25.8% 25.4% 
State revenue 
from industry^ 39,300 40,900 41,400 38,200 35,300 
®Unit: million yuan. 
^The State Statistical Bureau, 1981:260; 1983:292; the Economic Printing House, 
1981:18; 1982:21. 
^The State Statistic Bureau, 1983b:65. 
•^The State Statistical Bureau, 1984:35. 
®The State Statistical Bureau, 1984:418. 
decreased from 4.4 billion in 1978 to 3.9 billion in 1982. State revenue relative to 
national income declined from 37.2 percent in 1978 to 25.4 percent in 1982. These 
figures indicate that profit retention by enterprise in fact contributed to state revenue 
reduction because retained profit represented net loss to the state. 
In view of the expansion of enterprise autonomy, questions that should be asked 
are to what extent the limited autonomy given enterprise helped it improve economic 
performance. Did the limited reduction of the role of the state in the economy result 
in improved efficiency? What effects were produced by the first stage of reform? And 
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Table 3.2: State Industrial Performance Indicators: 1978-1982® 
Indicators 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Profit/ 
fixed asset 15.9 16.2 15.7 14.4 13.7 
Output/ 
Fixed asset 103 103 101 96 95 
Profit+tax/ 
Total funds 24.2 24.8 24.8 23.8 23.5 
Profit/ 
Output 15,5 15.8 15.5 15.0 14.4 
^Source; the State Statistical Bureau 1984:263. 
finally, to what extent did the administrative simplification and decentralization help 
reduce paternalism in state-enterprise relations? 
First, although state enterprise were given increased discretionary power and in­
centives, the financial performance indicators showed little evidence of improvement. 
In reality, between 1978 and 1982, all financial indicators of state enterprise had 
deteriorated. As Table 3.2 indicates, the ratio of profit, tax, and output generated 
by state enterprise to the input was not improved between 1978 and 1982. On the 
contrary, all declined, except for 1979. 
Second, because a portion of the profit and depreciation funds was now at the dis­
posal of enterprise, overextention of capital investment became a problem. Coupled 
with redundant investment concentrated in the consumer goods industries, excessive 
investment created the problem of imbalance at the macro-level and intensified the 
shortages of raw materials, energy, and transportation facilities already the PRC's 
economy. The shortage and imbalance, in turn, not only increased pressure on the 
state budget, but also increased demand for bank loans to match local investment 
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funds. As a result, excessive investment created high potential of inflation. 
Third, after the bonus system was revived, the indiscriminant reward of bonuses, 
welfare allowance, and other subsidies to workers in state enterprises became a prob­
lem (Walder, 1987). Because state-sector workers were typically employed in the same 
enterprise for life and were unlikely to be dismissed, any attempt to provide rewards 
based on merit rather than on seniority resulted in grievances from workers (Walder, 
1987). Indiscriminant distribution of rewards was aggrevated by the absence of a di­
rect link between profit and efficiency, and by the absence of feasible means to judge 
economic performance. These absences had become the basic problem underlying all 
others. 
Fourth, as a result of administrative simplification and decentralization, covert 
problems inherent in the system of unified revenue and expenditure and unified pur­
chase and sale surfaced. Chief among these was variation among enterprises in terms 
of skilled labor, material and capital supply, market, size, and location. Under the 
so-called unifed system, capital, material, equipment, and technical personnel were 
allocated administratively, without consideration for market factors. Differences in 
terms of these factors made it difficult, however, to apply a unified rate of profit 
retention across industry. Inequalities among enterprises were exacebated by the 
distorted price structure formulated under the system of unified purchase and sales. 
As the reform began to place primary value on monetary terms, that is, to focus 
on profit instead of physical output targets, the distorted pricing system made it 
difficult to differentiate between profit resulting from improved efficiency and profit 
gained from arbitrarily set high prices. Because it was unreasonable to penalize en­
terprise and its workers for problems beyond their control, different schemes had to 
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be introduced to remedy the situation. The multitude of strategies and the incon­
sistencies among them not only increased the workload of the design and bargaining 
administration, but also enabled participating firms to claim excessive shares of re­
tained profits (Lee, 1987). In some instances, enterprises capable of increasing profit 
attempted to run their factories at less than full capacity to avoid reaching profit 
levels that would be difficult to surpass the next year. Additionally, the ambiguity of 
reform schemes allowed enterprises to violate accounting rules and reap unreasonable 
profits (The State Economic Commission, 1980). 
Moreover, because state ownership is paternalistic by nature, loss-making en­
terprises were not allowed to go bankrupt. The result was that the profit retention 
ratio was negotiable, and enterprises had ample room to bargain. Bargaining and 
disputing over baseline figures between superorgans and enterprises were incessant. 
As long as bargaining was successful, a manager could retain a handsome profit and 
workers a bonus, without any improvement in economic efficiency occurring. The net 
result was that responsibility for profit making was accepted by enterprises but not 
the responsibility for losses. 
In sum, although the implementation of administrative simplification and decen­
tralization reduced excessive state intervention, diverse forms, tedious computations, 
incessant bargaining, and scheme designs began to constitute a workload too heavy 
for existing administration. At the same time, contrary to the objective of the re­
form, many loopholes were created causing serious decline in state financial revenue. 
Clearly the introduction of new regulatory forms gave rise to a new type of dys­
function and to some extent intensified the problems inherent to the old mode of 
governance. 
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Tax-for-profit: 1983-1986 
Trial implementations 
The evolution of reform in 1979-1982 revealed a fundamental dilemma of such 
partial reforms. On the one hand, reduction in mandatory physical targets slightly 
loosened administrative control, and profit sharing began to devolve some authority 
to enterprise; on the other hand, enterprise's newly acquired power remained circum­
scribed by continued arbitrary interference from state authorities at the municipal, 
provincial, or ministerial levels (White, 1985; Lin, 1989). Even though enterprises 
now had enlarged powers to dispose of retained profits, no corresponding economic 
measures had been developed to regulate its activities. On response, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, state authorities resorted to administrative measures with arbitrariness 
and inefficiency. 
From 1983 to 1986, the PRC government successively introduced a two-stage 
reform of the financial relation between state and enterprise. This reform was called 
substituting taxes for profits [yili daishui)^ or more concisely, tax-for-profit {li gai 
shui). Under this reform, state enterprise no longer remitted profits to the state; in­
stead, they delivered taxes on both sales revenues and profits. Despite its significance 
in the evolution of state-enterprise relation, the tax-for-profit reform has received the 
least attention from PRC watchers (see, however, Lee, 1987 and Bachman, 1987). 
Therefore, details of its policies and of the process of its implementation will be 
described and its origin and failure examined. 
The tax-for-profit system emerged as an alternative to profit retention, an off­
shoot of the perception that collectively-owned enterprises with independent account­
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ing {duli hesuan jiti qiye) were relatively successful, as well as of a strong motivation 
to assure state revenue. The earlist experimental "tax-for-profit" schemes evolved 
from state policy towards most collectively-owned enterprises. Unlike state-owned 
enterprises, which were directly controlled by the state, the collectively-owned enter­
prises practiced independent accounting and were responsible for their own profits 
and losses {duli hesuan, zifu yingkuei); over these firms the state had exercised rela­
tively indirect control. 
The tax-for-profit experiment was first attempted in Guanghua county of Hubei 
province in 1979, with small state enterprises at the county level. The independent 
accounting practice of collectively-owned enterprises was extended to five large state 
enterprises (Sichuan No.l Cotton Textile Mill, The Chengdu Electric Wire Plant, 
The Southwest China Electric Appliance Plant, The Chongqing Clock and Watch 
Company, and the Chongqing No.3 Printing House), some small state-owned enter­
prises in Sichuan province (Wang, 1982), enterprises under Light Industrial Corpora­
tion in Shanghai, and plants in other localities such as Liuzhou in Guangxi province, 
Shashi in Hubei province, Chongqing in Sichuan province, and Changzhou in Jiangsu 
province. The participating enterprises were allowed to deliver taxes in place of prof­
its and were required to assume full responsibility for their own profits and losses 
(The State Economic Commission, 1980). 
Early in September 1980, the State Economic Commission (1980) summarized 
three basic experimental models in Sichuan, Shanghai, and Liuzhou and requested 
every local government to select one or two enterprises to test according to three 
models; a) the "Sichuan model," which required experimental enterprises to pay three 
types of taxes—an industrial and commercial tax, a fixed-asset tax, and an income 
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tax; b) the "Shanghai model," which stipulated that participating enterprises, instead 
of remitting profits, had to pay five taxes and two fees-an industrial and commercial 
tax, an income adjustment tax, a real estate tax, a transportation license tax, an 
income tax, a fixed-asset utilization fee, and a working capital utilization fee; and 
c) the "Liuzhou model," under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Finance, which 
required enterprises to pay four taxes and two fees—an appreciation tax, a natural 
resource tax, a progressive income adjustment tax, an income tax, and fixed-asset 
and working capital utilization fees. 
In March 1981, the Ministry of Finance (1981b) promulgated a document pro­
viding a series of regulations concerning the tax-for-profit scheme in selected exper­
imental enterprises. The document decreed that, in such experimental enterprises, 
four types of taxes would be collected: a resource tax, which would be collected on 
industries producing oil, natural gas, and rare metals, having relatively high prof­
itabilities; an income tax collected on all enterprises at the rate of 50 percent of their 
incomes; a working capital utilization fee charged at a monthly rate of 0.2 percent; 
and a fixed-assets utilization fee charged at a monthly rate of between 0.2 percent to 
0.8 percent, depending upon the industry. Additionally, a Joint Circular issued by 
the State Economic Commission and nine other state agencies (1981) in May 1981 re­
quested that extension of experimental enterprises cease. Many enterprises, however, 
were enthusiastic about this trial. By mid-1982, 456 enterprises had been included 
as experimental enterprises with tax-for-profit schemes (Wang and Zhu, 1985:841). 
After these experiments, the government decided to expand the tax-for-profit 
program nationwide. From 1983 to 1985, it was introduced in two stages. The 
first stage (1983-84) involved the coexistence of tax and profit: enterprises paid an 
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industrial-commercial tax on their sales revenues and an income tax on their realized 
income and then handed over a share of their profits to the state. In the second stage 
(1984-85), profit remittance was expected to be replaced entirely by income tax (The 
Ministry of Finance, 1983a). 
Coexistence of tax and profit: 1983-1084 
In March 1983, a National Tax-for-profit Work Conference was convened by the 
Ministry of Finance, and a report was compiled (The Ministry of Finance, 1983a). 
This report was subsequently sent to the State Council for approval. On 24 April 
1983, the State Council handed down an endorsement that highly praised the report. 
The Council believed that the tax-for-profit program represented a step in the right 
direction towards solving the problems of state-enterprise relations and that "it is 
much superior to alternative methods" (The Ministry of Finance, 1983a:l). It was 
believed that the program would serve five purposes. First, through standardized tax 
rates, the distributive relations between state and enterprise could be formalized; by 
linking performance and reward, the reform would encourage enterprise to improve 
management. Second, formalized taxation would solve the problems arising from 
bargaining between state and enterprise over the baseline figure resulting from profit 
retention schemes. Third, a unified taxation system could help solve the problem of 
local protectionism. Fourth, such a system would provide the state with an effective 
economic lever by which to coordinate the economic activity according to the macro-
economic need. And fifth, it would ensure stable revenues for the state and balance 
the interests of state, enterprises, and individuals (The Ministry of Finance, 1983a). 
To ensure a smooth transition from profit remittance to taxation, the first stage 
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of this reform was cautiously designed to be a coexistence of tax and profit. State-
owned enterprises were each placed in one of two categories (medium- and large-scale 
enterprises, and small-scale enterprises) according to their original fixed asset value 
(1,500,000 yuan being the dividing point) and annual profit (200,000 yuan being the 
dividing point). Small-scale enterprises were required to pay taxes on their profits 
according to an eight-tiered, progressive tax scale. After paying the tax, they would 
take responsibility for their own profits and losses (The Ministry of Finance, 1983b). 
From the medium- and large-scale enterprises, 55 percent of profits were to be 
collected as income tax after the enterprise had paid an industrial commercial tax 
(turnover tax) on their sales revenues. This rate applied to all industries except 
the military, postal and telecommunications, grain production, foreign trade, and 
agriculture industry, and those industries run by labor reform camps. The after­
tax profits would be shared by the state and the enterprise, according to one of 
several methods (a progressive profit-sharing rate, a fixed rate of profit remittance, 
an adjustment tax, and a fixed delivery quota applied only to mining enterprises), 
each of which was assessed on the basis of profit figures for the 1982 fiscal year. Once 
the rates were set, they would remain fixed for three years (The Ministry of Finance, 
1983b). 
The retained portion of profit was designed for distribution among five funds 
(wujin): a new-product development fund, a production development fund, a reserve 
fund, a welfare fund, and a bonus fund. The sum of the first three funds, later known 
as the production development fund, was decreed to be no less than 60 percent of 
total retained profits, whereas the sum of the latter two could be no greater than 40 
percent (The Ministry of Finance, 1983b). 
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The first stage of the tax-for-prolit program, or the coexistence of tax and profit, 
was launched primarily because of perceived failure in the previous efforts to change 
state-enterprise relations. This stage represented a positive step towards reducing 
paternalism in that it allowed small-scale enterprise to take full responsibility for 
it profits and losses. Yet, it was conservative to the extent that it did not address 
paternalism in the medium- and large-scale state enterprises. In fact, such enterprises 
had the same after-tax profit retention as in 1982 and were thus not yet responsible for 
profits and losses. Because of the coexistence of tax and profit, bargaining over profit 
retention persisted and in some instances even intensified. As Bachman (1987:138) 
pointed out, "LGS (it li gai shui) in 1983 was more an extension of the previous 
profit-retention system than it was a new policy initiative." 
The second stage of tax-for-profit: 1984-1986 
Consistent with the policy of formalizing state-enterprise relations through tax­
ation, the second stage of tax-for-profit was expected to be a major step by the state 
towards solving the problems already discussed. The revised program was adopted 
in June 1984 and introduced nationwide the next October. A comprehensive tax 
scheme was designed to replace the unified industrial-commercial tax with product, 
value-added, salt, and operational taxes; to introduce a new resource tax; to set new 
local taxes, including city construction, real estate, land utilization, and transporta­
tion taxes; and to install an income tax (55 percent) as well as an adjustment tax to 
be levied on the basis of 1983's realized profit with the overfulfilled portion shared 
between the state and the enterprise at the ratio of 30:70. Once decided, this ratio 
would remain unchanged for seven years unless there were a significant change in gov­
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ernment policy or an irresistable change in the business environment (The Ministry 
of Finance, 1984). 
For small-scale enterprises, a revised eight-tiered progressive tax system was 
adopted. Revision of the system placed enterprises with less than 3,000,000 yuan fixed 
assets and 300,000 yuan annual profit in this category. For small-scale enterprises 
in Bejing, Shanghai, and Tianjing municipalities, the criteria were set at 4,000,000 
yuan and 400,000 yuan, respectively. 
Obviously the second stage of the tax-for-profit reform was intended to reform 
the medium- and large-scale state enterprises in two regards. First, the intent was 
to reduce the degree of paternalism in state-enterprise relation by formalizing the 
financial relation by means of a standardized taxation system. Second, the state 
hoped to create a competitive, marketlike environment for enterprises through a 
delicate financial design expected to "tax away" variations across them. 
It was assumed that by breaking down the original industrial commercial tax 
(turnover tax) into four components (product, value-added, business, and salt) and 
by mirroring the existing price structure through setting taxes according to price, the 
state would tax away product profitability differentials created by distorted pricing 
structure. It was also assumed that by introducing a firm-specific adjustment tax, 
the state would absorb the remaining undeserved portion of profits not covered by 
other taxes (Wong, 1986). Finally, in the original design, a fixed asset tax was to be 
built into the resource tax, which was assumed to tax away the differences in capital 
intensity across enterprises (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988). Through these mechanisms, 
therefore, it was expected that the system would take careful account of discrepancies 
in product prices and in access to resources, thereby allowing reward to be linked to an 
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enterprise's real performance, with no external factors (e.g., price, capital, technology, 
labor quality) affecting that linkage. Consequently, a simulated competitive market 
could be created, and enterprises would face a competitive environment on equal 
standings. 
By the end of 1985, 81 percent of all state enterprises had reportedly shifted from 
the responsibility to the tax-for-profit system (The State Statistical Bureau, 1986b). 
By the end of 1986, it was claimed that, with the exception of Capital Steel and 
several dozen other enterprises permitted to test out alternative reform programs, all 
state enterprises were under the tax-for-profit system (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988). 
Discussion 
Although the first stage of the tax-for-profit program took the form of coexis­
tence of tax and profit and was thus conservative, representing at most an extension 
of previous reform programs, the second stage of reform was seen as a significant step 
towards both reforming state-enterprise relations and reducing the degree of paternal­
ism. The original design was intended to create a genuine competitive environment 
for state enterprise, through the dampening of allocational distortions caused by the 
state-imposed pricing system, a system reflecting neither actual costs nor relative 
scarcity. By using a standardized tax system to formalize state-enterprise financial 
relations, reformers attempted to make enterprise truly responsible for profits and 
losses and to redefine the boundary between the state and the economy. 
Lee (1987) highly praised this reform and concluded that it was "an innovative 
alternative to command economy" (p.210) and "constituted a significant step toward 
the economic approach"(p.211). But as plausible as it may have seemed, in real­
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ity, the reform was, as Wong (1986; 1988) pointed out, generally a failure. It not 
only exacerbated the problems inherent in the old system but also generated novel 
distortions. The original designers had envisaged that formalized state-enterprise 
distributive relations and standardized taxation would eliminate administrative ar­
bitrariness; to the contrary, these reforms introduced their own irrationality and 
produced new administrative arbitrariness (Naughton, 1985; Bachman, 1987). 
The foremost defect of the second stage of the tax-for-profit plan was to be 
found in how profit was shared between state and enterprise. The relatively high 
product tax proposed by the Ministry of Finance encountered full-fledged resistance 
from local enterprises (Shirk, 1989) For example, later investigations revealed that 
the entire province of Jilin had never truly implemented the tax-for-profit scheme 
but had, instead, "used some flexible method to adhere to the responsibility system" 
(Micro Economic Research Office of the State Economic System Reform Institute, 
1988:1). During the tax-for-profit reform, some areas in Guangdong Province im­
plemented a so-called underground contract system in resistance to tax-for-profit 
(Capital Entrepreuneur Association, 1988). 
In theory, enterprise should have shifted to the tax-for-profit program by the 
end of 1985 (Wang and Zhu, 1985:324), but in practice many did not. For exam­
ple, instead of shifting to tax-for-profit, Jilin Industrial Chemical Corporation ac­
tually implemented a progressive profit contract system during 1983-1985 (Capital 
Entrepreneur Association, 1988c). In Fujian Province, real levied income tax rarely 
exceeded 40 percent of actual profits, whereas the decreed percentage was 55. As 
the director of the Reform Theory Bureau under the State Economic System Re­
form Commission pointed out, the phenomenon of widespread underground contract 
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systems testified to the shortcomings inherent in formalized taxation as a means for 
reforming the economy (Song, 1988). 
As with the first stage of reform which had turned out to be more conservative 
than local experiments would have indicated (Bach m an, 1987), substitution of an 
adjustment tax for a fixed assets tax was a good example of organizational inertia 
and the politics of reform. In this latter stage of reform, it had originally been pro­
posed to incorporate a fixed asset tax to narrow the differential in capital intensities 
among enterprises. In the final version of tax-for-profit regulations, however, this 
fixed assets tax was not mentioned. Instead, the adjustment tax, which was believed 
to introduce administrative arbitrariness, was encouraged (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 
1988). As described by Shirk (1989), the reason for this flip-flop was to compensate 
the Ministry of Finance for lowering the product tax. 
Finally, the arbitrariness and ambiguity inherent in the profit sharing system 
were not alleviated. In some instances, they were intensified. The arbitrariness 
introduced by the adjustment tax replaced the baseline profit as a bargaining focus. 
Ambiguities in tax rules allowed some enterprises to violate the rules and to evade 
taxation altogether. 
The most serious consequence of this reform was that it detered further efforts. 
Because the design of the program mirrored the distorted price structure, on which 
large amounts of taxes were based, the program actually served to reinforce rather 
than to correct distortion. As Bachman (1985:139) rightly argued, "once it (the 
tax-for-profitscheme) becomes institutionalized, it is likely to deter meaningful price 
reform due to the difficulties in changing the established sharing system and large 
reduction of revenue that is based on the irrational price system." 
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Contract Responsibility System: 1986-1988 
The contract responsibility system: a revival of profit retention? 
The failure of the tax-for-profit program to reach the dual objectives of creating a 
competetive environment for state enterprise and of formalizing state-enterprise rela­
tions led reform the PRC to enter the third stage-the contract responsibility system. 
Recognizing the defects inherent in the simple material incentive of profit sharing, in 
the decentralization of administration, and in the failure of uniform taxation in the 
absence of a rational pricing system, the contract responsibility system was ushered 
in as an alternative method of reforming state-enterprise relations. Based on the 
belief that separation of ownership from management was the key to invigorating 
medium- and large-scale state enterprise, this new program was designed to replace 
hierarchical relations with contractual relations. 
Unlike that of the first stage of reform, the objective of the third stage was to 
establish a contractual relation between the state and its enterprises that would be 
compatible with the principles and procedures of the market economy (Hua, Zhang, 
and Luo, 1988). The first stage of reform was based on the belief that the overar­
ching defect of the Soviet-type economic system was overcentralization. It was thus 
expected that once enterprises were given some autonomy and allowed to claim a 
slice of residual profit, they would have sufficient incentive to improve efficiency. But 
the contract responsibility system actually implemented after 1986 was based on a 
different line of thinking. It was based on the recognition that one of the central 
perplexities of the Soviet-type economic system is the issue of property rights (the 
ownership system). As the proponents of reform argued, "the success or failure of a 
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market-oriented reform, by and large, depends on the establishment of a property-
structure compatible with the principles and procedures of the market economy" 
(Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988:5). 
In addition, the failure of tax-for-profit reforms reminded some reform theorists 
of the duality of the role played by the state—that is, as property owner on one 
hand and as manager of society on the other. The subject of reform of the state-
enterprise relation was still the same, but the focus had become clarification of the 
vague boundary between state and enterprise. The reform theorists believed that to 
cut state enterprise's traditional role as a state appendage and to make them gen­
uinely independent financially, ownership and management had to be separated. This 
separation was to be achieved through a contractual relation replacing the command 
relation (the State Economic Commission and the State Economic System Reform 
Commission, 1987). 
The proponents of the contract responsibility system, therefore, reasoned not 
only that the underlying rationales of the third stage of reform had transcended 
the simple material incentives and simple administrative decentralization of the first 
stage, but also that the objective of separating ownership from management was quite 
different from the objective of expanding enterprise autonomy. The first stage had 
been designed to effect reform within the scope of the existing Soviet-type system, 
they argued, but the third stage was designed to touch the core of the system itself. 
While the first stage of reform had been implemented primarily as administrative 
decentralization, the third stage was implemented to establish market-like contractual 
relations aimed at making enterprises genuinely independent (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 
1988). 
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Although the underlying rationales and objectives of the two stages of reform 
were different, the contract responsibility system later turned out to be, to a great 
extent, a repetition of the first stage of reform. Furthermore, the problems and 
difficulties it encountered during implementation were similar to those encountered 
by the first. Despite the arguments of reform theorists (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988), 
who defended this third stage of reform in terms of its disposition to substitute 
market-like contractual relations for hierarchical ones, the real effect of the reform 
were hardly what the theorists had envisaged. 
First, the contract responsibility system grew from complaints made by enter­
prise managers about heavy taxation imposed by tax-for-profit reforms. A sharp de­
cline in both industrial growth rate and productivity in many industrial enterprises 
confirmed their point. Reformers had believed that enterprise managers should be 
given enough autonomy in decision-making, which was expected to be the driving 
force of the earlier high industrial growth rates. The earlier profit retention scheme 
by which enterprises were given relatively more profits was therefore considered an 
appropriate means of stimulating productivity. 
Second, the contract responsibility system also grew from reformers' dissatis­
faction with the tax-for-profit plan's inability to create a competitive environment 
for enterprise. The reform theorists believed that, given the wide range of variation 
across different enterprises in terms of both capital and technological intensity and 
price distortion, the only way to create a competitive environment was to determine 
the profit remittance ratio on a case by case base through contracting between gov­
ernment superordinate bodies and enterprises. As former premier Zhao (1988:9-10) 
put it, "state enterprises are currently operating in an unequal environment; this 
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unequal environment can be alleviated through the contract responsibility system." 
He argued that the creation of an equitable environment involved reform of the price 
and planning systems, reform then impossible. He thus saw the contract responsibil­
ity system as a feasible means of pushing enterprises towards accountability for their 
own losses and profits (Zhao, 1988). 
Third, the reformers believed that as long as no changes occurred in the state's 
dual role of property owner and society manager, the coexistence of tax and profit 
could remain a feasible means of distributive relations between the state and its 
enterprises. So a return to profit retention through contracting instead of through 
formalized taxation was seen as the proper direction to take (Zhao, 1988). Thus, 
although the reform had as its basic theoretical principle the new idea of separating 
ownership and management, the actual means resorted to was not new at all. 
The implementation of the contract responsibility system 
With the objectives of separating ownership from management, in December 
1986, the State Council (1986) issued a document calling for deepening enterprise 
reform and invigorating enterprise. In this document, past failure to implement ex­
panded enterprise autonomy were blamed mainly on the intermediaries who had not 
implemented the central policies sincerely and who had whithheld large portions of 
decentralized power. The document decreed that, based on the principle of sepa­
ration of ownership and management rights, the most important aspect of the new 
program regarding deepening reform and invigorating the economy was the granting 
of adequate managerial autonomy to enterprise managers. 
As with the tax-for-profit reform, state-owned enterprises were divided into two 
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categories: medium- and large-scale state enterprises and small-scale state enter­
prises. The latter were to take part in an experimental system of leases and contrac­
tual operations, whereas the former were to take part in variations on the contract 
responsibility system or in a shareholder system (The State Council of PRC, 1986). 
In addition to clarifying the reform objectives in the direction of establishing 
contractual relationship, State enterprises were encouraged, in addition to clarifying 
reform objectives towards establishing contractual relations, to quickly implement a 
factor-director responsibility system. They were also given autonomy in wage and 
bonus scales decision making within the state-stipulated range, and encouraged to 
merge or to establish the horizontal links by which to develop into industrial and 
commercial conglomerates. At the same time, the state intended to limit its command 
of enterprise and to encourage self-marketing. 
In accordance with contract responsibility system policy, the State Economic 
Commission and the State Economic System Reform Commission (1987) jointly is­
sued another policy paper entitled Suggestions Concerning Deepening Enterprise Re­
form and Improving the Contract Responsibility System in August 1987. This pa­
per elaborated on rationales and detailed stipulations. It stated that "the contract 
system is not a transitional expedient measure; it might be a way (of reforming 
state/enterprise relations). Therefore, it must be continued and improved gradu­
ally" (The State Economic Commission and The State Economic System Reform 
Commission, 1987:36). 
This report formally stated the objectives of formalizing the state-enterprise 
relation through contracts and of attaching independent-entity status to state enter­
prises. It suggested an introduction of competition into the contractual process by 
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using bids as a mechanism by which to identify entrepreuneureship. In addition, it 
suggested that separate accounts should be kept for state and enterprise funds, which 
was considered a step in the direction towards separation of ownership and manage­
ment; at the same time, enterprises were encouraged to become major investors and 
developers under the state's guidance. 
Based on these policy suggestions, the State Council (1988) issued a tract entitled 
Provisional Regulations Concerning the Contract Operational Responsibility System 
in State-Owned Industrial Enterprises in February 1988 that finally formalized this 
system. As with the policy implementations of the previous two stages of reform, 
enterprise shifted direction rapidly. By mid-1987, 74.7 percent of the medium- and 
large-scale state industrial enterprises had implemented this system, according to a 
variety of profit retention contracts; 43 percent of the small-scale enterprises had 
either become collectively-owned enterprises or had been leased to individuals for 
operation (People's Daily, August 10, 1987). According to the Statistical Commu­
nique published by the State Statistical Bureau (1988b;1989), by the end of 1987, the 
number of enterprises implementing the contract responsibility system had increased 
to 8,118, or 82 percent, among the medium- and large-scale state enterprises. The 
number increased to 9,024, or more than 90 percent, by the end of 1988. 
Like the economic responsibility system implemented during the first stage of 
reform, the contract responsibility system was a generic name subsuming different 
forms of contracting. To obtain a clear view both of how enterprises were grouped 
under the system and of the extent to which the systems was implemented, it is useful 
to look at summary statistics of how the system was implemented at the provincial 
level. Fujian and Guangdong will be used in this example. 
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According to a "Summary Table of the Current Situation Concerning Implemen­
tation of the Contract Responsibility System in Fujian Province" (Fujian Provincial 
Finance Bureau, 1988) which was collected during the field trip, there were 1,056 
state-owned industrial enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Fujian Provincial 
government that were involved in one or another form of the contract responsibil­
ity system. The real implementation of this system occured after 1987, however, 
because only one small enterprise and only 93 medium- and large-scale enterprises 
operated under this system before 1987. These firms accounted for less than 10 per­
cent of the total number of state enterprises. State enterprises were grouped into 
four general categories: medium- and large-scale enterprises, small-scale enterprises, 
marginally profitable enterprises, and loss-making enterprises. Each of the categories 
was considered suited to a specific contract system. For the medium- and large-scale 
enterprises, three major types of contract systems applied: the two guarantees and 
one link [liangbao yigua), the progressive profit remittance contract {shangjao liren 
dizheng baogan), and the baseline figure profit remittance contract (shangjao liren 
jishu baogan), with 18.8, 30.6, and 38.0 percent of these enterprises in each of the 
three categories, respectively, and the remainder being given other types of contract. 
For small-scale enterprises, there were two major contract types: the contract system 
( chengbao zhi) and the leasing system (zuling zi), with the majority of such enterprises 
under the former (97.6 percent). 
Seventy-six enterprises operated at a loss, or 7.2 percent of the total, and 150 of 
the enterprises were marginally profitable, or 14.2 percent. For enterprises operating 
at a loss, a loss contract system applied; the report did not indicate how marginally 
profitable enterprises operated under the contract responsibility system. 
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Table 3.3: Categories of Enterprises under Contract Responsibility System in Fujian 
Province: 1987° 
Categories Number Percent Percent 
(Category) (Total) 
1. Mid- and Large-Scale Enterprises 271 100.0 25.66 
a. Two Guarantees and One Link 51 18.8 4,83 
b. Progressive Profit Contract 83 30.6 7.86 
c. Base-figure Profit Contract 103 38.0 9.75 
d. Other Types of Contract 34 12.5 3.22 
2. Small-Scale Enterprises 466 100.0 44.13 
a. Contract Systems 455 97.6 42.99 
b. System of Leasing 11 2.4 1.04 
3. Marginally Profitable Enterprise 150 100.0 14.20 
4. Loss-Making Enterprises 76 100.0 7.20 
Tujian Provincial Finance Bureau, 1988. 
The pattern of distribution in Guangdong Province was somewhat different. 
According to one report prepared by the Industrial Economics Research Institute 
(1988), by the end of 1987, 1,824 out of 1,920 enterprises, or 95 percent, under the 
jurisdiction of the Guangdong provincial government had implemented the contract 
responsibility system. Unlike in Fujian province, the Guangdong province did not 
make distinction between medium- and large-scale and small-scale enterprises and 
between profitable and marginally profitable ones. Instead, enterprises were assigned 
one of four major contract types: 1,022, or 56.0 percent, implemented the baseline 
figure profit contract system; 220, or 12.1 percent, the two guarantee and one link 
system; 315, or 17.3 percent, the progressive profit contract system; and 127, or 7.0 
percent, the loss-contract system. The report did not indicate what the remaining 
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137, or 7.6 percent implemented. 
An observation should be made regarding the pattern of distribution. In general, 
the distribution pattern of the two provinces indicated that the largest group of 
enterprises was that under the baseline figure profit remittance contract system. The 
second largest was the group under the progressive profit remittance contract system. 
The third largest was the group under the system of two guarantees and one link. 
In both provinces, 7 percent of enterprises operated at a loss. As was seen in the 
economic responsibility system of 1982, different forms of contractual systems placed 
different requirements on enterprises. The two guarantees and one link was the system 
with the most stringent requirements, and the baseline figure system was that with 
the least stringent requirements (see discussion, in Chapter IV). Therefore, a relation 
readily apparent is that fewer enterprises were included in the more stringent category 
than in the least stringent one. 
Discussion 
The third stage of reform was designed to replace hierarchical command rela­
tions between state and enterprise with a market-like contractual relation, and thus 
to make enterprises independent economic entities. One of the key goals of this stage 
of reform was to introduce competitive mechanisms into the contractual process that 
were considered essential to the reform (Hua, He, Luo, and Zhang, 1986; China En­
terprise Reform Research Group, 1988; Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988). Given the these 
goals, questions arise as to what extent the contract responsibility system actually 
introduced competitive mechanisms into enterprise contracting and to what extent 
the objective of making state enterprises independent economic entities responsible 
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for their own profits and losses was accomplished. 
The difficulties encountered by the outside contractors attempting to enter re­
flects upon the degree of competitiveness introduced into the contractual process. 
Despite repeated calls to introduce competition into contracting through bidding, no 
evidence supports an increase in bidders. Of 90 managers I interviewed in 1988, only 
11 reported that contracts were based on bids from more than one bidder. Only nine 
reported that the management group reorganized after contracting. 
Late in 1987, the same pattern was reported by a broad survey of industrial man­
agers that was conducted by the China Enterprise Reform Research Group (1988). 
Its findings indicate that, with exception of enterprises under the leasing system in 
which 25 percent of managers are outside bidders, all other enterprise categories had 
very low frequencies of entry by outside contractors. This suggests that less compet­
itive mechanisms were introduced into the medium- and large-scale enterprises than 
the small state enterprises (Table 3.4) because the leasing system was only applied 
to the latter. Furthermore, a report made by Party Secretary He (1988) of Jilin 
Province, a model province in industrial reform, indicated that, in his province, more 
than 90 percent of contractors were inside bidders. Of these, more than 70 percent 
had been the original managers. 
The result of a broad survey conducted by the State Statistical Bureau (1987b) is 
even more revealing. It reported that the overwhelming majority of state enterprises 
were contracted to the original managers. Out of 18,000 enterprises (including non-
industrial business) surveyed, less than 100 managers had won bids through real 
competition. Of these enterprises, 26 were in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, which 
was the system's "experimental site." Only one or two competitive examples could 
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Table 3.4: The distribution of outside and inside contractors^ 
Contractors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outside 3.5 3.9 10.5 9.4 25.0 
Inside 96.5 96.1 89.5 91.6 75.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 376 308 38 32 100 
®China Enterprise Research Group, 1988:197-198. (1) Baseline Figure Profit Con­
tract. (2) Linking Total Wage Bill to Profit. (3) Loss-reduction Contract. (4) Asset 
Management Responsibility System. (5) System of Leasing. 
be found in each of the other cities studied. 
The low rate of entry by outside bidders illustrates the absence of competition in 
the contracting process. In fact, as China's Enterprise Reform Research Group (1988) 
reported, 54.6 percent of 1,296 enterprise managers reported that the major reason 
for implementing the system was that it was required by the superior government 
bodies; only 13.8 percent reported profit maximization was the major reason for 
implementation. 
Enterprises continued to rely heavily on government favor and hidden subidies 
after implementation of the contract responsibility system. An industrial survey by 
the State Statistical Bureau (1987b) showed that many superior government bodies 
followed the traditional ways of disaggregating planning tasks to surbordinate en­
terprises; thus "no responsibilities nor risks were contracted" (the State Statistical 
Bureau, 1987c:5). Many enterprises complained that the system contracts only profit 
remittance tasks, and that other contracts are simply nonsensical. In this view, the 
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system is merely a tool for the state to assure its profit shares, at the same time 
strengthening its authority rather than relinquishing it (the State Statistical Bureau, 
19875:5-7). 
The managers I interviewed frequently referred to the support of government 
bodies {shangji lingdao zhichi) as the most important factor behind their successes. 
This hanging of success and failure on the state has led to a situation similar to 
that described by Kornai (1980b) in his essay on the Hungarian reform experience. 
In Hungary, as in the PRC, enterprises granted autonomy by reform voluntarily 
resubjected themselves to state patronage. By requesting price adjustments, tax 
cuts, lower profit remittance rates, and increasing credits to ensure operation, they 
confirmed their dependence on the state apparatus. Thus the behavior of enterprise 
in effect served to perpetuate the paternalistic nature of state-enterprise relations 
and to reinforce its own dependency on the state. 
Conclusion 
What can we learn from ten year of reform in the PRC? First, how does a so­
cialist institution change? The institutional perspective maintains that institutions 
change through a process in which rules and procedures governing participants' activ­
ities are modified. The PRC's ten-year reform experiences testifies to the validity of 
this tenet. By presenting analysis of government documents, this study reveals that 
the rules and procedures governing industrial organizations in the PRC's state sector 
have undergone noteworthy changes, particularly in terms of state-enterprise rela­
tions. Institutional changes have been carried out primarily by the PRC government 
through conscious efforts aimed at reducing the role of the state and at changing the 
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paternalistic nature of state-enterprise relations. 
Ten years of reform have led to both claims and counter-claims about the degree 
to which paternalism and inefficiency have been reduced. The extent to which the 
reform efforts to change rules and procedures have been successful is in question, 
as are the continuities and discontinuities in the reform involved. The institutional 
perspective maintains that institutional arrangements affect the incentive structure 
and thus influence participants' behavior. To what extent have the modified rules 
and procedures affected incentive structure and enterprise behavior? 
As demonstrated in the preceding discussions, industrial reform in the PRC has 
indeed brought about genuine change in some areas, particularly in terms of the cri­
teria used to assess managerial performance, the degree of enterprise autonomy in 
decision making, and the incentives given managers and workers. At the same time, 
this study indicates that reform efforts to reduce the role of the state and to specify 
new rules and procedures have generally failed. Failure has resulted not only because 
each stage of reform introduced its own problems and unintended consequences, but 
also because it failed to alter some fundamental property of state-enterprise rela­
tion, specifically, the omnipresent paternalism. As White (1989:24) argued, "the 
fundamental nature of the relationship between state and enterprises has changed 
little", "nor has market process expanded as much as the reform blueprint envis­
aged" (White, 1989:24). 
The successive reforms did indeed introduce the profit motive into the lives of en­
terprise managers (Reynolds, 1987; Byrd and Tidrick, 1987). This, however, did not 
guarantee that enterprise would be driven by market forces instead of bureaucratic 
forces. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, under the current system. 
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profits are raised primarily by bureaucratic manipulation and are thus largely un­
related to actual performance. Profit-remittance has indeed been to a great extent 
replaced by taxes. But in actuality, bargaining over plan targets has been replaced by 
bargaining over retained profits, tax rates, investments, and prices of inputs and out­
puts, all of which remain important activities of enterprise managers. Although there 
has been a gradual shift in the traditional relation between a strong, pervasive state 
and its weak, captive enterprises, paternalism seems entrenched in state-enterprise 
relations. When enterprise managers realize that they will be better off if depen­
dent on the state, they surrender their newly acquired autonomy and behave in the 
familiar docile manner. 
The process of social change has long been a concern of sociology (Zaltman, 
1973). What are the characteristics of this process directed by the government of 
the PRC? Organizational inertia (Hall, 1987), systemic nature, and interconnected-
ness of social systems (Watson, 1973) all of which can impede change. As shown in 
the previous discussion, implementation of reform often resembled only superficially 
what reformers had originally envisaged. That the tax-for-profit program was resisted 
by an underground contract system in Jilin and Guangdong, and that the contract 
responsibility system was implemented such that most enterprises were included in 
the least stringent system are good examples of organizational resistance to change. 
Furthermore, the reluctance of the PRC government to alter fundamentally the pat­
tern of ownership and the inchoate nature of the reform testifies to the organization's 
being itself a major factor in the resistance to change. 
As indicated, a social system is a complex organism; it is difficult to change one 
aspect of the system without effecting concomitant changes in other aspects (Watson, 
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1973). Thus unreformed aspects of the financial structure (e.g., pricing structure, 
labor allocation, bankruptcy laws) had deeply felt ramifications on the reform of 
state/enterprise relations. Expanded enterprise autonomy without accompanying 
regulatory measures also had serious consequences (Perkins, 1988). As I will illustrate 
in the fifth chapter, the unreformed pricing structure impeded the objective judgment 
of organizational performance and consequently weakened the link between efficiency 
and reward. 
As was observed by Kornai (1980b; 1987) in his study of the Hungarian reform, 
the wave of economic dynamism brought about by decentralization and market forces 
was followed by several unintended consequences: overinvestment, budget deficits, 
wage and bonus explosions, and inflation pressures (Perkins, 1988). Resolution of 
these defects is overshadowed by persistent inefficiency in industrial production and 
by paternalistic state-enterprise relations, which, in addition to being the root cause 
of inefficiency, also constitute the most intricate dilemma faced by socialist reformers. 
In keeping with Kornai's (1987; 1989) observations, the reform of state-enterprise 
relations in the PRC reveals a pattern of alternating decentralization and recentraliza-
tion, reform and reversal, and progress and entrenchment. This alternating pattern 
of evolution of reform, supports Kornai's (1980b) argument that institutional reform 
in socialist economy, if not implemented in a coordinated manner, will involve a long 
historical process sometimes accelerating, sometimes decelarating, and in certain pe­
riods even reversing itself. 
The progress and difficulties accompanied the entire process of industrial reform 
demonstrate that it is far more difficult to abdicate a centrally managed bureaucratic 
mode of governance than to install one. The PRC economy, restructured by ten years 
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of reform, has moved away from generic Soviet-type socialism. But this restructuring 
has been, at most, piecemeal and has represented, by and large, technical improve­
ments within the existing Soviet-type system, rather than attempts at fundamental 
reform. As Perkins (1988: 618) argued, after these ten years, "both bureaucratic and 
market forces governed enterprise behavior"; but, at the same time, the economy, as 
Baum (1989: 121) put it, was "neither effectively plan-driven nor essentially market-
driven." Enterprises have begun to evidence the profit motive and limited autonomy 
in their operations. At the same time, they continued to rely on the government. 
The emerging mode, dissimilar to either the ideal-typical market or the hierarchy 
described by economists (Williamson, 1985), turned out to resemble Kornai's (1987) 
dual dependence. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE PERSISTENCE OF HIERARCHY: 
PATERNALISM AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
Economic reform in the PRC raised new concerns in 1988. With the highest 
inflation rate ever experienced in the history of PRC, a large budget deficit (eight 
billion yuan), and continued low efficiency, the early heroism and euphoria of re­
formers were forgotten in the face of public dismay and suspicion. Many traditional 
methods that had been abondoned during the reform years began to reappear. For 
example, political and administrative means were again advocated by the state as 
instruments to counter the inflation. Dominant concern of the late 1980s, instead of 
how to choose from among alternative reform strategies, became whether any such 
reforms could rescue the PRC from the economic morass in which it found itself. 
Aggregated statistics were disappointing. Losses to state enterprises totaled 4.2 
billion yuan in 1982; this figure was nearly doubled by 1988, when losses totaled 
8.2 billion (the State Statistical Bureau, 1989:325). Performance indicators were 
also gloomy. Although the gross value of industrial output produced by fixed assets 
increased, both profits and taxes generated by inputs decreased, indicating faltering 
efficiency (the State Statistical Bureau, 1986a:326;1987a:323;1988a:389;1989a:320). 
After ten years of reform, many features of hierarchical planning were still en­
trenched in the system. The entire economy continued to be plagued by symptoms 
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typical of a shortage economy as described by Kornai (1980). Questions therefore 
naturally arose as to why the ten years of reform had not been adequate to elim-
ininate these classic phenomena. What had constituted the root cause of continued 
organizational failure? 
In this chapter, I will argue that the continued dominance of paternalism in state-
enterprise relations and the persistence of soft budget constraints observed by Kornai 
in Hungary (1980b;1987;1989) are features also characterizing relations in the PRC 
and that they are the major factors responsible for continued organizational failure. 
In the first section of the chapter, I will elaborate Kornai's concepts of paternalism 
and soft budget constraints, and develop hypotheses regarding these concepts. I will 
then test these hypotheses in part and disscuss Kornai's concepts as they pertain to 
the PRC's state industrial sector. I will base the hypothese testing and the discussion 
on a number of case studies of both documentary and statistical data and conclude 
the chapter with a theoretical discussion. 
Paternalism and Soft Budget Constraints 
In the hierarchical mode of governance, Kornai (1986:7) argued, "shortage is con­
tinually reborn out of social conditions and certain characteristics of the economic 
mechanisms" and "the explanation of chronicle shortage, of suction, and of the func­
tioning of a resource-constrained system is to be found not in the financial sphere, 
or in special features of price information, but at a deeper level, in institutional re­
lationships and in behavioral regularities which the institutional relations foster in 
decision-makers" (Kornai, 1980a:559). Two primary features characterize these insti­
tutional relations and behavioral regularities. One is a high degree of paternalism and 
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the other is soft budget constraints. As Kornai ( 1980a) indicated, the phenomenon 
of chronic shortage was perpetuated by both a high degree of paternalism and soft 
budget constraints manifesting this paternalism. 
Kornai (1987) maintained that the persistence of paternalism and soft bugdet 
constraints are the defining features of state-enterprise relations in an economy char­
acterized by dual dependence. Because Kornai's concepts were developed from his 
observation of the Hungarian economy, questions arise as to what extent they can 
be applied to other socialist countries. Were state-enterprise relations in the PRC 
also characterized by a high degree of paternalism whereby enterprise continued to 
be subsidized? Have budget constraints on enterprise in the PRC's state sector been 
hardened after reform? These questions will be elaborated on and hypotheses will be 
developed. 
In his discussion of socialist economies, Kornai (1980a:562) argued that "the 
degree of paternalism in the relation between state and micro-economic organization 
is an important characteristic of the nature of a system." But because he "does not 
embark on a detailed analysis of the social relations and political and power struc­
tures of the socialist economies" (Kornai, 1980a:561), the sociological importance 
of paternalism was not elaborated. In my view, implicit in his other discussions 
(1986;1987;1989), there are two highly interrelated components that serve to consti­
tute the concept of paternalism. On one hand, paternalism represents state efforts 
through state ownership, to assist and protect subordinate economic units in their 
initiation, survival, and expansion. On the other hand, these indulgences are accom­
panied by the dependence of economic units on their superordinate bureaucrats and 
by hierarchical control and intervention. Thus, under vigorous paternalism, economic 
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units at lower echelon will not only obtain assistance and protection from their supe­
riors, but will also obtain such assistance and protection by simultaneously sacrificing 
independence and by subjecting themselves to the control and influence of the latter. 
Power and dependence have long been concerns of sociologists studying social 
relations. Weber (1978:942) argued that "the great majority of all economic organi­
zation, among them the most important and most modern ones, reveal a structure of 
dominancy". He also pointed out that power and domination exists when "the will 
of the one has influenced that of the other even against that other's reluctance....and 
this statement holds true for all relationship of exchange, including those of intangi­
bles" (Weber, 1978:947). Weber's argument implies that power is relational; in fact, 
Dahl (1957: 202-203) has defined it succinctly: "A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do." 
Because power exists in relations, contemporary power dependency theorists 
maintain that it is inseparable from the other party's dependence (Blau, 1964; Emer­
son, 1962). The higher the degree of dependence of B on A, the more power A will 
wield over B. In Kornai's definition of paternalism, he emphasizes state assitance to 
enterprise but does not mention the power-dependence component. 
Sociologists (Kleining, 1984; Walder, 1986) have studied the power-dependence 
dimension of paternalism. For example, in studying welfare capitalism and indus­
trial dependence in company towns, Nelson (1975) noted that dependence became a 
consequence of paternalism when workers obtained protection from their company. 
Kleining (1984) related paternalism explicitly to coersion exercised by one party and 
loss of freedom experienced by the other, Walder (1986), in analyzing industrial 
relations in the PRC, linked paternalism to organized dependence. Most of these 
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studies, however, have been concerned with the relations between individual workers 
and organizations. Little has been written about paternalism at the organizational 
level. 
This study will incorporate the power-dependency component into Kornai's pa­
ternalism framework. It is hypothesized first that the two components (power and 
dependency) are positively related. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis can be developed 
that the more a firm depends on the state, the more power the state will have over 
the firm (Hypothesis I). Dependence can be measured by the extent to which a firm 
is assisted by the state, whereas power can be measured by the extent to which the 
state can direct the firm's behavior. 
The degree of paternalism can also be determined indirectly by looking at several 
phenomena. Because power is one important dimension of paternalism, the latter can 
be assessed in terms of the extent to which a firm's revenue is redistributed by the 
state. So, Hypothesis II will stated that the more a firm's revenue is redistributed 
by the state, the greater the degrees of dependence and paternalism. 
Paternalism can be determined by looking at the extent to which a firm's reward 
is linked to its performance. This is so because strong paternalism means protection 
and assistance, regardless of the beneficiary's performance. Hypothesis III thus state 
that the weaker the linkage between performance and reward, the greater the degree 
of paternalism. 
Paternalism can also be assessed by looking at the extent to which a firm's ex­
pansion and growth depend upon its performance and asset accumulation, or depend 
upon government assistance. Hypothesis IV states that the more a firm's expansion 
and growth depend upon the firm itself, the lower the degree of paternalism, and that 
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the more they depend on government assistance, the higher the degree of paternalism. 
Soft budget constraints as developed by Kornai (1980a), refer to a lack of finan­
cial discipline in micro-economic relations. Soft budget constraints are characterized 
by a phenomenon in which firms were not obliged to cover expenditures from revenues 
made on the market, but instead supplemented by bureaucratic institutions in terms 
of price, tax, state grants, credit, and other subsidies. Soft budget constraint is also 
a concept encompassing a cluster of phenomena that prevalent in socialist societies. 
In discussing the problems of soft budget constraints in socialist economies, Kornai 
(1980a) noted several conditions that breed soft budget constraint phenomenon. 
First, in socialist economies, a firm is a price-maker rather than a price-taker, a 
statement referring to the phenomenon whereby prices are not subject to the demand 
and supply conditions of the market. State authorities can adjust prices at their 
will, and firms can influence them. Second, the tax system is soft. Not only is the 
tax rule formulation subject to the influence of various authorities, but exemptions 
or postponement can be granted to firms according to the will of the authorities. 
Third, free state grants can be extended to enterprises regardless of firm performance. 
Fourth, the credit system is soft. Credit at low interest rates, and in some cases at 
no interest at all is extended to enterprises in financial trouble. 
As Kornai (1980a) indicates, soft budget constraints are also the manifestation 
of a vigorous paternalism. In fact, the two concepts are in one sense intertwined and 
inseparable. One of the direct results of the softening of budget constraints is that 
the survival and growth of a firm are not associated with firm performance. Bail-outs 
in the form of free state grants (compensation for money-losing enterprises) directly 
contribute to the formation of paternalistic expectations in the minds of managers 
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(Kornai, 1980a). Once such phenomena are institutionalized, managers will become 
likely to expect a paternalistic support whenever financial trouble arise. Thus, a 
high degree of paternalism and soft budget constraints interact with and mutually 
reinforce each other, together perpetuating chronic shortage. 
Several phenomena need to be considered to ascertain the hardness or the soft­
ness of budget constraints faced by firm. The first phenomenon is the extent to which 
product price can be manipulated by the government in favor of or against firms. The 
second is the extent to which tax rules can be bent by the government to provide 
subsidies to firms. The third is the extent to which firm losses can be compensated for 
by the government and extent to which firms operating at permanant loss survive or 
grow. The fourth is the extent to which credit given firms is related to performance, 
or the extent to which credit at low interest rates or at no interest is given as a means 
of subsidy. The final phenomenon is the extent to which free grants are provided to 
firms as a means of subsidy. It is hypothesized that frequent manifestation of these 
phenomena indicates soft budget constraints and that absence of these phenomena 
indicates hard constraints. 
State-enterprise Relations as Reflected in Contracts 
Despite the importance of state-enterprise relations in the socialist economy 
of the PRC, how the state was related to enterprise during the period of reform 
has not been systematically studied. Part of the reason for this indifference is the 
difiSculty involved in assessing the data. During my field trip to China in 1988, I 
had access to 35 state-enterprise contracts (hereafter referred simply as contracts). 
These contracts not only revealed in detail the way in which enterprises were related 
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to the state, but also provided information on how the current contract responsibility 
system operated at the local level. Because of their importance, a general description 
of these contracts will be provided. Twenty-five of these contracts were collected in 
Fujian, a southeastern province that is neither innovative nor a laggardly in reform. 
For the sake of consistency, I will describe these Fujian contracts (see Appendix for 
names of contracting enterprises). 
A contract is an agreement between the state, represented by government agen­
cies, and a state enterprise. Government agencies most frequently represented are the 
local Finance Bureaus, superior bureaus originally in charge of the firm, and some­
times the local Systemic Reform Commissions (at the provincial level) or Systemic 
Reform Offices (at municipal or prefecture levels). The contract, as a new form of 
mutual obligations and rights, reveals the essence of the relation between the two 
parties involved. 
The contracts between enterprise and state generally consisted of eight compo­
nents. First, the form of contract responsibility system adopted was stated. The 
contracts I collected in Fujian Province ranged from examples of the loss-making 
contract responsibility system to the profit-increase contract system. Second, the 
duration of the contract was included. Among the 25 contracts reviewed, the longest 
duration was eight years and the shortest three. Average duration was four years. 
Three factors affected the duration of the contract: the industrial sector a firm be­
longed to, the type of contract system it had adopted, and the time at which the 
contract was signed. For example, most industrial mineral enterprises have con­
tracts of longer duration than those of other industries. Those who adopted the 
input-output contract system and the fixed subsidy contract system generally had 
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contracts of longer durations than those of other systems. And finally, those contracts 
signed before 1987 were of longer duration than those signed later. Whether these 
differences are due to production type or policy considerations is unclear. 
Third, the types of contracted responsibilities could be examined. Indicators 
of evaluation were generally specified, and the targets, both physical and monetary, 
were indicated. Generally, a table illustrating stated targets in numeric terms was 
attached. For example, those adopting the progressive profit contract responsibility 
system would state the amount of annual profit remittance to the state. In addition, 
the rate of annual increase, as well as the method by which increased profit was to 
be distributed between the state and the enterprise, was stated. 
The method of profit sharing, which specified the retention ratio or, for loss-
making firms, the amount needing to be subsidized, was the fourth component. Gen­
erally, contracts specified the ways in which realized profits were to be distributed 
between the two parties signing the contract or, for loss-making enterprises, the bur­
den shared between them. Distributive relations between state and enterprise ranged 
from enterprise subsidization of 600,000 yuan annually to 70 percent profit remission 
to the state. 
Fifth, the distribution ratio of the retained profit {sanjin bili), that is how the 
retained profit would be used and, in particular, how it would be distributed among 
production development, welfare, and bonus funds was specified. To check excessive 
and indiscriminant distribution of bonuses, the state stipulated a maximum limit 
of retained profits to be used as welfare and bonus funds. A variety of distributive 
methods were also used. These ranged from one whose production development funds 
equaled to 80 percent of retained profits to another whose funds equaled 40 percent. 
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Profits retained from contracted target amounts were generally distributed at a ratio 
of 70:30 between production development funds, and welfare and bonus funds. But for 
profits retained from overfulfilled portion, the ratio became 30:70 because enterprises 
were entitled to greater profit share if they could surpass their targets. 
Sixth, rewards and penalties for contractors were indicated; the maximum bonus 
and the maximun penalty incurred were stated in the contract. An upper limit was 
set so that the total income of a manager could not be greater than three times that 
of the average worker in the factory. That different systems of rewards were used 
was evident from these contracts. Some specified reward in terms of bonus, some 
in total salary, and still others in fixed salary. On average, if a firm fulfilled all the 
contracted tasks, its manager was entitled to a salary double that of the average 
worker. If it overfulfilled the contract by one percent the contracted profit amount, 
the manager would get a 0.6 percent raise. The vice-manager's salary was stipulated 
as 80 percent of the managers; this person was entitled to the same proportional 
rewards and subjected to penalties. 
Other obligations, which included the requirement of sticking with the four car­
dinal principles (Marxism-Leninism, people's democratic dictatorship; the socialist 
road; and Communist Party leadership), abiding by state regulations and laws, af­
firming the Marxist principle of "to each according to his works", implementing an 
internal responsibility system, upholding the quality of products, and maintaining 
safety standards, comprised the seventh component. 
Finally, contracts included provisions for termination and change. This eighth 
component took up the issues of breach of terms by either party and how contract 
content would be revised if changes in government rules and regulations, or irresistable 
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changes in the business environment affected contract fulfillment. 
Of these eight components, the form of contract responsibility system adopted 
was the most important because it not only dictated the distributive ratio of profits, 
but also influenced the duration of the contract, method of profit sharing, and the 
obligations of both parties. Eventually, this component became the focus of bargain­
ing between the state and its enterprises. In the contracts I collected, eight subtypes 
of the contract responsibility systems were used to define relation between enterprise 
and state: 
The input-output contract system (touru chanchu haogan) was applied to mineral 
producing firms. Under this type of contract, the provincial Finance Bureau agreed 
to provide certain investments as input while the firm was obliged to produce a 
specific output (physical or monetary). If the physical or monetary targets were 
reached, the firm would be entitled to retain a certain percentage of profit. Part 
of the contract overfulfilment could be used as welfare and bonus funds. Under the 
Loss-making contract systemfkueisuen haogan), a money-losing firm was subsidized 
by the provincial Finance Bureau to insure that workers would be entitled to welfare 
and bonuses no less than those working in profit-making firms and that the firm 
would have at its disposal enough money to survive and expand. In the progressive 
profit contract system (dizeng haogan)^ a firm would contract to increase its profit at a 
certain rate in exchange for retaining funds from additional work as welfare and bonus 
funds and as means of repaying bank loans. In the fixed profit remittance contract 
system (dinger shangjiao, chaoshuo quanliu, quebao huandai), a fixed amount of profit 
(often 55 percent) was required to be remitted to the state. The remaining profit was 
retained by the firm to repay bank loans and to cover welfare funds and bonuses. 
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The fixed subsidies contract system (dinger butie, chaokuei bubu, jiankuei quart-
liu, yingli bujiao) was a system under which firms were subsidized by the state at 
a fixed amount. After accepting the subsidies, firms would be fully responsible for 
operation. The most common type of contract adopted was the base-figure contract 
system, which entailed enterprise sharing of increased profit baogan, chaojishu 
fencheng, qianshu zibu). Eleven out of the 25 of Fujian contracts had adopted this 
system, which was designed for those with the potential to increase profits. Under 
it, a base-figure profit remittance was negotiated by government bureaus and the 
firm. Profit resulting from overfulfillment of the contract was shared at a rate agreed 
upon by the two parties. Although the two guarantees and one link system (liangbao 
yigua) has been promoted by the state, only two of the contracts from Fujian were of 
this type. This system was usually applied to factories that had both the potential 
to increase profit and had relatively stable supplies of material and markets. Two 
guanrantees refer to a guarantee of profit remittance and a guarantee of technological 
upgrading. The one link generally refers to the linking of the factory's total wage bill 
to its level of remitted profit and tax. Finally, the unified responsibility for profits 
and losses contract sysiem(tongfu yingkuei chengbao zhi) applied only to enterprises 
in the military industry. Under this system, the sector at the provincial as a whole 
level was to retain all remaining profits after 15 percent had been handed over to 
the Provincial Finance Bureau, because its supplies and investments came from the 
military budget. Nevertheless, various contract systems could be implemented inside 
the sector between firms and the Provincial Military Industry Office. 
96 
Persistence of Paternalism 
Paternalism and power dependency 
In discussing paternalism, I have indicated that the concept has two components. 
The first is government assistance to and protections of an enterprise. The second is 
enterprise relinquish independence. 
It has been hypothesized that the more a firm depends on the state for assis­
tance, the more power the state will have over the firm. To test this hypothesis, 
the 25 contracts were grouped into three categories according to the degree to which 
enterprises were assisted by the state: enterprises dependent upon conspicuous gov­
ernment subsidies (e.g., input-output contract system, loss-making contract system, 
fixed-subsidies contract system, and unified responsibility contract system); enter­
prises relying on hidden government subsidies such as budgetary refunds and credit 
favors (e.g., some enterprises practiced the fixed profit remittance system); and enter­
prises to which no government subsidies were provided (e.g., the two guarantees and 
one link system). Seven contracts were in the first category, which specified govern­
ment subsidies in terms of direct investment and loss compensation. Seven contracts 
were in the second category, which specified hidden subsidies by the government in 
the form of tax cuts, budgetary refunds, and repayment of bank loans before tax 
(see discussion in section IV of this chapter). The remaining eleven were in the third 
category and recieved no government subsidies (Table 4.1). 
The contracts revealed that four of the seven enterprises in the first category 
were required by the state to fulfill tasks in addition to that of profit target. For 
example, Luoyang Iron Mine was required to supply its products to a specific plants 
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Table 4.1: State assistance to and requirements of firms ® 
Conspicuous Hidden No 
subsidies subsidies subsidies 
No requirement 3 7 11 
Requirement specified 4 0 0 
Total 7 7 n 
"Source: Contracts from Fujian Province. 
(Sanmin Iron and Steel) in specified quantity and quality. In return, it received 
a 10 million yuan investment fund from the provincial Finance Bureau. Nanping 
Alumininum Products Factory was required to supply one third of its products to 
the provincial Department of Material Supply for a unified allocation. Another third 
of its products was required to be supplied to other state agencies that had invested 
in the enterprise. Only the remaining one third of its products was left the enterprise 
for sale within provincial markets. Sanming Iron and Steel was also required to 
supply its products to the provincial planning body at a price lower than that of 
market, and the remaining products could be sold only within the provincial market. 
In contrast, no requirements other than profit targets were made of firms in the other 
two categories (Table 4.1). 
Another phenomenon reflecting paternalism and power-dependency is the extent 
to which firm revenue is redistributed by the state. As Kornai (1986:91) stated, "one 
of the important indicators of the financial dependence of enterprises on the state is 
the magnitude of income redistribution among enterprises." It has been hypothesized 
that the greater the amount of firm revenue redistributed by the state, the greater 
the degrees of both dependence on the state and paternalism. 
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One government document illustrates In detail the redistribution process. In a 
report submitted by the Xiamen City Economic Commission to the Xiamen City 
Governement, a detailed description of redistribution of income of enterprises under 
the commission's jurisdiction was summarized. It was estimated that, during 1986, 
total realized profit had been 128.57 million yuan for these enterprises (Table 4.2). 
After paying taxes (including income tax and adjustment tax), bank loans, and an 
energy and transportation fund, however, only 22.44 million yuan, or 17.5 percent, 
of total realized profits could be retained by the enterprises. Moreover, these re­
tained profits had to be divided among three funds (welfare, bonus, and production 
development). After welfare and bonus funds had been set, only 39.6 percent of the 
retained profit was available for distribution as production development funds. But 
the enterprises were required to buy a fixed amount of government bonds using their 
production development fund. In short, only 1.88 million yuan, or 1.5 percent of the 
total realized profit, was left at the enterprises' disposal in the form of production 
development funds. 
Absence of link between performance and reward 
In the ideal market economy, there is a strong interdependence between effi­
cient performance and reward. Additionally, firm expenditures should be limited 
by sale earnings (Kornai, 1987). In the PRC's socialist economy, however, bud­
gets of firms may expand or contract quite independent of their firm performance. 
The link between the performance and reward has become attenuated as a result 
of the redistribution process. The contract responsibility system, as initially intro­
duced, was intended to ensure economic incentives at all levels, to improve efficiency. 
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Table 4.2: Income of the Xiamen City State Enterprises Redistributed by the State: 
1986* 
Items Amount Percentage Percentage 
(Total) (Retained) 
Total realized profit 128.57 100.0 
Income tax paid -39.00 30.3 
Adjustment tax paid -15.00 11.7 
Loans repaid -46.00 35.8 
Energy and Trans, fund - 6.13 4.8 
Profit retained =22.44 17.5 100.0 
1)Welfare fund -4.52 20.1 
2)Bonus fund -9.04 40.3 
(SEZ subsidies) (6.00) (26.7) 
3)Production fund =8.88 39.6 
(Government bond) (7.00) (31.2) 
"Source: Xiamen City Economic Commission; SEZ: Special Economic Zone; Unit: 
Million Yuan. 
Unfortunately, profit retained had little to do with original profit, for it was highly 
circumscribed by the state's redistributive measures and subject to a leveling of profit 
similar to what Kornai (1989) noted in Hunagry. 
This section will attempt to demonstrate certain phenomena. It has been hy­
pothesized that paternalism can be assessed by analysis of the link between perfor­
mance and reward. The stronger the association between the two, the lower the 
degree of paternalism. Data at the PRC's national level will be used. 
During recent years, four performance indicators have frequently been used by 
the state to assess overall performance of state enterprises: profit and tax generated 
by the enterprises relative to total funds used, including both net value of fixed 
assets and working capital (Indicator I), profit and tax generated relative to the gross 
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value of industrial output (Indicator II), the ratio between profit and tax versus the 
original value of fixed assests (Indicator III), and the decreasing rate of comparable 
costs (Indicator IV). Since 1985, the overall trend of the four indicators has been 
deteriorating, indicating a worsening of performance. 
For example, the profit and tax generated by total funds used (Indicator I) 
declined from 23.8 percent to 20.6 percent; this fact indicates that more inputs were 
needed to generate each unit of profit and tax. The profit and tax generated by the 
gross value of industrial output (GVIO, Indicator II) declined from 23.60 percent 
to 17.84 percent, indicating excessive inventory. Similarly, the ratio between a unit 
of profit and tax and a unit of fixed assets declined over the four years; this fact 
indicates that the state enterprises with a given amount of fixed assets could produce 
only a decreased amount of profits and taxes. The decreasing rate of comparable 
cost (Indicator IV) was defined by the PRC's State Statistical Bureau (1988a:419) as 
the "ratio of the cost for producing a unit of product in a given year relative to that 
of the preceding year." A positive sign indicated decreased costs and negative sign 
increased costs. From 1985 to 1987, the magnitude of the negative figure decreased 
marginally. The magnitude of negative figure increased from -7.04 to -15.59; this 
indicates that costs in 1988 increased relative to those of 1987. The deterioration of 
enterprise performance was also evidenced by the fact that losses incurred by money-
losing firms increased from 5.4 billion to 8.2 billion between 1986 and 1988 (Table 
4.3). Rather than being penalized, these money-losing firms were compensated by 
the state to allow them to survive. 
What was the trend of reward? Reward will be measured in terms of the total 
profit retained by the state-owned enterprises. Greater reward meant more profit 
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retained by enterprise whereas less reward meant less profit retained. If the profit 
retained by enterprise decreased as performance indicators declined, the relationship 
would be positive. If, on the other hand, profit retention increased with declining 
performance indicators, the relationship would be negative. Contrary to the trend 
of worsening performance, retained profits for the state industrial sector as a whole 
increased, from 23.3 billion yuan to in 1985 to 32.4 billion yuan in 1988 (Table 4.3). 
This negative relation between performance and reward can be observed. Clearly, 
data from the national level support the argument that reward is negatively associated 
with enterprise performance in the PRC's state industrial sector. 
Profit leveling: redistribution at the provincial level 
Can the argument that reward is negatively linked to performance in the PRC's 
state industrial enterprises be supported by data from the provincial level? Did 
state-owned enterprises at specific provinces deviate from the national data? In my 
field trip to Fujian Province in late 1988, the Balance Sheet of Fujian Provincial 
State-Owned Enterprises was obtained. This sheet classified state industrial enter­
prises into four categories: profitable enterprises (yiangli qiye), marginally profitable 
enterprises (weili qiye), small-sized profitable enterprises (xiaoxing yianli qiye), and 
money-losing enterprises (kueiaun qiye). Because incomplete data are reported for the 
third category (small-sized profitable enterprises), only the others will be compared. 
Profitable enterprises retained only 24.06 percent of profits realized, but marginally 
profitable enterprises retained about 51.62 percent of profits realized (Table 4.4). The 
total actual profit generated by loss-making enterprises was only 84,110 thousand 
yuan. The negative contracted profits-remittance figure shows that these enterprises 
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Table 4.3: Comparison of Economic Performance and Profit Retention for State In­
dustrial Enterprises: 1985-1988° 
Items 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Indicator I^ 23.80 20.70 20.30 20.60 
Indicator 11^^ 23.60 22.34 18,93 17.84 
Indicator III^ 22.40 19.90 19.30 20.20 
Indicator IV^ -7.70 -7.34 -7.04 -15.59 
Total losses/ N.A 5.40 6.10 8.20 
Retained Profit^ 23.30 22.80 26.50 32.40 
^Source: State Statistical Bureau, 1986a; 1987a;1988a;1989a. 
^Ratio between profit and tax versus gross output, in percentage. 
^Ratio between profit and tax versus original value of fixed assets, in percentage. 
^Ratio between profit and tax versus the original value of fixed assets, in 
percentage. 
^The decreasing rate of comparable cost. 
^In billion yuan. 
^In billion yuan. 
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Table 4.4: Comparisons among Profitable, Marginally Profitable, and Loss-making 
State Enterprises in Fujian Province: 1987^ 
Items Profitable 
enterprises 
Marginally 
profitable 
enterprises 
Loss-
making 
enterprises 
Total realized profits (1) 6,699.00 379.81 84.11 
Contracted profit remittance (2) 2,254.05 44.20 -107.55 
Overfulfilled profit (3) 274.28 115.74 189.38 
(3)/(l) 4.09% 30.47% 225.16% 
Overfulfilled part remitted(4) 65.10 9.21 5.91 
Total retained profits (5) 1,612.06 190.06 183.47 
(5)/(l) 24.06% 51.62% 218.13% 
Number of firms 271 150 76 
Average wage per worker (6)^ 1,455 1,198 1,468 
^Source: Fujian Province Finance Bureau; Unit: million yuan 
^Unit: yuan. 
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were compensated by the provincial government in the amount of 107,550 thousand 
yuan. Furthermore, when they overfulfilled the contracted amount (189,380 thou­
sand yuan), they were entitled to retain 96.8 percent of this amount. The net result 
was that they retained more than twice their actual realized profits. 
The average wage for profitable enterprises was 1,455 yuan per worker, which 
was higher than that for only marginally profitable enterprises. But the average 
wage in money-losing companies was highest (1,468 yuan per worker), fact indicating 
disassociation of individual reward with overall performance. 
Kornai (1987, 1989) observed that in Hungarian enterprises, the most profitable 
firms would not receive greater profit share than the less profitable ones: "profits 
distributed to employees are almost independent of the 'true', 'original' profitabil­
ity of the enterprises" (Kornai, 1989:91). The general tendencies seen in Table 4.4 
echo Kornai's observation: profit sharing between state and enterprise which has, 
through state redistribution, become a regular component of wages, is not associated 
with performance. The classical relationship between performance and reward in the 
market economy has been altered in this instance. 
Profit leveling inside enterprise 
The absence of a link between reward and performance is not limited to bureau­
cratic redistributive practices. It is also a common phenomenon in the basic economic 
units. In one of the cases I studied, profit leveling was also used as a redistributive 
measure of enterprise financial practice. The Fujian Provincial Auto-parts Company 
{fujiansheng qiche peijian gongsi), a state-owned enterprise at the provincial level, 
had nine subcompanies at each prefactural or municipal level, with headquaters at 
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Table 4.5: Profit Leveling inside a Fujian Provincial Autoparts Company, as Re­
flected in Contract: 1988^ 
Subcompany Base Figure Income Tax Adjustment Retained % 
Profit Tax Profit 
Headquarter 407.0 224.0 53.0 130.0 31.9 
Putian 90.0 50.0 15.0 25.0 27.8 
Quanzhou 189.0 104.0 36.0 49.0 25.9 
Xiamen 124.0 68.0 15.0 41.0 33.1 
Zhangzhou 109.0 60.0 20.0 29.0 26.6 
Sanming 160.0 88.0 26.0 46.0 28.8 
Longyan 359.0 197.0 72.0 90.0 25.1 
Nanping 383.0 211.0 77.0 95.0 24.8 
Ningde 64.0 35.0 7.0 22.0 34.4 
Total 1,885.0 1,037.0 321.0 527.0 27.9 
®Source: Contract No.19 see Appendix. Unit: 1,000 Yuan. 
Fuzhou, the capital city of Fujian. 
Between 1988 and 1990, a so-called internal unified redistribution system was 
used to adjust the portion of profit retained by each subcompany. In the three 
years, profits made by each subcompany ranged from 407,000 yuan to 64,000 yuan 
(Table 4.5). Each subcompany was required to deliver 55 percent of its realized 
profit to the state as income tax. But after this tax was paid, subcompanies were 
required by the general company to pay an adjustment tax at a rate between 11 and 
20 percent. After the adjustment tax was paid, the subcompany realized the least 
profit (Ningde) retained the highest percentage (34.4%) of these profits, whereas 
the subcompanies ranking second (Nanping) and third (Longyen) in terms of initial 
profit realized retained the lowest percentages (24.8% and 25.1%), respectively. The 
internal redistribution system resulted in an inverse relation between reward and 
performance. 
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Soft Budget Constraints in Action 
Case studies will be used to discuss phenomenon of soft budget constraints and to 
test whether Kornai's concept can be applied in the PRC setting. The documentary 
data that I collected during my field trip will be discussed in relation to Kornai's 
theory. 
Price manipulation as a means of subsidization 
In a shortage economy, Kornai (1980) argued, the administratively determined 
price structure can be bent to provide financially-troubled enterprises with hidden 
subsidies, because the state-imposed prices are disassociated with supply and demand 
and do not reflect scarcity of resources. As described by Kornai (1980b), a firm facing 
financial pressure can react in two different ways. It can adapt to this difficulty by 
adjusting its production, marketing, and financial strategies. But this way of reacting 
involves taking risks and may or may not be successful; even if it succeeds, it has 
involved certain sacrifices. An alternative for enterprises in socialist economies is 
to ask higher authorities for help in the form of price adjustments, tax cuts, credit 
increases, and so on. Because this involves less risk, enterprises are more apt to resort 
to it. An example from Xiamen city in PRC illustrates this phenomenon. 
When the contract responsibility system was implemented in 1987 in Xiamen, 
Fujian Province, complaints and grievences were filed by factory managers. Although 
government officials tried to convince managers to sign the contract, no single man­
ager was willing to do so; they asked the city government to resolve certain so-called 
external problems. The most frequently mentioned issues were that they faced an in­
sufficient and irregular supply of water and electricity and that they faced increases in 
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the price of their inputs, particularly of raw materials. The factory managers insisted 
that one of two measures had to be adopted before they would sign the contracts: 
profit remittance figure had to be lowered or factories had to be allowed to raise 
prices. 
The solution proposed by the Municipal Economic Committee was to ask the 
Municipal Price Committee to allow the factories flexibility in increasing the prices 
of their products, as long as prices remained within the state-set price limits. So for 
those whose earnings from increased prices still could not offset the increased price 
of inputs, the municipal government would change the profit retention base-figure 
(Xiamen City Economic Committee, 1987). 
Other methods were also used by enterprises or government agencies to manip­
ulate prices. For example, enterprises whose products were awarded such titles as 
"brand name" or "superior quality" by the state could raise their price by 5-15 per­
cent; enterprises often bargain very hard to get such titles in order to reap profits. 
In some instances, bribes were used. On the other hand, bureaucrats often took 
advantage of this mechanism to give hidden subsidies to enterprises (Micro-Research 
Department, Economic System Reform Research Institute, 1986:47). 
A Soft Tax system 
Tax exemption and reduction can be extended to enterprise at the will of bu­
reaucrats. Disguised subsidies can be provided enterprises by various means created 
by state bureaus. In the PRC as in Hungary (Kornai, 1989), both conspicuous and 
hidden subsidization were practiced by the state. 
As stated in the The Trial Measures for the Second Stage of the Tax-for-Profit 
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Program by the Ministry of Finance (1983b), enterprises were to pay 55 percent of 
total realized profits as income tax. Exceptions to the rule were allowed, however, for 
enterprises operating at a loss and for those repaying loans to banks. Loss-making 
enterprises were divided into two types (money-losing due to either government pol­
icy or mismanagement) and, in theory, different measures of subsidization were to be 
applied. But in fact, distinctions were often difficult to make, and subsidies were pro­
vided without inspection. For enterprises repaying loans to banks, before-tax profits 
were allowed for this purpose. Even though it was stated that only the profits gener­
ated from bank loans could be used in repayment, again in practice, little distinction 
could be made between profits generated from different sources. In the contracts 
collected, no stipulations were included regarding this matter. 
One of the practices of soft budget constraints is the so-called budgetary refund 
(caizheng fanhuan). Through this practice, a firm is required to pay taxes according 
to the tax law formulated by the state. After its tax payment, however, part or all of 
the payment can be reimbursed by the state finance bureau to help the firm pay bank 
loans (Contract No. 17), add to production development funds (Contract No. 18), or 
distribute bonus or welfare funds (Contract No.19). 
For example, the Jianyang Automobile Repair Factory had a loan of 550,000 yuan 
from a bank during 1988. Its tax payment and profit remittance to the state Financial 
Bureau equalled 440,000 yuan. After payment, according to the contract between the 
factory and the Finance Bureau, the latter had to return 330,000 yuan. Thus, by 
combining its refund with the 220,000 yuan in production development funds, the 
factory could pay back all its bank loans (Contract No.16). Another example was the 
contract signed between the Fujian Auto-transportation Company and the Finance 
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Bureau. The company was allowed to use 60 percent of its realized profits to pay 
back bank loans before taxes were assessed. In addition, after paying 26.9 percent of 
its total realized profits as taxes (including the income tax and the adjustment tax), 
75 percent of this amount was returned to the company as a budgetary refund. In 
fact, the company paid only 6.7 percent of total profits in taxes (Contract No. 1.3). 
State subsidies to loss-making enterprises 
As Perkins (1988) pointed out, the existence of loss-making enterprises propped 
up by subsidies is symptomatic of what Kornai calls soft budget constraints. In 
the PRC's socialist economy, money-losing firms, even if they lose money for years, 
are generally compensated for by the state through various means. In 1989, state 
subsidies to money-losing companies amounted to 59.98 billion yuan, which accounted 
for as much as 20 percent of total state budgetary spending (Wang, 1990). Most firms 
operating at a loss still distributed profit sharing money among their employees. In 
the contracts I collected, there are a number of cases which reveal such practices. 
Pucheng Bronze and Copper Mine was a loss-making enterprise. In a contract 
signed between the Finance Bureau and the mine, the mine was permitted to lose 
400,000 yuan between 1988 and 1991. It was also agreed that the mine would receive 
the same amount as subsidy. The contract specified that 34,000 yuan could be used 
as bonuses so that each worker would received 200 yuan per year in bonuses (Contract 
No. 5). Another example was Fujian Provincial Ship-building Corporation, which 
was contracted to lose 600,000 yuan during 1988-1990. With a subsidy matching its 
loss, the contract specified that 45 percent of the company's retained profit should 
be distributed as bonuses and 15 percent as welfare funds (Contract No. 18). 
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Money lost by mismanagement can also be compensated for by the state. For 
example, during 1985-1986, the Fujian Computer Corporation imported some low-
quality products, which resulted in a loss of 4.31 million yuan. A final contract was 
signed between the Financial Bureau and the computer company allowing the latter 
to use its realized profit to compensate the loss. After this compensation was made, 
taxes were calculated on the remaining profit (Contract No.4). 
Another example was the Provincial Agricultural Machinery Company. The con­
tract between the company and the Finance Bureau stated that instead of reducing 
bonuses and welfare funds, the company was allowed to use production development 
funds to compensate for losses due to poor quality and wasted products (Contract 
No. 12). 
During 1987, 76 out of 1,056 medium- and large-scale state enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of Fujian Province were permanent money-losing enterprises losing 12.33 
million yuan per year (Fujian Provincial Finance Bureau, 1988). For these enterprises, 
a loss contract system was designed whereby the state would subsidize annually 
a certain amount of money guaranteeing their survival. Aforementioned Pucheng 
Bronze and Copper Mine and the Fujian Provincial Ship-Building Corporation are 
examples. The latter had to rely on these subsidies to upgrade equipments and 
technologies. In the contract, the provincial Finance Bureau agreed to subsidize 
the company by providing 600,000 yuan per year for its investment in technological 
upgrading (Contract No. 18). This form of free grant is a common subsidy designed 
to assist troubled industries. 
I l l  
A Soft Credit system 
One symptom of the soft-budget constraints described by Kornai is the credit 
system. "The bank sector," said Kornai (1989:43), "acts as a credit-rationing admin-
strative authority and not as a genuine bank following commercial principle. Granting 
and denying credit is almost uncorrelated with the past or present profitability and 
credit worthiness of the firm. To some extent, the opposite relationship is true. The 
credit system is used frequently to bail out firms failing on the market." The same 
phenomenon described by Kornai (1989) was found in the PRC. In their detailed 
study of relations between banks and enterprises, Bowles and White (1989) found 
that the reformed bank system, after being empowered to supervise, restrict credit, 
audit, and penalize poorly performing enterprises, had not become more discrimi-
nanting in its granting of loans. On the contrary, it had become to a great extent 
softer than before. 
The softening of bank constraints on state enterprises was also evidenced by the 
surprisingly high percentage of insolvency in the state-owned Construction Banks in 
18 cities investigated by the 1985 CESRRI survey (see Chen, Wang, and Colleagues, 
1988: Table 5). Based on their investigation, these researchers argued that the 
bank system, once the hardest constraint on state enterprises, showed a tendency to 
soften. As the World Economic Herald (1988) reported, the state-controlled banks 
often allowed enterprises to use state funds irresponsibly, and it was estimated that 
over half of these loans might not be paid back. An even more striking case was 
reported by Bowles and White (1989). According to their findings, between 1980 
and 1986, 70 billion yuan had been issued as state allocation credit, of which only 
3.2 billion (4.6 percent) had been repaid. This had occurred because the loans had 
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not been involved any legally binding terms. 
The softening of the credit system was evidenced by the contracts examined in 
this study. For example, out of 25 contracts, 10 explicitly specified the firm obligation 
to repay bank loans. Some contracts even provided exact amount the contractors had 
to pay each year. Why the Finance Bureau was so concerned with loan repayment 
was at first perplexing issue because the bureau's major responsibility is to collect 
profits and taxes. One bureau official explained, however, that because enterprises' 
failing to repay or deferring their repayment had been such widespread phenomenon, 
the banks had had to ask the bureau for help. 
Kornai (1987;1989) has discussed classical examples of both manipulation of tax 
rules and price structures that are, in effect, hidden subsidies to state enterprise in 
Hungary. Similar practices can also be observed in reformed state enterprises in the 
PRC. One of the most striking cases is the manipulation of pre-tax payment of bank 
loans. During my interviews in 1988, pre-tax and post-tax payment was frequently 
debated by tax collectors and factory managers. According to state tax law, each 
enterprise is required to pay 55 percent of its profit as income tax to the state. This 
rule, however, is often subject to manipulations. The Finance Bureau often allowed 
certain enterprises to pay their bank loans before taxation, therefore, taxes, assessed 
only on the remaining profits, are reduced. 
Table 4.6 illustrates pre-tax manipulations. During 1988-1990, the Fujian Auto-
transportion Company was expected to generate a profit of 50 million yuan. The 
contract specified that 60 percent of profit could be used to repay bank loans and 
only 40 percent assessed for taxes. Fifty-fivr percent of the remaining part would be 
paid as income tax (22 percent of the total profit) and 12.3 percent as adjustment 
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Table 4.6: Profit Sharing between the Fujian Auto-transportation Company and the 
Provincial Finance Bureau® 
Items 1988 1989 1990 Total 
(%)  ( % )  (%)  (%)  
Realized profit 20.00 15.00 15.00 50.00 
Percentage (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) 
Pre-tax 
Repayment of loan 10.00 10.00 10.00 30.00 
Percentage ( 50.00) ( 66.67) ( 66.67) ( 60.00) 
Profit 
Subject to tax 10.00 5.00 5.00 20.00 
Percentage ( 50.00) ( 33.00) ( 33.33) ( 40.00) 
Income tax 5.50 2.75 2.75 11.00 
Percentage ( 27.50) ( 18.33) ( 18.33) ( 22.00) 
Adjustment tax 12.26 6.13 6.13 2.45 
Percentage ( 2.45) ( 4.09) ( 4.09) ( 4.90) 
Budgetary refund 5.04 2.52 2.52 10.09 
Percentage ( 25.22) ( 16.82) ( 16.82) ( 20.18) 
®Source: Contract No. 13, P.2; Unit: million yuan. 
tax (4.9 percent of the total). By this pre-tax manipulation, the company could pay 
26.9 percent of its total profit as tax, whereas, as stated earlier, the standardized 
tax rule was 55 percent. In addition, it would receive a budgetary refund from the 
Finance Bureau that equaled to 75 percent of its paid taxes (Table 4.6). 
One important rationale underlying the tax payment practice was that the pre­
tax measure was essentially a remedy for heavy taxation. Yet, the pre-tax remedy was 
far from satisfactory. In reality, it became a measure for administrative bureaucrats 
to deprive enterprises of their autonomy inasmuch as enterprise needs the approval 
of higher authorites to secure both bank loan and pre-tax payment loans as favors. 
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In return, the enterprise is obliged to accept an unprofitable production plan created 
by administrative bodies. 
Discussion: Unbroken Ties between State and Enterprise 
This chapter has examined the main features of the dual dependence mode of 
governance discussed by Kornai {1980a;1987), a mode characterized by persistent 
paternalism and soft budget constraints. The concept of paternalism is further elab­
orated and the sociological importance of the power-dependency relation discussed. 
Hypotheses about paternalism are developed and partially tested against empirical 
data. First, the hypothesized power-dependency component of paternalism is sup­
ported by the positive association between the degree of assistance provided by the 
state to enterprise and the degree of power wielded by the state in controlling enter­
prise activities. Second, power dependence in state-enterprise relations is illustrated 
by examining the extent to which enterprise revenue is redistributed by the state. 
The example used tends to support Kornai's observation that a large portion of the 
enterprise revenue was still redistributed by the state. Third, the hypothesis regard­
ing the absence of link between performance and reward is partially tested against 
data from the national, provincial, and enterprise levels. It was found that there 
is in fact a negative relationship between enterprise performance and reward. The 
findings also tend to support Kornai's (1980a) argument that a firm's expansion and 
survival under dual dependence are not associated with market performance. 
Kornai's concept of soft budget constraints is also discussed and further elabo­
rated in the context of the PRC's reforms. It was found that the major dimensions of 
this concept can be found in state-enterprise relations in the PRC. Price manipula-
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tions, tax cuts, a soft credit system, and subsidies, all of which bolstered loss-making 
enterprises, were discussed on the basis of the PRC data. 
Some observations can be made based on these findings. One of the major 
purposes of industrial reform in the PRC has been to free enterprise from bureaucratic 
ties and to increase enterprise autonomy. After ten years of reform, however, there 
is as yet little evidence to suggest that its purposes have been realized. Instead 
of a significant improvement in these respects, state enterprises in the PRC remain 
highly dependent on the state, and enterprise loss and poor performance are still 
widespread. A high degree of paternalism continues to be a characteristic of state-
enterprise relations. 
This continued dependence of enterprise on the state is evidenced by the contin­
ued direct control of the state over wage rates, workforce size, managerial appoint­
ments, investment finance, and key material inputs and working capital allocation 
(Perkins, 1988). Even in areas where formal autonomy has been granted enterprise 
(e.g. retained portion of profit), enterprise continued to depend upon the state for 
directions and the state redistribution remained prominent. 
Although Kornai's concepts were developed from his observation of the Hungar­
ian economy, they apply to the PRC as well. In the state industrial sector of the PRC, 
the state indulgence towards enterprises in financial troubles went even beyond what 
Kornai (1980a) had observed in Hungary. Through succession of profit-retention 
schemes, tax rates, prices, and profit retention rates remained highly negotiable. The 
leniency with which enterprises were treated escalated. Through contract bargaining, 
bureaucrats manipulated tax rules, price structures, credit and loans practices, and 
even free state grants to provide subsidies to enterprise. 
116 
There was no genuine competitive pressure, no nsk of bankrupcy, and, there­
fore, no real incentive for enterprises to improve performance. As long as they were 
successful in bargaining with bureaucrats, enterprises could easily survive and even 
expand. Instead of striving to become independent, enterprises found it rather com­
fortable to behave exclusively in accord with their prescribed roles—to implement 
policy and to adhere to script written for them by bureaucrats. After ten years of 
reform, even enterprises with a degree of autonomy remained highly dependent on 
the state. Paternalism and soft budget constraints remained the main features of the 
system. 
Given the evidence of the widespread state redistribution of enterprise income 
and the implied high degree of dependence of enterprises on the state, questions arise 
as to why the characteristics of the shortage economy described by Kornai (1980) 
remain entrenched in this system after ten years of reform. The answer is that 
reforms have been incomplete. Because little effort has been made either to touch 
the root cause of paternalism, which lies in state ownership, or to reform the state-
imposed price system, enterprises remain insulated from market forces and face no 
genuine competition. 
Budget constraints on state enterprises remain soft rather than hard. State 
enterprises are still able to rely on the state for subsidies, free grants, credits, and tax 
cuts to survive and expand. Under such conditions, there is no pressure for them to 
improve efficiency. In contrast, there is ample incentive for them to continue in their 
dependence upon the state. The direct result, as Kornai (1980b) recorded it, is that 
enterprises initially granted autonomy by the reform voluntarily surrendered their 
newly acquired rights and subjected themselves to the state patronage. By requesting 
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tax cuts, free grants, bank credits, or other speciess of financial aid, enterprises 
actually reaffirm the paternalistic relationship and their dependence on state (Kornai, 
1980b). 
The unbroken ties between state and enterprise and the persistent phenomenon 
of soft budget constraints observed in this chapter confirm the dual dependence ar­
gument made by Kornai (1987). Continued poor performance by enterprise con­
firms the observation made by Baum (1989: 115) that "China's partially-reformed, 
partially-restructured economy at present is neither effectively plan-driven nor essen­
tially market-driven; indeed, it is something of a hybrid mutant that has tended to 
capture-and accentuate-some of the worst features and distortions of both systems." 
In his review of economic reforms in the PRC, Perkins (1988) points out three 
keys to assessing socialist industrial reform: whether loss-making firms will be allowed 
to go bankrupt; whether bank credit and state grants are available to financially 
troubled enterprises; and who hires, fires, and promotes enterprise managers. Judged 
against these standards, the PRC's state enterprises still have a long way to go in 
reforming their troubled structures. Without both complete and thorough change and 
decisive reform in the ownership structure, which is the root cause of paternalism, it is 
difficult to see how budget constraints could be hardened. It is also difficult to see how 
significant reform in state-enterprise relations could be effective without concomitant 
systemic reform in price structures and other macro-economic mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 5. INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS: THE STATE-IMPOSED 
PRICE SYSTEM 
Overview 
One of the least reformed areas in the PRC is the industrial price system. In 
this area, state control has remained prominent, and most industrial product prices 
are still set by state pricing bureaucrats, who pay little regard to market conditions 
(Perkins, 1988). This chapter will examine the administrative pricing system and 
its institutional effect on the behavior of micro-economic organizations. First, I will 
briefly review the theoretical debates encountered during reform, a debates which 
centered on the relative importance of micro- or macro-structural reforms. Second, 
I will propose, based upon these theoretical debates, a two-level statistical model 
to be used in ascertaining institutional effects. I will use data from PRC state-
owned large- and medium-sized enterprises to test the effect of state-imposed price 
distortions. Based on the statistical analysis, I will discuss the adverse ramifications 
of the adminstrative pricing system and will argue that coordinated reform is needed 
to implement further reform. Third, I will attempt to tie my disscussion to the general 
consideration of industrial reform and to argue that micro- and macro-reforms are, 
in reality, interrelated and inseparable. 
119 
The Micro-Macro Reform Debate 
Since the introduction of reform, PRC reform theorists have been concerned 
with micro- and macro-priorities in the implementation of institutional reforms of 
the state industrial sector. Industrial reform during the past decade has beencharac-
terized mainly by reorganization of a Soviet-type centralized planning system through 
simple decentralization of decision-making power to basic economic units. These ef­
forts to enlarge autonomy at the level of economic units has generally been viewed 
by Chinese theorists as a micro-reform because it is aimed at enhancing the responsi­
bility of micro-economic units for their profits and losses, improving micro-incentives 
through restoring bonus sytems, shifting power to the hands of enterprise directors, 
and eliciting accountability from micro-economic organizations. 
This micro-approach to PRC institutional reform has provoked reactions from 
researchers both inside and outside of China. Although researchers agreed on the 
neccesity of the measures, they have disagreed on the importance of this approach. On 
one side of the debate, reform at the micro-level has been praised as highly successful 
in its dismantling of the Soviet-type centralized planning system and in bringing 
about industrial growth (Hua et of, 1988; Zheng, 1987; Chen, Wang, and Colleagues, 
1988). The same strategy, however, has been viewed by others as piecemeal, partail, 
and unsuccessful (Johnson, 1988; Wu, 1988). These differing assessments have led the 
PRC reform theorists to split into two major groups. Some give priority to enterprise 
autonomy; others stress reform of pricing system. 
According to one group, reform at the micro-level bore fruitful results in that it 
reorganized the highly centralized planning system, expanded enterprise autonomy, 
and streamlined the internal organization of enterprises. This micro-reform, they 
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argued, has introduced competitive mechanisms into enterprises and the contract 
responsibility systems have resulted in the formation of a market system both between 
and inside enterprises (Micro-Research Department, 1988; Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 
1988). 
Even though they agreed that there have been some inadequacies inherent in 
the simple decentralization of power and recognized the need for macro-level reform, 
they argued that further reform should be pursued along micro lines through further 
strengthening the power of the enterprise managers and clarifying the distributive 
relation between the state and micro-economic units. The micro-oriented reform 
theorists argued that "restructuring micro-economic organization through reforming 
property right relationship is the central task of economic system reform" (Hua, He, 
Zhang, and Luo,1986:12). Therefore, the contract responsibility systems and those 
accompanying shareholder systems, system of leasing, and more radically, the reform 
of the system of ownership were considered desirable by this group in solving the 
problems of paternalism and the soft-budget constraint symdrome in the state-owned 
enterprises (Hua, Zhang, and Luo, 1988; Li, 1988). 
The group associated with macro-orientation was examplified by the viewed held 
by Mr. Wu Jinglian affiliated with the State Council Economic Research Center and 
some other PRC economists. According to the group with a macro orientation, the 
micro-reform centered around the simple delegation of power to micro-level managers 
has generally been a failure. Although they agreed on the essential role played by the 
decentralization, the macro-oriented reform theorists argued that the microreform 
failed because it was not complete (Wu, 1987; 1988). For these theorists, a complete 
or coordinated package of reforms at the macrolevel, particularly the reform of the 
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pricing system would be needed in addition to the decentralization of power to level of 
the enterprises. Although this group argued for a synchronized reform at both levels, 
because macro-reform (such as reform in finance, banking, and the pricing system) 
has lagged behined the micro ones, what is necessary and essential, according to 
them, is a reform at the macro-level. 
The importance of the macro approach has been stressed by most western ob­
servers. Johnson (1988) expressed his pessimistic view that micro-reforms "have rep­
resented desirable adjustment within the framework of the existing system"( 1988:322.5). 
He (1988:5241) admitted that he was "relatively pessimistic about the effectiveness 
of reforms that rely on shifting decision making and financial responsibility to the 
enterprise level until there is a fundamental reform of the price system." The delega­
tion of power to the micro level has also been criticized for not being implemented 
simultaneously with macro-level price reforms. Tidrick (1986:204-205), in his article 
on the PRC's economic planning, argued that "giving enterprises the right to de­
termine what products they produce will be beneficial only if it is coordinated with 
price reform" and "these changes must go hand-in-hand with rationalization of prices 
to ensure that they reflect social cost and benefits." 
It should be noted that both groups agreed upon the neccessity of reform; and 
both recognized the importance of reforming the price system and expanding enter­
prise autonomy. The difference between them lies in the relative importance they 
attributed to, and the relative priority they attached to, the two levels. The differ­
ences between the two approachs also stems from the basic assessment of the previous 
reforms and the fundamental defects attributed to the Soviet-type economic system. 
For the micro oriented theorists, the fundamental defect in the existing system is to 
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be found in the micro level: lack of autonomy of enterprise managers and lack of in­
centives to both managers and workers caused by the rigid wage systems. Compared 
with macro-reform, the micro-oriented theorists believed that little reform had been 
directed to the enterprises that were the micro cells of the economy. But for the 
macro-oriented group, the fundamental defect of the old structure is to be found at 
the macro level; the misallocation of resources due to mistaken signals from distorted 
price systems imposed administratively by the state. According to this group, it was 
the price reform, not other problems, that was seriously lagging behind reforms in 
other spheres of the economy. 
Contentions between these assessments have led to different arguments for futher 
reforms. The suggestion forwarded by the micro-oriented theorists was that micro 
reform centered on clarifying the vague boundary of property rights (Li, 1988), be­
cause they (Micro Research Department, 1988:42) believed that "the difficulty for 
further reform lies in eliminating micro-causes for the instability of the macroecon-
omy. Therefore, the reform of the micro-operational mechanism is crucial to deepen­
ing the reform of the whole economic process Without deepening the micro-level 
reform and strengthening the responsibility of enterprise managers, "its [the state's] 
control of the wage fund has resulted in declining productivity;...and its price reform 
has almost become a synonym for price hikes or increasing subsidies," and "the mi-
croeconomic organizations are unable or unwilling to adjust their modes of activities 
following changes in the macro-environment"(Micro Research Department, 1988:44-
45). The micro-oriented reform theorists believed that, even if there is a market-
determined price, enterprises cannot reap the benefits unless they have meaningful 
discretionary authority in their operations and enterprises may not be responsive to 
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price signals if they don't have any incentive to do so. The logical extension of the 
argument, of course, is that futher reform should be focused on clarifying property 
rights at the microfoundation of macroeconomy (Hua, He, Luo, and Zhang, 1986). 
Generally speaking, the revival of the contract responsibility system after 1986 has 
reflected this line of reasoning. 
The failure of individual organization to alter their behavior after the simplifying 
administration and expanding enterprise autonomy was taken by the macro-oriented 
reform theorists as evidence for the priority of macroreform. Many problems that 
arose in the economic structure, they argued, were related to the fact that the on­
going reforms were piecemeal and fragmented (Wu, 1988). Wu (1988) argued that 
"the only remedy would be to adopt a comprehensive set of reforms in a coordinated 
manner." Because the most acute gap between micro and macro reform lies in the 
lag related to the necessary price reform (Wu, 1988), such reform should come at the 
top of the agenda (Yenal, 1990). 
Because the macro-oriented reform theorists believed that both the ability of the 
central planners to allocate budgetary resources to meet national growth objectives 
and of enterprise managers to organize production to meet micro efficiency objec­
tive, depend on the transmission and receipt of clear and correct signals for resource 
utilization, without market-determined prices, efficient allocation of resources, eco­
nomic calculations and judgments of success or failure of micro-economic units would 
be impossible (Wu, 1988). Profit retention cannot possibly be linked with enterprise 
performance until meaningful criteria for judging performance are developed. But 
performance, in turn, is highly dependent on a rational price system that reflects 
consumers' demands for scarce resources. Meaningful discretionary power of enter-
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prise managers, they argued, has to be based on meaningful criteria for assessing real 
efficiency, which has to be embedded in and determined by a market-furnished price 
structure. Thus, the most urgent task is to reform the state-imposed administrative 
pricing system (Wu, 1988). 
Two-Level Analysis of Institutional Effects 
The clearest contrast between these two alternative perspectives can be found in 
micro-macro debate in almost every area of the social sciences. Researchers have long 
been aware of issues in choosing the unit of analysis and problems of linking analysis 
on data collected at one level to another. However, the technique known as multi­
level analysis (Bock, 1989; Goldstine, 1987) or contextual analysis (Boyd and Iversen, 
1979; Blalock and Wilken, 1979; Blalock, 1984; Mason, Wong, and Entwisle, 1984) 
developed during recent years, provides a promising tool to disentangle multilevel 
effects and to study macro effect on micro variables. 
Basically, a multilevel analysis is developed out of the need to deal with data 
that are available at two or more levels of observation, particularly on individuals 
and groups to which they belong (for example, students and classes or schools; and 
residents and their communities). This technique represents an effort to explain 
lower level dependent variables using a combination of lower-level and higher-level 
independent variables. In its simpliest form, the behavior or characteristic of the 
ith individual in the jth group is explained by a combination of the individual-level 
independent variable Xj^j and the group mean Xj (Blalock, 1984). 
A two-level effect model is appropriate in dealing with the micro-macro issue; 
it will be used to illustrate the macro institutional effect on performances of micro 
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organizations. Specifically, it will be used to study the effect of the state-imposed 
price system on the performance of the state-owned large- and medium-sized indus­
trial enterprises in the PRC. This study argues that in the PRC's partially reformed 
industrial sector, an individual organization's performance is dependent on the insti­
tutional price arrangement; this price arrangement has serious ramifications for the 
future resource allocation in the PRC's economy. 
The two-level effect model 
The starting point of a two-level effect model is individual organizations. In the 
basic model, it is hypothesized that the the PRC's state enterprises' production is 
determined by the level of their capital and their labor inputs, that is: 
Qij = (5-1) 
This function specifies that an organization's production Q is a function of two vari­
ables: capital K and labor L. In theory, this function in equation 5.1 can be written 
in the following logarithmic form: 
= °^ij + + 0iLn{L.ij) + Uij (5,2) 
where represent the ni enterprises in each jindustry, j=l....A^y, representing 
= Nj industries. In equation (5.2), Qjj is the quantity of gross value of 
products, K^j is fixed assets at original value, L^j is the number of workers, and Uij 
represents a stochastic disturbance term. 
The model proposed thus far is similar to neoclassic formulation in that its unit 
of analysis is individual organization (in this case the state enterprises). The major 
concern in this section, however, is with the determinants of production beyond 
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conventional labor and capital assumed by neoclassic economics. What is of interest 
is whether the term of intercept aij is determined by some other variables. This 
concern requires that the model be extended beyond this single-level model to take 
into account other variables. 
One additional variable is the extent to which differentials in the average wage 
among these factories influences performance, given that one of the important as­
pects of the industrial reform has been to relate work incentive to work performance. 
Another variable is the extent to which the enterprise performance is dependent upon 
the state-imposed price structure; that is, how will an institutional arrangement affect 
an individual business performance? 
"ij = "Oij + ^ iuLn{Wij) -f l3pLn(Pij) + Vij (.5.3) 
Equation (5.3) specifies that the term of intercept aij depends upon the micro incen­
tives measured by the average wage per worker, Wij of zth enterprise in jth industry 
and the relative prices for each industrial products Pjj. Substituting equation (5.3) 
into equation (5.2), gives: 
LnQij = aQij -t- l3j^Ln{Kij) -f l3iLn{Lij) + /3wLn(Wij) + l3pLn(Pij) + e (5.4) 
where Kj^j is a quantity of capital used by ith enterprise in jth industry; L^j is a 
quantity of labor employed by zth enterprise in jth industry; Wij is average wage 
per worker for ith enterprise in ji'th industry; and Pij is the relative prices for each 
enterprise's products; and e = {Uij + Vij)-
In estimating this model, two issues need to be discussed before any analysis 
can be applied. The first involves the measurement of the relative price structure. 
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Because no systematic data have been released on relative prices for different indus­
trial products, the correct proxy variable seems unaccessible. In addition, even for 
single industrial products, there exists a number of different prices after the intro­
duction of a dual price system (Byrd, 1989); the real percentage of a products in each 
price category is unknown. This adds more complxity to using price in predicting 
performance. 
Nevertheless, an alternative exists. Since it is well known that the PRC's indus­
trial enterprises are less diversified and that in general are specialized along product 
lines (Tidrick and Chen, 1987), and that the price system is also arranged along indus­
trial lines, the overall profitabilities generally reflect the price arrangement (Walder, 
1987). Therefore, the sample enterprises can be grouped roughly according to their 
belonging to each of the industries; the average industrial profitabilities Pj becomes 
an approximation of the price structure. By using average industrial profitability, 
therefore, the model to be estimated gives: 
Ln{Qij) -  a^ij i3i^Ln(Kij) + i3iLn(Lij) l3wLn{Wij) + l3pLn[Pj) + e (5.5) 
where is the fixed assets for ith enterprise in jth industry, L^j is the total number 
of employee of %th enterprise in jth industry, Wij is average wage per worker for zth 
enterprise in j'th industry, and Pj is the average profitability for j industry, and 
e = {Uj^j 4- Vjj). The null hypotheses are that the coefficients (3nj and /3p are not 
significantly different from zero. The null hypotheses will be rejected if they are 
significantly different from zero. 
However, if an industrial average profitability Pj is used in place of Pij of relative 
price, a second issue emerges because Pj is a variable at the industry level. The 
analysis thus far has only dealt with variables at the individual organizational level, 
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such as gross value of products of each factory, number of workers in each one, 
fixed assets of each factory, and average wage per worker in a factory. The average 
profitability used in this model, however, is a variable at the industry level; therefore, 
the model being estimated is essentially a multi-level model with variables at both 
the enterprise level and the industry level. Thus this model involves two levels of 
analysis, which would generally be estimated separately by conventional methods. 
And now, the possibility of violating of homosticesticity assumption in the use of the 
ordinary least square estimation should be discussed. 
First, it is well known that the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation is based 
on a homoscedasticity assumption; that is, the variance of error term should be 
relatively constant across all the cases. This classical assumption, however, is likely 
to be violated because the error variance in this two level analysis is likely to be 
proportional to the variance of the industry in which these enterprises are grouped. 
That is, the error magnitude is likely to have a systematic relation to the level of 
one of the independent variables-industrial profitability. The issue can be illustrated 
algebraically (for discussion, see Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1983:167-172). For 
ordinary least square, the least square criterion in a two-variable equation takes the 
form 
n 
^ij = - "Oii - 1^1 Pij(5.6) 
i=l 
However, if Pj is used instead of Pjj, the model includes variables at two levels and 
it is likely for variance of error term to be proportional to Pj which is a variable 
at industry level around which the enterprises are grouped. That is: 
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Thus, instead of a homoscedastic cr?., the error variance is liicely to vary with the 
independent variable at the higher level (in this case the industries). In violating the 
homoscedasticity assumption, according to Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1983), 
the ordinary least square estimates will no longer be the minimum variance unbiased 
estimators, though they are still unbiased. 
One of the remedies is to use weighted least square (WLS) estimates instead of 
conventional ordinary least square estimators. According to Neter, Wasserman, and 
Kutner (1983), the weighted least square, in a simple two-variable equation, takes 
the form: 
n  
^ AQij - ocQij - (5.8) 
i=l 
where the weights w = of which the cr^- are the error variances likely to vary with (T. . V 
V 
the level of the industry variable. Because erf - = kP^ and because the proportionality i j  J  
constant k can be dropped from the normal equation, the weights can be used: 
ly = -i (5.9) 
n 
SPSSx version 3 has a procedure to perform such a weighted least square regression 
by simply specifying the variable containing the weight. After specifying the average 
industry profitability as the variable containing the weight, a weighted least square 
model can be estimated. If the weighted least square is significantly different from the 
results of the ordinary least square, it implies that there might be possible violation 
of homoscedasticity assumption. In such cases, the weighted least square estimates 
should be used instead of that of the ordinary least square. 
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Data and estimation methods 
The data used to estimate equation (5.5) are 1986 financial statistics for 622 
state-owned large-and medium-sized industrial enterprises reported by the State Sta­
tistical Bureau (1988a:400-415) in the PRC's Statistical Yearbook for 1988. The data 
reported for the enterprises are mainly financial: gross value of industrial products, 
net value of industrial products, total number of employees, total wage bill, total 
sales revenue, total amount of tax and profit, total circulation funds; and total fixed 
assets at original value. This is the first time such systematic data on individual state 
enterprises have been included in the PRC's yearbook. 
This dataset, however, can only provide us with information on these 622 state 
enterprises at the individual organizational level. In order to get information at the 
industry level, other data have to be used. Fortunately, almost all of these enterprises 
were named after their localities and products (e.g., Shanghai Leather Shoes Factory, 
Beijiing No.2 Woolen Product Factory, and Jiangxi No.l Suger Factory). These 
conventions allowed grouping these enterprises into different industries according to 
the conventional division of industrial sectors in the PRC and to use the data on 
average profitability of each industry during 1986 reported by the State Statistical 
Bureau (1987a) in the 1987 yearbook. Data regarding those factories whose categories 
of products were not clear were treated as missing data, the remaining 584 factories 
were classified into 23 industries (Table 5.1). 
Despite the fact that the data was reported by the PRC's official statistical 
bureau, the issue of representativeness was still a major concern. First, these data 
were reported for only part of all large- and medium-sized enterprises following a 
stratified sampling procedure. Industrial factories were selected according to the 
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total number of industrial establishments in each province; within each province, one 
or several representative factories in each of the industries were selected. For those 
provinces or municipalities with larger numbers of industrial plants (e.g., Shanghai 
and Beijing), more factories were selected than those with small numbers of industrial 
establishments (e.g., Tibet did not have a single factory included in this sample). 
Table .5.2 includes information on some characteristics of the sample enterprises. 
They are compared with those of the large- and medium-sized, and all state industrial 
enterprises. First, enterprises included in the sample were more productive than the 
average of entire population of state enterprises as well as the average of large- and 
medium-scale ones. Productivity was measured by using the ratio between the gross 
value of industrial products and the total number of employees in a firm. Second, the 
size of enterprises, measured by average number of employees, included in the sample 
were larger than the average of all state enterprise but smaller than that of large-
and medium-sized ones. But the size measured by fixed assets and gross value of 
industrial products (GVIO) of the sample enterprises tended to be larger than both 
other groups. This indicates that the sample enterprises are more capital intensive 
than the average of both other two groups. Third, average ratio of profit and tax 
generated by total sales, by gross value of industrial products, and by fixed assets, 
for sample enterprise were generally higher than the average of all state enterprises 
and that of large- and medium size ones, except for ratio between profit and tax 
versus total sales, because no information was available for the group of large- and 
medium-sized enterprises. These indicated they were more profitable and had more 
capacity to generate taxes. Fourth, the ratio of gross value of industrial products to 
total fixed assets in sample enterprise was higher than that of the large-medium-size 
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enterprises but lower than the average of all state enterprises. Finally, the average 
wage per worker in sample enterprises tended to be higher than both the average of 
large- and medium-sized and all state enterprises. 
A possible reason for this sample bias might be the sample procedure used by this 
data collection. The level of industrialization tended to be higher in provinces and 
municipalities with larger number of industrial establishments; they also enjoyed the 
advantages of industrial connections and better transportation and communications. 
More weight given to them might be one of the reasons for this sample bias. Table 
5.3 shows the distribution of enterprises sampled across different localities and their 
relative degree of industrialization (measured by ratio of industrial ouput relative 
to that of agriculture, the State Statistical Bureau, 1987a). It indicates that, more 
enterprises have been selected from provinces and municipalities with higher degrees 
of industrialization. 
Second, because this sampling procedure were attempted to comprehensively 
cover industries within each localities, it tended to choose at least one factory from 
each industry regardless of whether or not the industry has been an appropriate 
one to be sampled in some of the localities. For example, except for the Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region and three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin), all the 
provinces have at least one mineral industrial establishment included in the sam­
ple regardless of whether the mineral industry has been appropriate to the random 
procedure or not. 
The single-level model was first estimated to see how the gross value of industrial 
products has been determined by capital and labor. The result of this equation 
illustrates that the gross value of products of these state-owned large- and medium-
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sized enterprises depends on fixed assets and the total number of its workforce (Table 
5.4, model 1). This equation, however, only reconfirms the neoclassic argument of 
the input-output relation in which a firm's gross value of products is determined by 
the capital and labor. 
In the second model, another variable was introduced into the equation to test 
whether the variation in average yearly wage per worker among the state-owned 
industrial enterprises contribute significantly to the variation in production. The co­
efficients indicate that the differential in average wage among enterprises contributes 
significantly to the levels of production. The coefficient of {j3xu = 0.4599) and stan­
dardized coefficient (B=0.1276) are statistically significant at 0.01 level (Table 5.4, 
Model 2). This result indicates that the reformed incentive structure began to play 
its role in contributing to the level of production. If we look at the relative increment 
of variance explained by adding this variable into the equation, however, the role 
of the incentive structure played in level of production is limited. The B? of the 
second model is 0.5295; ther is only .0152 increment in additional variance explained 
by including the wage variable, indicating the limited role played by the differential 
in average wage across these enterprises. 
The third model is the two-level effect model that examines the extent to which 
the enterprise performance is dependent on industry profitability that reflects the 
price structure. The result shows that there is indeed a significant contribution of the 
variable to the gross value of products. The coefficient (3p 0.6946, or the standardized 
coefficient Bp 0.4223, are significnat at 0.01 level (Table 5.4, Model 3). The results 
indicate that Byj and Bp are significantly different from zero. The null hypotheses 
are therefore rejected. 
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The results of the weighted least square are reported in Table 5.4, Model 4. 
to compare with Model 3. Because no significant differences are found between 
the coefficients of the two models, the ordinary least square estimates can also be 
accepted. This allows me to compare the R^s to see whether there is a significant 
increment in variance explained by Model 3 compared with Model 2. The for 
this equation is .7376 (Table 5.4, Model 3). There is a 0.2081 increment in additional 
variance explained by introduction of the industry profitability variable, indicating 
the important role played by this industry-level variable in predicting the level of 
performance of individual enterprises. 
Discussion 
This statistical analysis demonstrates that the performance of an enterprise is 
dependent not only on its level of capital and labor, but also on individual incentives 
measured by average wage per worker and the industry's profitability reflecting the 
state-price arrangement. It supports the hypothesis that institutional price system 
imposed by the state at the macro level exerts a significant impact on industrial 
performance of enterprises at the micro level. Therefore, an argument that can be 
derived from this analysis is that an enterprise in an industry with a higher level 
of profitability is more efficient than a factory in an industry with lower level of 
profitability. Because an industry's profit level is largely a reflection of the state-
imposed price system, it can be argued that enterprises in industries favored by the 
price system had better performance than enterprises in industries disfavored by the 
state-imposed prices. This study also supports the argument that enterprises with 
higher levels of average wage performed relatively better than those with lower level 
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of average wage. 
This statistical analysis has some important implications. First, it illustrates the 
importance of the state-imposed price structure in determining economic activities 
of micro organizations. It implies that an enterprise's membership in an industry 
favored by the high price set by the administration, or its status in the industrial 
system, is important . An enterprise happening to be in a specific industry favored by 
price structure will find it easier to make profit than one disfavored by price structure 
imposed by the state. 
Second, it implies that it is difficult to judge an enterprise's performance because 
profit does not necessarily reflect the real efficiency but is more likely to reflect price 
arrangement. Because an enterprise's performance is highly dependent on the state-
imposed macro-price system, there is little hope forjudging real performance with any 
meaningful criteria in the absence of a price reform. Consequently, because irrational 
pricing precludes using profitability as a reliable basis for evaluating managerial and 
productive efficiency, there is no meaningful penalty and reward that can be applied 
to the micro-economic units. Budget constraints on them have to remain soft and the 
state has to continue to rely on redistributive methods in dealing with state-owned 
enterprises. 
Third, this statistical analysis not only illustrates the statistical dependence of 
the micro-enterprise performance on the macro-price structure, but more importantly, 
it also highlights the nature of what Walder ( 1987:38) called "fatal interconnectedness 
of all aspects of industrial reform." The continued unsatisfactory performance of state 
industrial enterprises is a direct result of the persistent problem of soft-budget con­
straints rooted in the paternalistic characteristic of the state-enterprise relation. This 
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continued soft-budget constraint is, in turn, highly interrelated with the distortion of 
the price structure. 
Fourth, the analysis of the effect of state-imposed price structure on micro-
economic organizational performance also highlights another important aspect of the 
state-enterprise relation. The price system is arranged by the state so that profit at­
tained by an enterprise is more likely to be the result of bureaucratic influence than 
that of a genuine operating efficiency. Therefore, micro-organizations have no alter­
native but to behave according to this arrangement. Just as Chinese economists have 
argued, it is not the behavior of enterprises that is irrational, it is the irrational struc­
ture of institutional arrangement that makes enterprises behave accordingly (Wu, 
1988). 
Finally, this analysis demonstrates the systemic weakness of the PRC's industrial 
economic institutions. It shows that persistent problems in a soft-budget constraint 
mode cannot be solved by simple decentralization of power to the micro economic 
organizations without changes in the macro fiscal and price structures. Likewise, 
the simple revision of the macro price structure would not do any good if micro 
organization is not responsive to the signals, as the micro-oriented reform theorists 
have argued. Reforms in one area are dependent on reforms in other areas. The 
profit contract or profit retention program, for example, cannot possibly resolve the 
problems of soft-budget constraints until useful indicators of economic efficiency are 
developed. But the latter is highly dependent on the development of a rational price 
system. Without reforming the irrational price structure, simple profit retention can 
only encourage more distortion in economic investment and exacerbate the structural 
imbalance of an already unbalanced economy. 
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Table 5.1; Distribution of Sample Enterprises Across Industries 
Industries number percentage 
Coal Mining and Preparation 19 3.25 
Crude Petroleum Extraction 14 2.39 
Lumber material Praperation 8 1.32 
Water Supply 12 2.05 
Food Processing 35 5.98 
Beverages 10 1.61 
Tobacco Manufacturing 26 4.44 
Printing and Paper Products 26 4.44 
Textile Products 64 10.94 
Lumber and Wood Products 6 1.03 
Pharmaceutical 12 2.05 
Petroleum Processing 19 3.25 
Chemicals 48 8.21 
Chemical Fibre 14 2.39 
Rubber Goods 22 3.76 
Plastic Products 9 1.54 
Construction Materials 26 4.44 
Ferrous Metal Processing 39 6.66 
Nonferrous Metal Processing 8 1.37 
Fabricated Metal Products 22 3.76 
Machine Building 45 7.69 
Transportation equipments 36 6.15 
Electrical and Electronics 67 11.45 
Total 584 100.00 
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Table 5.2: Comparison Between Sample, Average Large- and Medium-Sized, and 
All State Industrial Enterprises 
Sample Large- and All state 
enterprises Medium-size enterprises 
Average wage 1,647.6 1,291.0 1,388.0 
Labor 
Productivity 28,155.5 18,026.0 15,451.0 
Number of 
employees 10,244 25,866 561 
Fixed assets 29,586.8 5,485.8 956.6 
Gross Value 
of products 28,353.2 4,662.6 879.5 
Profit and Tax-
sales ratio 28.28 9.79 
Profit and tax-
output ratio 27.19 26.82 19.28 
Output-
asset ratio 92.62 84.99 109.00 
Profit and Tax-
asset ratio 25.18 22.79 21.02 
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Table 5.3; Distribution of Sample Enterprises and Degree of Industrialization Across 
Provinces 
Locality number percentage degree of 
sampled in the total industrialization 
Bejing 30 4.82 7.63 
Tianjin 26 4.18 7.48 
Hebei 23 3.70 5.80 
Shanxi 14 2.25 5.88 
Neimongol 10 1.61 4.47 
Liaoning 46 7.40 7.19 
Jilin 21 3.38 6.08 
Heilongjian 25 4.02 6.22 
Shanghai 50 8.04 8.17 
Jiangsu 27 4.34 6.68 
Zhejiang 15 2.41 6.33 
Anhui 17 2.73 4.80 
Fujian 15 2.41 5.01 
Jiangxi 14 2.25 4.99 
Shandong 25 4.02 5.50 
Henan 20 3.22 4.92 
Hubei 20 3.22 5.79 
Hunan 20 3.22 4.96 
Guangdong 29 4.66 4.93 
Guangxi 17 2.73 4.42 
Sichuan 39 6.27 5.08 
Guizhou 18 2.89 4.59 
Yunnan 19 3.05 4.59 
Shaanxi 26 4.18 5.60 
Gansu 21 3.38 5.43 
Qinghai 10 1.61 4.12 
Ningxia 9 1.45 4.72 
Xinjiang 16 2.57 4.63 
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Table 5.4: Models Estimated and OLS/WLS Comparison'^ 
Model 1 
(OLS) 
Model 2 
(OLS) 
Modle 3 
(OLS) 
Model 4 
(WLS) 
Ln(ijj) .3690** 
(.3918) 
.4158** 
(.4415) 
.5773** 
(.5721) 
.5645** 
(.5449) 
l n { K i j )  .2721** 
(.3550) 
.2246** 
(.2930) 
.1973** 
(.2452) 
.2038** 
(.2566) 
.4599** 
(.1276) 
.5924** 
(.1644) 
.5975** 
(.1610) 
Ln(fj) .6946** 
(.4223) 
.6881** 
(.4680) 
a 3.9696 4.8625 1.8563 1.9066 
R? .5143 .5295 .7376 .7532 
®**:siginificant at .01 level; Standardized coefficients in parentheses 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter will first summarize the theoretical findings and highlight some 
observations from this study. Then it will be followed by the discussion of sociological 
reflections of this study, and it will conclude with the discussion of limitations of the 
study and suggestions for future studies. 
Theoretical and Empirical Findings 
Industrial reform of the PRC is a process of institutional change by which rules 
and procedures are modified. By focusing on the state-enterprise relation, this study 
views the reform process as a state effort to withdraw from economy by relinquishing 
certain autonomy to economic enterprises and allowing market mechanisms to play 
a limited role in coordinating economic activities. Based on documentary data, this 
study examines in detail how rules and principles were changed under the reform 
efforts of the state in the PRC, particularly the rules and procedures governing the 
state-enterprise relations. 
The third chapter examines the changes that have taken place in the institutional 
arrangement since reform was first instituted in 1978. The PRC's industrial reform 
has been implemented through three stages with different instruments. The first 
stage simplified administration and decentralized certain decision making power to 
142 
enterprise. This stage has been characterized by an increased expansion of enterprise 
autonomy and by introduction of a certain market sort of mechanisms into state-
enterprise relations. The second stage has been a tax-for-profit reform aiming at 
formalizing the state-enterprise relation through standardardized taxation. And the 
third stage has been represented by an introduction of contract responsibility system 
that was expected to replace the bureaucratic command relation between the state 
and enterprises with a market contractual relation. Although the three stages of 
industrial reform represents a continual effort to change the state-enterprise relations, 
each stage has had its difficulties and limitations. 
Ten years of reform in the PRC has brought about some changes in its state-
enterprise relations, particularly in such areas as profit sharing, managerial autonomy 
in decision making, and limited market competition. Nevertheless, little change has 
taken place in such areas as labor allocation, wage determination, manager appoint­
ment, and more importantly, the ownership systems. It is true that reform in the 
PRC has taken the form of state withdrawal, but it has been partial and limited. 
Although enterprises has been granted certain autonomy enabling them to claim a 
residual profit, but this autonomy has been highly circumscribed by continued arbi­
trary state intervention. 
Although each of the three stages of reform represents significant effort of the 
state in its own right and has been based on novel ideas, all has had some serious 
unintended consequences. These unintended consequences have forced the state ei­
ther to reformulate its strategies or to resort previous methods. The unintended 
consequences of each stage of reform and continued poor performances of state en­
terprise has resulted from the interconnectedness of the systems on the one hand 
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and reluctance of the state to implement a synchronized reform on the other. The 
intrinsic nature of functionally interconnectedness of systems demands reform to be 
implemented in a coordinated manner. Thus, the reluctance of the state to alter 
fundamentally the pattern of the state-enterprise relation resulted in a process in 
which acceleration and deceleration, reform and reversal, progress and entrenchment 
alternated to form a pattern of the reform. This pattern testifies to the sociological 
assertion that society is a functionally interrelated organism that it is difficult to 
reform one aspect without effecting concomitant change in the others. 
The reluctance of the state in the PRC to engage in a coordinated reform and 
to fundamentally alter the hierarchical mode of governance have also resulted in 
a emergence of mode of dual dependence. It has been the repeated intention of 
the reformers in the PRC to harden ftnancial constraints on state enterprises. The 
study suggests that little evidence indicates a movement toward this direction. Even 
though by modifying the existing rule of principles, the reform in the PRC has made 
it possible to rationalize the bureaucratic mode to some extent, strong bureaucratic 
control has remained intact. Under reform, market mechanisms have undeniably 
been allowed to play a more significant role in regulating economic actions. But 
the amount of discernible change could have been easily exaggerated. Enterprises, 
particularly the medium- and large-scale ones, continued to be insulated from the 
forces of market competition. Market mechanisms, even though existed to some 
degree, have still been overshadowed by state control and bureaucratic scrutiny. The 
objective of greater reliance on market has not been realized and it has been negated 
by the lax of financial disciplines and paternalistic state assistances. The findings of 
this study support Johnson (1988s) and Wong's (1986) assessments that the PRC's 
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industrial reform has seriously been stymied and that in general, it has failed. 
The ten-year reform efforts have been remarkable in themselves, but the results 
has been disappointing. The gap between vision and realityhas been particularly 
manifest when looking at the persistent paternalism and continued soft budget con­
straints characterizing state-enterprise relations. Because enterprises have remained 
largely unaffected by market forces, they have not been subjected to real budgetary 
constraints. Failure to address the issues of paternalism and soft budget constraints 
is one of the major reasons for continued organizational failure in the PRC's economy. 
The partial reform and the resulting coexistence of changes and continuities 
have given rise to an instituional pattern distinct from both market and hierarchical 
modes of governance. By using Kornai's (1987) dual dependence mode in analyzing 
this emerging institutional pattern, hypotheses about persistent paternalism of con­
tinued soft budget constraints were partially tested. Similar to what happened in 
Hungary, paternalism and soft budget constraints have remained prominent features 
characterizing state-enterprise relations in the PRC. The findings of this study sup­
port Kornai's (1987) argument that partial reforms in socialist societies give rise to a 
dual dependence mode of governance in which firms vertically depend on bureaucratic 
state apparatus and horizontally depend on market. It is argued that a sociological 
meaning of power dependency dimension should be attached to Kornai's concept of 
paternalism that the power of the state to direct a firm's behavior is positively related 
to state assistance to the firm. 
One of the least reformed areas is the state-imposed price system. Scholars are 
divided on the relative importance of reform on macro price structure versus reform 
of micro organizations. A multilevel effects model was developed to test the effects 
145 
of state-imposed institutional prices on the performance of individual enterprises. It 
was hypothesized that there was a macro-level effect on enterprise performance in 
addition to micro-level effects. This hypothesis was supported by data from state-
owned medium- and large-sized enterprises in the PRC. Based on this finding, it 
is argued that both micro- and macro-arguments have strengths and weaknesses. 
Institutional reforms are highly interrelated; reform in one area cannot be successful 
unless coordinateded with reforms in other areas. Therefore, a synchronized reforms 
in both ownership and pricing systems is suggested. Since reform in one area is 
highly dependent on, and interrelated to, reform in other areas in a systemic way, 
the conclusion reached is that, without a decisive move in this direction, it is difficult 
for the PRC to escape from the dilemma of dual dependence. 
Sociological Reflections 
What can sociology contribute to an understanding of economic action? How can 
an economic reform in socialist country supply information to the study of sociology? 
From the seminal work of Weber (1978) to such recent work of Granovetter (1985), 
Perrow (1981;1986), and Zald (1987), sociologists have long been concerned with the 
issue of interplay of economy, state, and society. Granovetter ( 1985) demonstrated the 
importance of social structure in determining economic actions. Perrow (1981;1986), 
in his study of transition of organization, demonstrated the efficacy of authority 
perspective in explaining corporitism and organizational transition. 
By emphasizing change and continuity in rules and procedures governing state-
enterprise relation, this study demonstrates how non-economic factors such as insti­
tution can facilitate or impede changes in economic behavior of organization. By 
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focusing on state-enterprise relation, this study suggests that authority relation that 
exist between state and economic organization is one of the most important factor in 
shaping economic activities of organization. In studying economic action, neoclassical 
economists often underestimated the importance of institution. The current study, 
however, indicates that understanding of organization is not limited to such economic 
concepts as economy of scale, profit motivation, and barrier to entry. Instead, soci­
ological concepts of organization such as long-term relational pattern, institutional 
structure, and authority relations can play significant role in the understanding of 
economic action. 
First, by employing an institutional perspective, this study illustrated the ar­
gument that institutional arrangement has a profound influence on the economic 
behavior of organization. Changes, or a lack of change, in an institutional pat­
tern can facilitate or impede transition in micro-economic organization, because it is 
the institutional arrangements that determines the structure of incentives, therefore 
shaping the forms and behaviors of economic organizations. The example of how 
a persistence of certain features in an institutionalized state-enterprise relation has 
impeded changes in the behavioral pattern of the economic organizations in the PRC 
testifies to this assertion. 
Second, understanding of the systemic nature of a social structure can contribute 
to the study of the economic reform in socialist societies. As demonstrated by this 
study, change in one area is highly dependent on changes in other areas. The intercon-
nectedness of institutional arrangements has, in fact, made it difficult for the reform 
in the PRC to succeed, because it is impossible for one to reform one area without 
effecting reform in others. The highly interrelated nature of decentralization and 
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reform in macro-economic regulations demonstrates the importance of sociological 
interpretation. 
Third, economists often ignore the power dimension of economic behavior based 
on an assumption of utility maximization. The current study, however, illustrates 
how power exists in a contractual relations. As Weber (1978) argued, command and 
obedience, as well as confirmity and control, exist in every sphere of human interac­
tion. Economic activities are no exception. Failure to address the issue of power in 
the study of state-enterprise relation would impede or mislead precise interpretations. 
Fourth, the concept of state has long been neglected not only by economists but 
also by organizational theorists. The sociological and political importance of state 
were demonstrated. Not only did the state play an important role in the political 
sphere, but it also had a decisive role in shaping economic activities of organizations. 
The state constitutes one of the most significant elements of the social environment 
of economic organization. Failure to recognize the role of the state by economists and 
organizational theorists may significantly reduce the validity of a study, particularly 
when applied to socialist countries. In contrast to neoclassical economists who take 
the institutional environment as given, sociology, with its strength in studying social 
relations and institutions, can contribute significantly to the examination of economic 
actions. 
Because this research is still at its beginning and the reform process in the PRC is 
still unfolding, it would be premature to give a precise prediction of the future of the 
reform. The future of the reform is still contingent on the interplay of various social, 
political, and economic factors. However, one argument seems to hold firm, given 
the analyses thus far, that is, without a decisive shift from hierarchy to a structure 
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of market governance, and without coordinated, synchronized, and complete reform 
in those interrelated areas of China's industrial economic system, there can be no 
escape from the dilemma of dual dependence. 
Research Limitations and Future Directions 
The research objectives of this study are to examine the process of industrial 
reform in the PRC, to make an objective assessment on this reform, to apply an 
institutional perspective in the study of this reform, to incorporate concept of state 
into the institutional perspective, and to test Kornai's theory of dual dependence 
against the PRC's reform experiences. However, both empirical and theoretical lim­
itations prevent detailed explanations of the massive state-initiated reform. It is 
neccesary to point out some of the limitations of this study, both methodologically 
and theoretically. 
Methodologically, students of the PRC have long been aware of the difficulties 
involved in access to empirical data and research field in the PRC. Social scientists 
who studied the PRC have relied heavily on secondary data. Though this study 
attempted to overcome data limitations by using diverse sources of information and 
to combine them in a coherent manner, some clear inadequacies still remain. 
Systematic data collection turned out to be a major problem in studying the 
PRC's state industrial enteprises. Because of both time and resource limits, the data 
used in this study tend to be fragmented and the sources of information tend to be 
unsystematic. For example, few of the state-enterprise contracts collected contained 
adequate information to allow further analysis. Few of them reported background 
information on the enterprises involved in the contracts, such as total number of 
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workers, total amount of fixed assets, amount of inventory, and even their previous 
records of performance. These inadequacies indicate lower level of formalization of 
the contract system and add the difficulties to interpretation. 
The procedure for grouping enterprises into industries was performed by identify­
ing each enterprises by its name and products. Some enterprises may have diversified 
their product lines across more than one industry, therefore, the grouping procedure 
is likely to produce inaccuracy. Because the enterprises included in the data analysis 
were not randomly sampled and tend to be more productive, technologically more 
advanced, and more from highly industrialized areas, biases could have been intro­
duced. Due to all these limitations, caution should be made when generalizing to a 
larger population. 
In addition to the data limitations, the lack of a systematic theoretical frame­
work in studying socialist societies continues to be a major problem that impedes 
interpretation. Though an attempt to overcome this difficulty uses an institutional 
perspective to study socialist economy and combines strength of Kornai's economics 
of shortage with a sociological interpretation, theoretical limitations remain. 
First, for example, for simplicity in this analysis, it was assumed that a state is 
a coherent entity that is represented by various state agencies at national, provincial, 
and county levels. However, this assumption neglects the fact that there exists great 
difFrences between various levels of government, their interests are often not identical, 
and sometimes even in conflict, as many scholars have discovered recently (Wong, 
1988; Naughton, 1985; Shirk, 1989). Local governments might sometimes line up 
with with the enterprises under their jurisdiction to confront the central government, 
and sometimes they were the real extension of the central government in controlling 
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micro-economic organizations. Therefore, for future studies, a distinction should be 
made among the different levels of the state apparatus and their political interplay 
should be studied. It is believed that by doing so the role of state may be more 
fruitfully analyzed. 
Second, it was also assumed in this study that there is a generalized applicability 
of the interpretations to different localities in the PRC's socialist economy. However, 
the interpretations made and conclusions reached may not necessarily be generalizable 
because of diverse local conditions and complex situations in various settings. Further 
investigation should be conducted to unravel diverse patterns across the different 
localities. 
Third, no distinction has been made between the levels of subordination of an 
enterprise due to the data limitations. However, there have been suggestions that 
the subordinating levels of an organizations (i.e., city, province, central ministries) 
might be one of the important variables in determining the survival and growth of 
an organization in the PRC. 
Fourth, the description of the evolution of the reform relied heavily on gov­
ernment documents as the data base. However, the actual implementation in local 
settings may deviate from the central state policies. This deviation was not likely 
to be revealed from study of central government documents. Although I attempted 
to check this validity by referring to other information such as questionnaires and 
personal interviews with industrial managers, more effort should be made in future 
studies to examine these diversities. In addition, most analysis of the state-enterprise 
relation was analyzed in terms of the state's domination over individual organiza­
tions. But my interviews with enterprise managers indicated that this relation shoud 
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be better understood as a two-way interaction. There has been a number of cases in 
which counter-tactics were used by enterprise managers in this relation, particularly 
in bargaining over the profit-retention ratio with the state agencies. Further studies 
will be needed to explore the contribution of the organizational inertia at the firm 
level to the perpetuation of soft-budget constraints. 
Fifth, politics are accepted as a given. But other studies have suggested that 
political interests have played important roles in the strategic considerations (Shirk, 
1989; Bachman, 1987; Naughton, 1985). For example, the advocacy of piecemeal and 
incremental reforms may be the only strategy that is politically feasible. Mounting 
political pressure from the public for fear of inflation resulted from price reform might 
be the most important consideration for micro-oriented reform theorists to avoid 
advocating price reform because it is politically safer than a synchronized reform. 
Though in theory, allowing prices to adjust themselves according to market con­
ditions would solve the problems in many areas, political reality and administrative 
complexity only allowed reformers to sidestep such reform. In addition, reforms gen­
erally involve a redistribution of power, status, and privilege that will benefit some 
to the detriment of others. Viewing it from this angle, a reform is an political process 
in which different interest groups play in a political arena. For these reasons, fur­
ther reform might be highly dependent upon political process underlying the PRC's 
economic reform. 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF NAMES OF CONTRACTING ENTERPRISES 
1. Fujian Provincial Autoparts Corporation. 
2. Fujian Provincial Mechnic Supply Company. 
3. Provincial Electronics Equipment Corporation. 
4. Fujian Provincial Computer Corporation. 
5. Pucheng Bronze and Copper Mine. 
6. Fujian Provincial Manganese Mineral Corporation. 
7. Xiamen Wolfram Products Factory. 
8. Sanming Iron and Steel. 
9. Luoyang Iron Mine. 
10. Nanping Aluminum Products Factory. 
11. Fujian Provincial Coal Ming and Preparation Corporation. 
12. Fujian Provincial Agricultural Machinery Company. 
13. Provincial Auto-Transportation Company. 
14. Gingzhou Paper Products Factory. 
15. Fujian Provincial Petro chemicals Supply Company. 
16. Jianyang Auto-Repair Factory. 
17. Fuzhou Auto-Repair Factory. 
18. Fujian Provincial Ship-Building Corporation. 
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19. Mindong Electrical Machinery Corporation. 
20. Fujian Provincial Ocean Products Corporation. 
21. Fujian Provincial Packing and Printing Corporation. 
22. Provincial Fuzhou Warehouse. 
23. Fujian Provincial Metallurgical Industrial Corporation. 
24. Fujian Provincial Military Industry. 
25. Fujian Provincial Electrical Industrial Equipment Corporation. 
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